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Abstract
A  critique  of  texts  on  human  security  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign
Affairs of Japan between 1998-2008 and made publicly available through the
Internet  is  undertaken.  Analytical  and  problematisation  strategies  focus  on
textual  representation  of  discursive  objects  categorised  broadly  according  to
four  poles:  1)  the  meaning  and  concept  of  human  security,  2)  reason  and
justification  for  the  pursuit  of  human  security,  3)  events  and  phenomena
posited as being in an antagonistic relationship with the condition of human
security, and 4) relations between agents undertaking human security praxis.
Critical and problematising strategies which had not yet been applied to Japan's
human  security  discourse  were  applied  to  texts  with  a  focus  on  comparing
discursive formations  and tropes  both within and between  official  documents.
These  were  derived  from  consideration  of  difference  and  inconsistency  in
representation  of  key  discursive  objects,  identification  of  promoted  and
marginalised  interests,  implications  for  human  security  and  freedom  at  the
individual  level,  indication  of  omissions,  silences  and  ambiguities  in  textual
representation. As a whole, Japan's human security discourse is characterised
by a finely detailed postulation of factors making up human security, high levels
of  representational  inconsistency,  an  absence  of  theoretical  elucidation,  a
complex system of rationalisation of human security praxis, and the postulation
of ambiguous relationships between various agents of human security. Japan's
human security  discourse  was  found to  share  numerous characteristics  with
other  human  security  discourses  but  was  unique  in  situating  the  human
individual  as  only  one  of  a  plurality  of  policy  beneficiaries,  conceptualising
human security as an extension of state security, and being explicitly committed
to the use of securitisation as a way to affect policy agendas.
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Chapter I: Introduction, Justification, 
Methodology
The Object of Inquiry
This  thesis  is  concerned  with  Japan's  official  discourse  on  human  security.
Specifically,  the object  of  inquiry is  Japan's  textual  representation of  certain
elements  of  social  reality  which  are  associated  with  the  notion  of  human
security.1 The work is motivated by two concerns. The first is normative; in the
sense that the critique undertaken here aims to add a critical perspective to a
policy movement which Japan has been pursuing since around 1995.2 From its
own  account,  Japan's  commitment  to  enlarging  its  profile  in  international
relations – and being seen as doing this3– together with its significant economic
resources, have contributed to a considerable expansion of its human security
1 A rich body of literature on the topic of human security is in existence. For a general 
discussion on the topic, see: Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 
International Journal 56 (2001): 442–460; Sarka Waisova, “Human Security-the 
Contemporary Paradigm?,” Perspectives 20 (2003): 58–72; Tobias Debiel and Sascha 
Werthes, Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas:  Changes, Concepts and Cases 
(Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2006); 
Marlies Glasius, “Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job 
Description for a Human Security Worker,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 
31–54, doi:10.1177/0967010607086822. For an introduction to human security from a 
historical point of view see: Sabina Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security 
(Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of 
Oxford, 2003); Paul M. Evans, “Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning.,” Journal
of East Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 263–284. For discussions regarding the 
relationship between human security and other forms of security or international law, see: 
Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001; P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The 
Convergence of National and Human Security,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 4 (December 1, 
2002): 473–488; Ralph Pettman, “Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising 
Strategic Studies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2005): 137–150; 
Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?,” Global 
Governance 11 (2005): 185–203.
2 Japan's first invocation of human security was in 1995; framed as a new security strategy 
for the United Nations. See Bert Edstrom, “Japan’s Foreign Policy and Human Security,” 
Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 212–13.
3 Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century 
Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium 
on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html.
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practices around the world. As of August 2009, Japan had spent approximately
US$347 million on United  Nations  Trust  Fund for  Human Security  projects
implemented in 118 countries. Furthermore, within the period of just two years,
2006-2008,  it  appropriated  31  billion Japanese  Yen (approximately  US$376
million) for its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects.4 As
Christie  has  observed,  “human  security  has  shaped  and  altered  security
narratives  and  practices  [and]  thus  cannot  be  dismissed  as  being  irrelevant
either to policy or to the development of current Northern trends of engagement
with  the  global  South”.5 The  stakes  in  the  determination,  adoption  and
implementation of a set of human security practices are high: the very terms of
the  experience  of  being  human.  Human  security,  as  a  form  of  politics, is
concerned  with  monitoring,  regulation  and  control  of  biological,  medical,
economic, psychological, philosophical and economic facets of life to the most
general  and  overarching  extent;  in  the  sense  that,  through  the  use  of  the
adjective  human and as a form of  international activity,  it  encapsulates every
single person on the planet as an object of interest. It is because of its potential
for  such  wide  ranging,  complex  and  comprehensive  intervention  that  the
interrogation of human security discourse at both theoretical and ethical levels
is of the utmost significance. The second motivation is that of developing and
utilising a methodological perspective which has not been applied widely to the
field of Japan's human security policy. The conceptualisation of Japan's human
security documents as making up a discourse and approaching it from a point of
view which is familiar in literary theory6 but still somewhat unusual in the field
of  human  security  studies,7 contribute  to  the  development  of  the  critical
perspective  that  is  necessary  for  realising  the  normatively  directed  analysis
envisioned in the thesis.
4 “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009), 4, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.
5 Ryerson Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To 
Critique?,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 171.
6 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
7 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36, 
no. 01 (2010): 77–94.
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The thesis itself takes the form of a monograph that deals with the concept and
elements of  the  practice  of  human  security  as  represented  by  Japan  in  its
publications on the topic. It engages with these publications in the sense that
the topics discussed in the thesis correspond to the ones raised in Japan's texts;
the  intent  being  to  concentrate  on  facets  of  the  idea  which  Japan  has
incorporated into its politics of representation by invoking them publicly. This
type of engagement is relevant to the chosen methodology because it encourages
reflection on the question of how the discursive formations found in these texts
can be interpreted to promote certain interests and ideas, whilst concurrently
taking emphasis  away from or marginalising the  significance of  others.  It  is
important to point out that a focus upon representation does not necessarily
come with the assumption or suggestion that Japan's human security texts are
either  purposefully  untruthful  about  human  security  policy  or  are  a
misrepresentation  of  it.  Rather,  questions  about  truth  or  truthfulness  are
bracketed here, with the focus being on the political aspects of representation in
which  some  facets  of  human  security  are  expressed,  having  been  voiced  by
Japan in a particular way, whilst others are left out. What is more, it is not the
case that the data are perceived as either propaganda or ideology in the sense
articulated by Morgenthau.8
Morgenthau argued that the meaning and content of diplomatic language and in
fact all political language is hidden by ideology; such that the form of language
which  political  agents  use  to  speak  about  their  motivations,  objectives,
strategies,  rationales  or  desired  outcomes  does  not  reveal  the  fundamental
pursuit of power that political and diplomatic activity aims to satisfy.9 One of the
objects of Morgenthau’s inquiry and theorising was the political agent who was
interested  in  power;  one  who  had  to  keep  this  interest  concealed  from  the
domestic  polity  because  its  legitimisation  would  lead  to  a  generalised  and
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Seventh (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).
9 Ibid.
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chaotic  pursuit  of  power  by  all  people.10 On Morgenthau's  account,  political
agents are aware of and acknowledge amongst themselves, the apparent truth
that  the  pursuit  of  power  is  the  fundamental  objective  of  political  activity.
However, they must also keep this truth hidden from non-political bodies11 so as
to prevent an unbridled contest  for political power in the domestic sphere. In
order  to  keep the  true  nature  of  political  activity  hidden from the  domestic
population, the language of politics aims to obscure reality through the use of
so-called ideology: language which does not evoke or explain the power-political
nature of politics, but cloaks it in terms of patriotism, humanitarianism, human
rights, world peace, security, biological necessity or some other popular slogan.
At the same time – continues Morgenthau's argument – since the pursuit of
power is  a  natural  instinct  for  people,  their  activities  need to be directed at
pursuits which are non-political or of marginal political significance and as such
this is a necessary part of the state's political practice. 
In  contradistinction  to  the  position  of  Morgenthau  or  neo-realist  views  of
international relations, in this thesis it is not postulated that the language of
politics is  an ideology used to “mask, sustain or advance the power-oriented
interests  of  states”.12 Alternatively,  as  enunciated  in  discourse  theoretical
views,13 language is not seen, a priori, as opaque; as part of a truth-concealing
strategy. The language used by political agents is understood as representing
reality  in  a  transparent  way,  albeit  the  meaning  of  that  language  might  not
always  be  consistent  with  common  or  general  language  use.  Moreover,  the
10 For Morgenthau, this was a matter of human nature: so-called man is by nature inclined to 
pursue power.
11 Morgenthau did not provide any means to distinguish between political and non-political 
agents other than to postulate that the former, in distinction to the latter, were official 
practitioners of politics.
12 Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 
(1999): 265.
13 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Allen Lane 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1 
(London: Penguin, 1976); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without 
Apologies,” New Left Review I, no. 166 (1987); Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse 
(Oxford, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999).
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discursive methodology taken in this thesis does not suggest that political agents
are not capable of telling lies, purposefully misrepresenting issues, obfuscating
their  beliefs  or  misleading  their  interlocutors.  In  reference  to  the  approach
taken in  this  thesis,  the  main  difference between the ideological  perspective
taken by Morgenthau and the discursive approach, in regard to language, is that
in the latter (a)  it  is  not assumed outright that political agents use language
merely to cover up the truth about their activities, and that (b) the phrases and
expressions used by political agents work to represent or construct objects in
ways  which  implicitly  promote  certain  interests  over  others  and  have
ramifications for the relative positioning between political agents as well as the
conditions of life for human individuals. As an aside, an underlying assumption
in this thesis is that Japan's representation of human security is implicitly made
in line with its own interests; that it  functions to naturalise, make facile and
unproblematic practices made in the name of human security. The discursive
view taken in this work does not suggest that when an agent explains action in
reference to, for instance, human rights, they must be telling the truth; that they
cannot  be  lying,  hiding  the  truth,  or  attempting  to  mislead.  However,  the
discursive view rejects the automatic assumption that phrases such as  human
rights or  human security represent little more than rhetorical  devices which
conceal  one's  true  intentions  or  objectives,  or  ways  by  which  to  manipulate
public attention or opinion. Alternatively, a discursive approach requires that
one asks what a phrase such as human rights means for the particular political
agent at hand: its connotations, implications, connections to other aspects of
political activity and political objectives, as well as its rhetorical value. Because
the term meaning can connote a kind of psychologism in which the thoughts of
the  human  subject  are  postulated  as  being  open  to  empirical  observation
through either linguistic or extra-linguistic signs, for the most part it has been
avoided in this thesis in lieu of the term representation, which is used here in a
way which excludes consideration of humans' subjective mental states, focusing
instead only on the form that objects take in discourse. 
That is to say, it is not the contention of this thesis that Japan's human security
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discourse is either a linguistic or rhetorical  obfuscation of  its  true or honest
policy objectives – insofar as the notion of true or honest policy objectives can
be theoretically  maintained – or that it  constitutes an attempt to present an
image  of  how things  should  be  or  might  be  despite  a  significantly  different
reality. Such nefarious motivations on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of  Japan are  not  being  implied  here.  To  the  contrary,  although not  utilised
directly  in  the  thesis,  background  interviews  with  a  number  of  individuals
involved with Japan's human security policy have revealed quite the opposite:
an  empathetic,  compassionate  and  authentic  desire  to  improve  the  security
conditions in which human beings exist.14
One of the reasons for avoiding postulating Japan's utterances as being a form
of ideology is that “[ideology] always stands in virtual opposition to something
else which is supposed to count as truth”.15 Lacking a point of reference from
which questions about the truth of Japan's human security language might be
answered, the analysis taken up in this work is not concerned with objective
notions of truth. Rather, it is interested in how truth might be perceived and
what its effects might be, if a discourse  purporting to be true was to secure a
hegemonic  or  dominant  position  in  discussions  on  topics  such  as  human
security,  or  if  such  a  language  of  human  security  was  acknowledged  as
encapsulating the concepts and relationships needed for theorising or talking
about human security.16 Questions about objective reality do not contribute to
an analysis of political representation in which the focus is on what is taken to
be truthful by those who subscribe to, operate in terms of, or propagate such
14 Interview data was originally envisaged as one of the kinds of texts that would be analysed 
in the thesis but this idea was abandoned because of the difficulty in accessing officials from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and because of a high degree of overlap between 
the statements of interviewees and the content of texts available from the Ministry's 
website.
15 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (London :  
Ringwood, Vic.,: Penguin, 1991), 60.
16 Whilst the dynamic interplay between various state and non-state discourses on human 
security and their proponents' attempts at hegemony and dominance are fascinating and 
important research avenues, the scope of this thesis is limited to Japan's human security 
discourse and the representations found within it. 
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discursive formations, rather than it being on what  is truthful according to an
imagined  authority  rooted  in  fields  such  as  science  or  religion.  In  terms of
Wittgenstein's language games,17 it hardly matters whether the categories and
terms  used  by  participants  in  a  game  are  considered  to  be  true  by
non-participants, if the game's players implicitly agree to abide by its rules and
to  treat  them as  valid  within  its  bounded context.  Accordingly,  the  analysis
undertaken here is concerned with finding out and problematising the terms,
categories and rules of a language game as the one comprised by Japan's human
security discourse. 
The  main  site  or  representation  selected  for  this  research  was  that  of
cyberspace;  the  Website  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan.18 The
majority of  texts  chosen for analysis  were speeches made between 1998 and
2009 at  various  diplomatic  forums,  as  well  as  a  number  of  documents  and
pamphlets  on  the  topic  of  Human  Security  published  by  the  Ministry.  This
eleven year period makes up the Ministry's official, public chronology of human
security.19 Analysis  of  texts  did not  incorporate  a  temporal  dimension which
may have considered a development of discourse over time or conceived of the
texts as making up a cohesive, longitudinal narrative which would have been
open to methodologies such as narrative policy analysis.20 It  could certainly be
fruitful and interesting to examine the way in which tropes, themes or concepts
found in the discourse have appeared in various guises through time; how they
may have changed, been dropped or picked up again in different contexts or
settings.  However,  because  speeches  and  documents  were  of  unknown
authorship  and  were  presented  by  different  people,  rather  than  considering
them in terms of a linear narrative, and because elements within texts seemed to
17 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Singapore: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
2009).
18 “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” accessed July 14, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/index.html.
19 Though beyond the scope of this thesis, it is of interest that the Ministry's chronology does 
not include human security themed speeches prior to 1998, even though these were being 
made as early as 1995. See Edstrom, “Japan’s Foreign Policy and Human Security,” 2003.  
20 Emery Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice (Duke University Press, 1994).
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appear,  disappear and reappear in complex ways, it  was deemed to be more
interesting  to  consider  them  in  relation  to  each  other  without  the  added
variables of time or temporal context.
Cyberspace as a site of representation is significant mainly as a delineation of
the  data  used  in  this  study.  However,  the  presence  of  this  representational
(web)site  is  remarkable  because  it  exists  as  a  discrete  place  with  clear
boundaries which are delineated according to the organisation of the site; there
is a specific page for human security texts,21 which can be found in a section
dedicated  to  foreign  policy.22 As  such,  it  is  possible  to  refer  to,  and  point
towards,  a body of human security texts published by Japan: a discourse on
human  security.  The  texts  under  examination  in  this  thesis  are  written
exclusively  in  English;  either  official  translations  or  documents  composed
originally  in  English.  Because  the  analytical  emphasis  of  the  thesis  is
representation in the public sphere and the resultant images and constructions
of human security as they are inscribed  in texts, the issue of translation  from
Japanese  to  English is not  problematic.  Had  the  research  programme  been
aimed at determining things such as the meaning of human security as held by
Japanese members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan or the ministry
itself, or  the  intent  behind publishing  these  speeches,  issues  relating  to
translation or cultural differences as manifested through language would have
been  significant.  However,  the  primary  objective  of  the  thesis  was  the
examination of a particular discourse, published in English, which is a de facto
site of representation for Japan's official stance on human security which exists
independently in English.
As the focus of this thesis is public rather than private or confidential discourse
21 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Human Security,” The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, accessed May 7, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.
22 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Foreign Policy,” accessed June 14, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/index.html.
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on the topic of human security, analysis was limited to those documents which
could  be  obtained  through  open  sources;  specifically  the  Internet  website
mentioned above.  Whilst it  would be possible to make the case that  Japan's
human  security  discourse  could  be  taken  to  include  texts  produced  by
non-government institutions, organisations or individuals, a conscious decision
was made to focus on documents or transcripts which were explicitly published
by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan.  This  choice  was  grounded  in
practical  and ethical considerations.  Practically speaking,  both time and word
limit considerations prevented  inclusion of potentially  enormous networks of
texts which may have served as elements  of,  or intertexts  for,  Japan's human
security discourse. In ethical terms, whilst a consideration of texts which could
not be clearly delineated as being official utterances of the Japanese state may
certainly have added more depth to the discussion of issues raised in analysis, it
would have limited the scope of the thesis as an analysis and critique of official
human security, if the counter-argument were  to be  raised that the discourse
examined did not entirely reflect the position of the Ministry of Affairs of Japan.
Discourse Theory
The object of inquiry in this dissertation is Japan's official discourse on human
security.  A key  theoretical  assumption of  this  thesis  is  that  official  Japanese
human security discourse defines the “systems of signification”23 held by Japan
as  a  state  actor.  In  this  thesis,  discourse  is  not  understood  as  being  a
representation  or  interpretation  of  an  objectively  existing  reality.  Rather,  it
refers to the “conditions [under which] thought [is] able to reflect relations of
similarity  or  equivalence  between  things,  relations  that  [...]  provide  a
foundation and a justification for [...] words, their classifications, their systems
of exchange.”24 In the field of international relations, systems of signification
23 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of 
Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999): 229.
24 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, World of Man: A Library of Theory and Research in 
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can be conceptualised as the sphere of actors' subscriptions to ideas about the
composition  of  reality.  They  are  manifested  in  language  and  are  a  form  of
linguistic currency regarding issues such as:
● the  content  of  state  and  non-state  actors'  interests  and  appropriate
means for their realisation;
● what is recognised or imagined by the state and non-state actors as a
phenomenon pertaining to their activity and interests;
● relational structures with other states and political actors that determine
which of these actors will have a bearing on policy formation;
● meaning or value attributed to material resources;
● significance and construction of common international relations theory
constructs such as sovereignty or power;
● notions of membership in a society of states including ideas about how
states  act  in  and  are  acted  upon  in  the  world  they  experience  and
construct.
Another  important  theoretical  presupposition of  this  thesis  is  that  state  and
non-state  actors  exist  in  worlds  of  their  own  construction,  where  subjective
meanings  attributed  to  material  objects  or  ideas  determine  behaviours  and
policies.25 A  system of  signification  –  expressed  through language  in  official
documents,  speeches and texts and referred to in this thesis as discourse  –
serves  as  the  conceptual,  theoretical,  and  hermeneutic  horizon which makes
particular policy ideas and practices come across as thinkable, facile, warranted,
the Human Sciences (ed: R.D. Laing) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1994), xxiv.
25 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and 
Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33–75; Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A 
Users’ Manual,” in International Relations in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka 
Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); 
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 
(1995): 71–81; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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justified or in the realm of the possible. At the same time, the truths, logic or
forms of  argumentation inscribed in this  system can work to  preclude other
forms of practice from serious consideration if these are  inconsistent with the
logic of the signification system. Such linguistic systems of signification can also
be  understood  as  common-sense  folk  theories  to  which  states  subscribe
regarding their existence and reality in a broader sense. 
Through  its  systems  of  signification,  Japanese  human  security  discourse
represents a commitment on behalf of the Japanese state – as embodied by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan – to a particular version of the truth. In the
words of Foucault:
Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types
of  discourse which it  accepts and makes function as true;  the mechanisms and
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by
which each is  sanctioned;  the techniques  and procedures accorded value in  the
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true.26
The regime of truth is the foundation for the content of  states'  folk theories
regarding the nature of their being and action in international politics. With this
in  mind,  the  analysis  of  discourse  is  not  about  unlocking  the  nature  of  a
pre-existing world by revealing the meanings that actors ascribe to material and
ideational  objects  in  the  world.  Rather,  though  materially  objects  exist
independently of observers, there is no sense in which they have meanings and
attributes  independent  of  the  collective,  societal  mind  –  as  represented  by
language; consistently with Wittgenstein's reminder that there is no such thing
as a private language.27 Discourse defines subjects (including states and people)
according  to  the  way  in  which  they  are  spoken  about,  written  about  and
otherwise  represented.  Objects  or  subjects  do  not  have  meanings  beyond
discourse,  although  there  can  be  competing  discourses  (truth  claims)  about
26 Foucault, “Truth and Power,” 1991, 73.
27 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2009.
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them;  with  international  relations  actors  both  reinforcing  and  challenging
dominant or repressed discourses through their practices. The constructive or
constitutive  effects  of  discursive  representation can include the  ascription of
power to some bodies, whilst overlooking or glossing over the importance of
others. In this way, even though power can take the form of a resource held by
particular actors such as states, kings, or individuals, it is also the case that their
power  is  a  result  of  the  play  of  the  discourses  which  constitute  them  and
represent their nature; such subjects are themselves the result of the power of
discourse.28
The fundamental task of this thesis is to reveal and problematise Japan's human
security  system  of  signification,  consistently  with  the  discursive  practices
approach. As such, Japan is not itself a direct object of observation and it is not
conceptualised anthropomorphically,  a priori,  as being a rational, calculating
actor that makes strategic policy and diplomatic decisions based on a hierarchy
of preferences or cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly, questions focusing on
the reasons for why Japan has been pursuing human security  or why it  has
adopted the notion as a part of its foreign policy, are not a focus in this thesis.29
Whilst the search for causes and reasons is both an interesting and established
pursuit in international relations scholarship, it also comes with a number of
theoretical  difficulties  which have resulted in this  aspect of  knowledge being
28 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1976.
29 For an introduction to work which does concern itself with questions of causality in regard 
to the presence of human security in Japan's foreign policy, the reader is directed to: Elena 
Atanassova-Cornelis, “Japan and the ‘Human Security’ Debate: History,  Norms and 
Pro-active Foreign Policy,” Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 3, no. 2 (2005): 
58–74; Satomi Ho, “Japan’s Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of Its Limits and 
Failures,” Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 101–112; Nobumasa Akiyama, “Human 
Security at the Crossroad: Human Security in the Japanese Foreign Policy Context,” in 
Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building, IPSHU 
English Research Report Series 19, 2004, 252–70; Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese Security 
Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security,” Asia-Pacific Review 
12, no. 1 (2005): 103–116; Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, “Japan’s Pursuit of Human 
Security: Humanitarian Agenda or Political Pragmatism,” Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 
193–07; Tadashi Yamamoto, “Human Security-From Concept to Action: A Challenge for 
Japan,” Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2004, 
http://www.unesco.or.kr/kor/activity2003/ss_data/Paper-Tadashi_Yamamoto.doc.
12
bracketed in this work. One of the difficulties in attempting a causal analysis of
Japan's  human  security  discourse  is  that  the  authorship  of  the  texts  under
examination is uncertain and potentially comprised of a number of individuals
who may have different positions within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As
such,  beliefs  or  reasons  for  acting  may  be  inconsistent  across  the  various
authors of the discourse. Furthermore, even if the authors of these texts were
known and available for comment, considering the political status of the texts,
there would be no grounds for asserting that the beliefs or motivations they
expressed for acting were not themselves politically or strategically minded acts
of representation, aimed at situating them or the Japanese state in a particular
light. Furthermore, as Foucault points out in relation to the history of science,
questions of causality are theoretically problematic:
It is not always easy to determine what has caused a specific change in a science.
What made such a discovery possible? Why did this new concept appear? Where
did  this  or  that  theory  come  from?  Questions  like  this  are  often  highly
embarrassing because there are no definite methodological principles on which to
base such an analysis. The embarrassment [...] probably reaches its highest point in
the  case  of  the  empirical  sciences:  for  the  role  of  instruments,  techniques,
institutions, events, ideologies, and interests is very much in evidence; but one does
not know how an articulation so complex and so diverse in composition actually
operates.30
Instead of being concerned with questions regarding the causes which have led
to  Japan  producing  discourse  on  the  topic  of  human security  or  apparently
undertaking actions in its pursuit, official Japanese assertions and claims that –
inter-alia – “the Japanese Government is steadily promoting Human Security as
a pillar of its diplomacy”31 inform the epistemological commitment of this thesis
to situating discourse as an object of analysis; a system of signification which
constitutes  international  relations  actors'  representations  of  identities  and
subjectively experienced and understood realities.  In other words, this  thesis
30 Foucault, The Order of Things, 1994, xii–xiii.
31 “Human Security and National Security,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0406.html emphasis added.
13
has  at  its  centre  the  notion  that  discourses define  what  actors  understand,
believe or take to be truth. Consequently, discourse places restrictions but also
provides  opportunities  for  state  actors  in  regard  to  what  kind  of  action  is
possible,  legitimate,  rational,  irrational,  desired,  neglected  or  simply
unimaginable according to that which the discourse establishes as logical and
consistent with its own precepts. Dominant discourses determine the content of
thought about foreign policy and diplomacy. Subjects that are not defined or
constructed by discourses literally do not exist for the state and its agents. Just
as  changes  in  discourse  about  sexuality  in  Europe  during  the  Victorian  age
reconstituted subjects such as morality, reproduction, or deviance in response
to the development and dominance of a particular discourse on the political and
economic meaning and significance of populations,32 human security discourse
in  Japan  determines  how  the  Japanese  state  construes  the  world  of
international  relations  and diplomacy,  at  least  insofar  as  its  human security
texts  constitute  the language through which the policy world  – including its
inhabitants and their actions – is apprehended and communicated.
An integral part of the analytical framework undertaken in  this thesis,  is the
reformulation of the main research question from a why type to a how type of
question. Rather than looking for causes, the concern is with how Japan's texts
represent international relations – particularly in reference to human security –
and how these representations function to legitimate human security policy or
affect the life experience of human individuals. As Doty indicates:
When we  pose  a  how-possible  question,  we  can  still  ask  why,  but  we  must  in
addition inquire into the practices that enable social actors to act, to frame policy as
they do, and to wield the capabilities they do. Perforce more critical, this mode of
questioning takes us to relations of power -  power in its productive  aspect that
why-questions neglect.33
32 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1976.
33 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of 
U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 
3 (1993): 299.
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Grounded Theory
A number of questions with which to interrogate Japan's human security texts
were posed at the outset of the study, but a first reading revealed that some
facets of the concept were brought up and elucidated upon more than others.
Consequently,  the  original  conceptual  and  organisational  scheme  which  had
been envisaged for the data had to be reassessed. Because of the uneven nature
of the data and its complexity, it became necessary to listen to the texts; in the
sense  that  the  basis  for  the  construction  of  the  analytical  categories  which
comprised the thesis' four substantive analytical chapters was dictated partially
in terms of the content of the texts; rather than solely in accordance with the
interests of the researcher. This approach, in which the object of inquiry – a
node  in  an  endless  network  of  language34 which  appears  in  various  forms
depending on the perspective of the observer and is connected to both the past
and future  through the concept  of  intertextuality35 – was approached with a
necessary attitude of naivety. Analytical categories were formulated according to
what  texts  had  to  offer,  rather  than  being  imposed  by  the  researcher;
consistently with the idea of a grounded theory:
A grounded theory is one that, rather than selectively choosing data according to a
priori theoretical  categories  formulates  the  theory  from the  data  by  developing
provisional categorisations via empirical study and abstraction, comparing on the
basis of new data whether these categories fit and, if necessary, reformulating the
categories so that they are empirically valid.36
34 As Laclau reminds, “language (and by extension, all signifying systems) is a system of 
differences [in which] linguistic identities – values – are purely relational and that, as a 
result, the totality of language is involved in each single act of signification”. Ernesto 
Laclau, “Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?,” in Emancipation(s) (London, New 
York: Verso, 2007), 37 emphasis added.
35 Fabienne Darling-Wolf, “Texts in Context: Intertextuality, Hybridity, and the Negotiation of
Cultural Identity in Japan.,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 24, no. 2 (April 2000): 
134–155.
36 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” 1999, 234.
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In claiming to have eschewed the formulation of theoretical categories prior to a
careful reading of the texts under examination, it is not being argued that it is
possible to be totally free of pre-conceived notions about the research topic at
hand. It is acknowledged that –  inter alia – formative education, upbringing,
psychological drives and other factors constitute one's understanding of social
reality.37 Even ignorance may be a factor in determining a  de facto theoretical
stance; as simply stating that the constructs one uses to guide data collection or
understanding do not represent a theory does not make it so. Furthermore, an
epistemological position based on the idea of a grounded theory is in itself a
form  of  meta-theory  which  conveys  an  understanding  of  the  relationship
between subject and object, and therefore itself takes on the status of theory.38
However it  is  possible to have the intent to be theory-unladen as a point of
departure,  even if  the  attempt can only  ever  be  asymptotic  and  never  quite
achieves the ideal.39 
The approach indicated above by Milliken identifies  the analysis,  or  body of
knowledge  which  is  a  final  result  of  research  and  writing  processes,  with  a
theory containing generalisations about the data at hand. However, the method
taken  here  differs  from  Milliken's  characterisation  in  one  important  aspect.
Whilst the attitude towards texts is the same, it is not one of the objectives of
this  thesis  to  make  generalisations  about  them.  To  do  so  would  entail,  in
figurative terms, an attempt at arbitrarily separating one particular area in the
sea of discourse from the rest of the ocean; attempting to explain too much and
implicitly working towards reifying and fixing the meaning of Japan's human
37 I refer here to the idea of “intertextuality”, where the interpreted assumptions implicit in 
one kind of discourse merge and are supported through commitments to other discourses. 
For a discussion of how texts are layered to construct reality, see Darling-Wolf, “Texts in 
Context,” April 2000.
38 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory
and Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1998): 
259–294.
39 Marisa Kelly and Steven Maynard-Moody, “Policy Analysis in the Post-Positivist Era: 
Engaging Stakeholders in Evaluating the Economic Development Districts Program,” 
Public Administration Review 53, no. 2 (1993): 135–142.
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security texts in one specific point in time and place. Rather, the interest in this
work  is  in  examining  the  details of  Japan's  discourse  on  human  security;
contemplating, probing and problematising them in relationship to each other
and  in  regard  to  their  differing  relative  positioning  across  and within  texts,
rather than devising categories which efface differences and inconsistencies in
the interest of formulating elegant, logical, easily comprehensible and predictive
theories.  Analytical categories are present in this  work but they serve not as
fixed  points  of  reference  for  generalisation  or  theory  building,  but  as
impermanent, convenient and ultimately arbitrary conceptual schemes through
which  to  apprehend  and  comprehend  the  complex  and  sometimes
counter-intuitive, diverse or contradictory metaphysics constructed by Japan's
human security discourse.
The Concept of the Political
The notion of representation is key in this thesis. Accordingly, analysis does not
presuppose the  discovery  of  real,  factual,  or  truth-like  universal elements  in
Japan's  human  security  discourse.  Instead,  emphasis  is  placed  upon  these
elements as  represented by Japan and the resultant image of Japan's human
security  policy  that  is  formed,  as  well  as  the  overall  image  of  international
relations reality as it pertains to human security. The significance of political
representation can be discerned through Carl Schmitt's notion of the political;
distinguishable from the social, the economic or the cultural on the basis that it
essentially  categorises people as either friends of enemies, with the potential
result of this division being armed conflict, destruction or death.40 Similarly, in
the words of Mouffe, the political is  “the dimension of antagonism which [is]
constitutive  of  human  societies”.41 One  aspect  of  the  political  is  that  of
40 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Expanded edition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007).
41 Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (Routledge, 2005), 9.
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convincing others of the apparent truth or validity of a friend-enemy division,42
and this visage of truth is created through politics;  that “ensemble of practices,
discourses and institutions that seek to establish a certain order and to organize
human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because
they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'.43 With these notions of the
political  and politics  in mind,  discursive representation of  different  facets  of
human security in Japan's official texts on the subject is a political issue because
it demarcates objects within the realm of international relations as either ones
which necessitate a response as part of security practice or as ones which can be
safely ignored. In the words of McDonald,  decisions regarding “who is to be
protected,  from  what  threats,  by  what  means  and  so  on  are  fundamentally
political  choices”.44 From  this  point  of  view,  it  is  possible  to  conceive  of
Schmitt's enemy as those phenomena, people, bodies or events which come to
be represented as problems for, or threats to, human security. 
Delimitations
Representation of a discursive object can be undertaken from a vast number of
points of view and in reference to numerous other discursive objects. For this
reason,  analysis  of  representations  positioned  relatively  to  each  other  can
conceivably be continued perpetually and in reference to ever more distant and
specialised nodes of the discursive network which is envisioned as the object of
inquiry in this dissertation. This necessitates the imposition of some boundaries
on one's analytical scope. For the most part, delimitations are based on practical
considerations  about  the  time  available  to  carefully  analyse,  critique  and
problematise the large volume of human security texts available through the
website  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign Affairs  of  Japan.  Texts  for  analysis  were
42 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 2007.
43 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?,” Social Research 66, no. 
3 (Fall 1999): 754.
44 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” Global Society 16, no. 
3 (2002): 289.
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primarily  selected  according  to  the  degree  of  elucidation  they  contained  on
various aspects of human security, as well as for the novelty of their content. As
such, texts whose content had been encountered elsewhere were discarded in
favour of new material which had not been seen in other documents. 
Analysis
The  method  of  discursive  analysis  used  in  this  thesis  relies  on  a  focus  on
presupposition,  predication,  subject  positioning,  framing  and  metaphor45 to
bring out the main constructs present in Japan's human security texts and to
apprehend  them  from  a  critical  point  of  view.  Following  the  “sobjectivist”
methodology  of  Pouliot,46 objectification  of  the  data  is  undertaken  by
contextualising findings in reference to scholarly work in the field of human
security.47 
Following  Doty,  if  “discourse  creates  a  'world'  in  the  sense  that  a  particular
'reality' must be accepted in order for the statements to make sense”, one way to
apprehend  this  world  is  through  the  analytical  tools  of  presupposition,
predication, and subject-positioning.48 The first of these, presupposition, refers
45 See Saft & Ohara (2006). This approach will only be used to the extent that metaphorical 
language is present in diplomatic texts. Moreover, considering the linguistic complexity of 
translation, it is beyond the scope of this work to analyse Japanese metaphors which have 
been translated into English.
46 Vincent Pouliot, “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” International 
Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (June 2007): 359–384.
47 For example, early Japanese human security discourse often referred to the Asian Financial 
Crisis as a key driver in the development of a human security agenda. The reasoning was 
along the lines that the crisis had resulted in severe economic hardship at the individual 
level, thus justifying a human security approach for the security of individuals. An 
investigation into the details of subsequent Japanese human security policy revealed that 
Tokyo did indeed focus on economic elements of human security, but in light of the 
contested nature of the link between human security and economic security (see Liew 
2000), it was not entirely clear whether it was the state (and moreover which state) or 
individuals, who would benefit. The point here is not to assert that official talk about human
security might be ideological, but rather, to explore the notion of what Japanese 
policy-makers really mean when they talk about human security.
48 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. 
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to background knowledge – taken to be true – which is implicit in statements.
For  example,  for  a  clause  such  as  “the  logic  of  realpolitik  retains  lasting
relevance  because  it  captures  best  the  essential  nature  of  the  international
political system”49 to be comprehensible, one must assume that “realpolitik” –
whatever it happens to be – exists and has a logic, that there is an international
political system which has an essential nature that can be captured and that the
author is in a position to make this assertion of fact with legitimacy. The second
analytical  tool  of  predication,  involves  bringing  to  light  texts'  attribution  of
values and properties to discursive objects through the adverbs and adjectives
used to describe them. For example, the contention that “the United States has
stood for fair play, for aid to the weak, for liberty, and freedom”,50 establishes
the  United  States  as  a  particular  kind  of  object  defined,  in  part,  by  its
egalitarianism, sense of justice and altruism, as well as a commitment to liberty.
Thirdly,  the  idea  of  subject  positioning  brings  to  one's  attention  the  way  in
which subjects/objects are related to each other and thereby mutually define
each other. Doty's deconstruction of the following excerpt on Filipino natives
demonstrates these three critical strategies of discourse analysis clearly, and is
included here as a point of reference for similar analyses undertaken on Japan's
official human security texts in chapters two through five:
The whole time he treats you with the deference due to the superiority which he
recognizes.  He  knows  the  duties  of  no  occupations  with  efficiency  and  he  is
perfectly willing to be a 'jack of all trades'. So long as he gets his food and fair
treatment,  and his  stipulated  wages  paid  in  advance,  he  is  content  to  act  as  a
general-utility  man.  If  not  pressed  too  hard,  he  will  follow  his  superior  like  a
faithful dog. If treated with kindness, according to European notions, he is lost. The
native never looks ahead; he is never anxious about the future; but if left to himself,
he  will  do  all  sorts  of  imprudent  things,  from  sheer  want  of  reflection  on  the
consequences.  The native has  no idea of organization on a large scale,  hence a
successful revolution is not possible if confined to the pure indigenous population
unaided by others, such as creoles and foreigners. Under good European officers
they make excellent soldiers. There is nothing they delight in more than pillage,
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” 1993, 308.
49 Ibid., 306.
50 Ibid.
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destruction and bloodshed, and when once they become masters of the situation in
an affray, there is no limit to their greed and savage cruelty.51
According to Doty, this passage unproblematically presupposes the superiority
of  the  European  through  the  assertion  that  “under  good  European  officers
[Filipinos]  make  excellent  soldiers”,  and  that  “if  not  pressed  too  hard  [the
native] will follow his superior like a faithful dog”. An analysis of predication
reveals that Filipino natives are said to be – among other things – inefficient,
dog-like followers who never look ahead, enjoy violence, and are limitless in
their greed and cruelty. As the speaking subject, the European is constructed in
a way which is implicitly the opposite of the native. One way in which these two
subjects of the discourse are positioned – i.e. the European and the native – is
in  regard  to  agency.  For  instance,  the  proposition  that  Europeans  have  the
qualities it takes to be officers and that they are able to make good soldiers out
of  the  natives,  whilst  Filipinos  are  followers  who  do  not  reflect  upon  the
ramifications  of  their  actions,  works  to  position  the  former  subject  with
relatively more agency. The difference in positioning is also discernible if one
considers that the European subject is implied as having knowledge of Filipinos
as well as the authority to make statements about them; in this case the latter is
merely the object of the knowledge of the former. 
An example by Milliken also demonstrates how this kind of discursive analysis
can be undertaken in practice.52 The following section invokes the discursive
objects of Japan, the US, Korea and Asia in the context of the US-Korean War:
51 Ibid., 307–09.
52 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” 1999, 232.
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If  the  US  does  not  take  any  action  in  Korea,  this  would  produce  a  marked
psychological reaction in the public mind and in the minds of Asian leaders. US
prestige would be damaged throughout the region. Japan, the linchpin of our policy
in Asia, would lose morale and experience a strengthening of the widespread desire
for neutrality, with the result that not even a commitment of significant US military
strength would keep Japan in the West.
Milliken  argues  that  through  predication  and  positioning  in  relation  to  the
discursive object of the US, Japan is constructed as being able to feel emotions
(since it  has “a desire” for neutrality),  has psychological  reactions (by losing
“morale”),  is  generally  passive and has a  subordinate position to that  of  the
United States. 
Another element of the methodology employed in this thesis is that of framing.
Frames are general ways of construing phenomena, with ramifications on the
kinds of reactions and responses that are consequently considered by readers to
be appropriate in dealing with the issues at hand.53 The idea stems from critical
discourse analysis, which assumes that issues are framed in certain ways, not
only  as  a  part  of  a  process  of  reality  construction,  but  also  actively  for  the
“exertion and maintenance of power and control”.54 The active use of framing to
promote a particular world view is, in general terms, consistent with the idea
that discourse is strategic.55 In other words, that the representation and framing
of objects and subjects in discourse involves highlighting certain elements of
those objects and subjects, whilst backgrounding others; and as such, working
to promote certain political projects over others. 
As  a  precursor  to  the  critical  work  taken  up  in  the  thesis,  the  analytical
53 Scott Saft and Yumiko Ohara, “The Media and the Pursuit of Militarism in Japan: 
Newspaper Editorials in the Aftermath of 9/11,” Critical Discourse Studies 3, no. 1 (2006): 
81–101.
54 Ibid., 82.
55 Michael J. Shapiro, “Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of 
‘Security Policy’ in the Video Age,” International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 
327–340.
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categories and concepts discussed above have been applied to data at hand with
the purpose of ordering and making sense of it. The necessary first step of the
critique  was the identification of  the key  metaphysical  elements that make up
the human security world as depicted by Japan in its texts on the subject. In this
regard,  the  idea  of  presupposition was  useful  because  it  allowed  the
development  of  questions  which  served  as  a point  of  departure  for  an
interrogation of the ontology of Japan's  human security texts. Such questions
include:
• Of what does the condition of human security consist?
• Who or what is to be the object/beneficiary of human security practice?
• What are to be the agents working in the interests of human security?
• What are the issues or phenomena which are relevant to, or associated
with human (in)security? For the most part, in this thesis, this question is
concerned with those things which are in a relationship of antagonism
with human security.
The  idea  of  predication brings  to  light  questions  about  the  qualities  and
attributes of the discursive objects identified according to questions inspired by
analysis  of  presupposition.  Predication  involves asking  about  the  nature,
characteristics and qualities of those objects posited as being the beneficiaries of
human security  practice,  as  well  as  those  objects  who are  to  realise  human
security and those things which bring about depressed levels of human security.
The  idea  of  subject-positioning was  most  consciously  applied  in  the  fifth
chapter, which deals with texts' invocations of agents that are to be working in
the realisation of human security and with the relations between those agents. It
manifested itself  as  a  series of questions about  the  power relations  between
various actors posited  within the texts as being necessary for realising human
security.  Finally, the notion of  framing featured prominently in chapter three,
where texts were examined for the way in which human security was depicted as
being related to other pressing issues; it involved asking questions such as:
• What is the reasoning and rationale for pursuing human security?
23
• What are the benefits of achieving human security?
• What is at stake in realising human security? 
• What are the dangers of not working towards human security. 
  
Critique
The critical approach taken in this thesis is, in part, an attempt to address the
unreflective  tendencies  of  the  field  of  human  security  studies  –  partially
attributable  to  a  commitment  to  policy  relevance  and  accessibility  to  policy
circles  –  especially  in  regard  to  a  lack  of  engagement  with  issues  of
epistemology,  ontology  and  methodology.56 Such  tendencies  can  also  be
discerned in the literature on Japan and human security, particularly manifest
in  the  lack  of  attention  paid  to  the  representational  –  and  thus  political  –
aspects  of  official  texts  on  the  subject.  Critical  voices  in  the  field  of  human
security are not entirely absent, with engagement having come from a number
of  perspectives  including  those  which  seek  to  further  develop  security
discourses,  examine  issues  of  gender,  contribute  to  human  emancipation,
introduce ethico-political elements to theorisation, and examine ways in which
the  development  of  human  security  discourse  has  affected  technologies  of
governance.57 The research paradigm pursued here is consciously committed to
56 Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” 2010.
57 Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,” April 1, 2010. See also: Barry Buzan, “A 
Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value,” Security Dialogue 35, no.
3 (2004): 369–70; Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict: The Contested Claims
of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 3 
(September 1, 2006): 285–303; Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach
to Alleviating Human Misery?,” Global Governance 7, no. 3 (2001): 231–236; Edward 
Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” Security Dialogue 35, 
no. 3 (2004): 358–359; McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” 
2002; Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human 
Security In Southern Africa,” Journal of Security Sector Management 4, no. 2 (2006); 
Ngambouk Vitalis Pemunta, “Health and Development: HIV/AIDS and the Double 
Appropriation of Human Security Discourse by Practitioners of Female Circumcision and 
Development NGOs in Cameroon,” Journal of Human Security 3, no. 1 (2007): 45–61; Kyle
Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional Debate.,” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008): 383–401; Mark Duffield, 
“Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror,” in New 
Interfaces Between Security and Development (presented at the 11th General Conference of
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the idea that “critical approaches question ‘reality’ as a central part of their goal
[and  that]  they  raise  questions  about  existing  policy  assumptions  and  the
interests they serve”.58 It deals with the way in which Japan's human security
discourse creates opportunities for the application of power in the governance of
individuals' lives, how it justifies and legitimates its own existence and right of
being, and how it promotes the interests of state policy objectives. 
Inspiration for undertaking critique and justifying it was drawn from the work
of Michel Foucault and Richard Ashley. For Foucault: 
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a
matter  of  pointing  out  on  what  kinds  of  assumptions,  what  kinds  of  familiar,
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.59
Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show
that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as
self evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of
making facile gestures difficult.60
Such a critical attitude is deemed to be appropriate because “the work of deep
transformation can only be carried out in a  free atmosphere,  one constantly
agitated  by  a  permanent  criticism”.61 This  kind  of  critical  approach  is  thus
directed  by  a  commitment  to  improving  the  object  of  critique,  having
acknowledged  that  it  is  a  constituent  part  of  social  reality.  Essentially,  the
critique undertaken in this thesis is committed to the question of whether the
normative  prescriptions  contained  within  Japan's  human  security  discourse
the EADI, Bonn, 2005), 1–16; Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, Human Security and 
Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage (University of Lancaster, 2004); 
Miguel De Larrinaga and Mark G. Doucet, “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human 
Security,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 5 (2008): 517–537; Newman, “Critical Human Security
Studies,” 2010.
58 Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” 2010, 90.
59 Michel Foucault, “Practicing Criticism,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. L.D. Kritzman and Alan Sheridan (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1988), 154.
60 Ibid., 155.
61 Ibid.
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and realised through its  human security practices,62 are  justified in terms of
theoretical  coherency and in reference to the idea of  a  just  society  in which
human beings are guaranteed the maximum amount of freedom and choice in
their everyday lives, without excessive intervention or regulation by the state. 
Richard  Ashley's  sustained  critiques  of  international  relations  theory,
particularly  in  reference  to  neorealism63 and  economic  determinism,64 also
provide direction to the critical approach of this thesis. One of Ashley's longest
and  most  well  known  deconstructions  of  neorealism  concludes  with  the
following justification for the seemingly harsh and non-apologetic tone taken
throughout the body of the critique:
Let us then play havoc with neorealist concepts and claims. Let us neither admire
nor ignore the orrery of  errors,  but let  us instead fracture the orbs, crack them
open, shake them, and see what possibilities they have enclosed. And then, when
we are done, let us not cast away the residue. Let us instead sweep it into a jar,
shine up the glass, and place it high on the bookshelf with other specimens of past
mistakes.65
As this passage suggests, Ashley's reasoning for his critical work is positive in
regard to the discipline within which he operates, for the results of his writing
take the form of a reminder of mistakes to avoid in future theorising. Moreover,
the  fracturing  of  which  he  speaks  provides  the  foundation  for  an  analytical
approach in which the key elements of a theory can be apprehended one by one
in order to assess their cogency, as well as providing a means by which to assess
their legitimacy on the basis of the ramifications they have for human freedom.
62 The actual practices undertaken by Japan as part of its human security policy are largely 
beyond the scope of this work. Whilst chapter 5 examines the discursive representation of 
agents of human security, their relationships and particular aspects of human security 
praxis, the rest of the thesis is concerned with representation of issues surrounding the 
meaning of human security, reasons for its pursuit and those things which are postulated as
being antagonistic to human security. 
63 Richard K Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38, no. 2 
(1984): 225–286.
64 Richard K Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 
(1983): 463–96.
65 Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” 1984, 286.
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In the case of this thesis, the criteria according to which the elements of Japan's
human  security  discourse  were  primarily  weighed  were  theoretical  and
representational  consistency  across  and  between  texts,  as  well  as  the
consequences  that  constructions  of  human  security  have  on  individuals'
experiences of life. 
A brief remark by Jacques Ranciere, that “critique acknowledges some thing's
existence, but in order to confine it within limits”,66 served a negative function
in  the  development  of  the  critical  attitude  applied  throughout  this  thesis.
Namely, as a reminder to avoid writing in a way which would limit the potential
for elucidation, change or reorientation in theoretical formulations of human
security  or  to  devalue  the  contribution that  Japan's  human security  policies
have had in promoting health, safety, security, well-being, peace and prosperity
around  the  world.  Instead,  by  focusing  on  ramifications,  underlying
assumptions,  political  interests,  theoretical  inconsistencies  and  omissions  of
Japan's human security discourse, the aim has been to remove limits to further
advancement of human security thought and theory. 
Problematisation of the representations found in Japan's corpus of texts follows
the  general  methodological  strategy  of  comparison.  Representations  are
compared both across and within texts for consistency and coherence, with their
theoretical  ramifications  and  implications  discussed  and  compared  across
different representational categories. 
Outline and Structure of Thesis
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapters two to five contain the bulk of
the substantive critical  and analytical  work that was undertaken throughout.
66 Jacques Ranciere, Hatred of Democracy (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 2.
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This first introductory chapter is concerned with the methodological, theoretical
and  normative  commitments  of  the  thesis,  as  well  as  the  objective  of
undertaking  the  research  compiled  within,  whilst  the  final  chapter  is  a
conclusion of the findings from chapters two to five.
In broad theoretical terms, chapters two to four take Japan's representation of a
number of facets of its human security discourse as their object of analysis and
critique. Importantly, and consistently with the constructivist commitments of
the thesis, questions asked of these texts are not underwritten by a search for
truth or objective reality. Throughout the thesis, the constructs brought up and
discussed  are  approached  as  images,  representation  or  pictures  of  an
international  relations  reality  inscribed  in  text.  Whether  the  texts  examined
were  considered  to  be  an  expression  of  truth  by  those  involved  in  their
compilation or publication is a theoretically interesting question, but one which
is not taken into consideration in the thesis due to its foundation in a different
methodology than that proposed here. 
Chapter two is dedicated to the question of how Japan's human security texts
represent  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  human  security.  Accordingly,  the
materials under investigation are considered in terms of how they represented,
implicitly or explicitly, answers to questions such as:
1. Who determines the meaning of human security?
2. Which humans are to be secure?
3. What is the status of human security as a body of knowledge?
In chapter  three,  only  one fundamental  question is  asked of  Japan's  human
security texts: namely, why should the security of humans be pursued? Because
the texts  under  consideration are  somewhat impoverished in terms of  direct
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answers to this question, the functional analysis is based on the question of how
ideas about human security invoked in these texts work to evoke a picture in
which the pursuit  of  human security comes across as warranted,  justified or
facile. 
Chapter  four  addresses  representations  of  discursive  objects  which  are
positioned as having an adverse effect on human security. As such, texts are
primarily interrogated with the following questions in mind:
1. What is considered to be a threat to human security?
2. Who or what is the cause of human insecurity?
3. Who determines what is ascribed with the property of being a threat to,
or problem for, human security?
4. How do threats differ from problems?
The fifth and final analytical chapter is concerned with human security practice;
particularly in terms of representations of actors said to be responsible for its
realisation and the relations between them. The key analytical questions are:
1. Who is to act in the name of human security?
2. What is the form of relations between different bodies ascribed with a
role in realising human security?
The sixth chapter is comprised of a summary and conclusion of the findings
discussed throughout the thesis.
***
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Having  discussed  the  motivation,  theory  and  methodology  underlying  this
thesis, the next chapter takes up the question of how human security, as a state
or condition of being, is represented in Japan's official human security texts. 
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Chapter II: The Meaning of Human Security
This  first  analytical  chapter  is  concerned  with  Japan's  representation  of  the
concept of human security. Specifically, three analytical perspectives have been
undertaken in exploring and problematising this element of the discourse. The
first part of the chapter deals with the subject of human security practice; asking
of the  texts  who the beneficiaries  of  Japan's  human security policy are.  The
second  analytical  theme  undertaken  in  this  chapter  is  concerned  with  the
ontological construction of human security and asks about the representation of
the  concept  of  human security  in  reference to  its  component parts.  Notions
which  have  been  brought  up  across  the  discourse  as  implicit  parameters  of
human security are numerous, but analysis focused upon only some of these,
primarily  because  the  discourse  is  impoverished  regarding  the  theoretical
treatment  of  these  component  parts;  at  times  there  was  literally  nothing  to
examine, analyse, or problematise about them other than to point out that it is
not enough to invoke concepts without even an attempt at definition, let alone
exploration  of  their  relationships  with  each  other.  Japan's  human  security
discourse has made some contribution towards countering Thomas et. al.'s 2001
charge that in general the concept remained “theoretically underdeveloped”, but
there  are  certainly  numerous  omissions  remaining.1 In  the  terms  of  Imre
Lakatos, the concepts examined can be considered as the hard core of Japan's
human security concept. They sit in this position simply because as the most
commonly invoked aspects of human security, they are the least impoverished
in terms of elucidation. The final part of this chapter is concerned with Japan's
representation  of  human  security  from  an  epistemological  point  of  view;  in
reference to implicit  claims regarding its status as an authoritative source of
knowledge. 
1 Nicholas Thomas, Michael Wesley, and Hee-Soo Kim, “Human Security in the Western 
Pacific: The Asian Economic Crisis and Beyond 1,” Asian Journal of Social Science 29, no. 1 
(2001): 122.
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Whose security?
This first section is concerned with the question of whose security and interests
are at stake in human security discourse. In Japan's human security texts, there
is a  measure of conceptual opaqueness regarding the question of who is to be
the  beneficiary  of  actions  taken  in  the  name  of  human  security.  Such
indeterminacy  was  present  from  the  beginnings  of  Japan's  human  security
chronology,2 as can be seen in the earliest speeches delivered by Obuchi Keizo in
1998. To an extent, this indeterminacy is not surprising since Obuchi's speeches
form  the  genesis  of  Japan's  human  security  policy;  with  exuberance  and
excitement  associated  with  promoting  the  idea  making  up  for  a  lack  of
theoretical rigour. The lack of clarity is evident in all of Obuchi's three major
speeches that touched upon human security, when one considers that the titles
of the speeches – “Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium”,3 “An
Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow”,4 and “Toward the Creation
of a Bright Future for Asia”5 – do  not indicate a concern with the human as a
subject  of  security  practice.  Even  though on  its  website  Japan's  Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs has categorised these three texts under the heading of Human
Security Foreign Policy,6 at first glance they point towards activities which are
aimed at furthering the interests of states (Japan) and regions (Asia) rather than
humans. 
2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chronology of Activities Related to Human 
Security by the Japanese Government,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed 
October 29, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/chronology.html.
3 Keizo Obuchi, “Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium” (Singapore, May 4, 
1998), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html.
4 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”
(presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html.
5 Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” (Hanoi, Vietnam, 
December 16, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html.
6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Human Security,” The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, accessed May 7, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.
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The indeterminacy mentioned above is not resolved by Obuchi throughout his
speeches, but made more acute when he expresses his belief that “we must deal
with [...] difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments
of population,  in the light of "Human Security,"  and that we must seek new
strategies  for  economic  development  which  attach  importance  to  human
security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region”.7 In
this  formulation, one can observe the conceptualisation of policy not only in
regard to a region, but also vis-a-vis a particular segment of population. The
problem of an unclear beneficiary is further compounded when Obuchi asserts
that  “in  our  times,  humankind  is  under  various  kinds  of  threats  [and]
environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for
us but also for future generations”,8 as here he sets the beneficiary of policy as a
kind of being (i.e. humankind/human-being), and adds humans conceptualised
in terms of generations to the human security policy equation.  
Fukushima  has  argued  that  Obuchi's  human  security  speeches  “formed  the
foundation of Japan’s approach to human security and its policy agenda”,9 but
this is only a partially accurate characterisation. One element which was missing
from Obuchi's speeches, but has been a constant feature of all the texts after
Obuchi, is the individual human being as the avowed beneficiary of policy. With
later  Japanese  speeches,  the  matter  of  the  object  of  policy  was  made  more
complex  because  human  security  began  to  be  theorised  in  reference  to  the
interests of individuals, rather than just groups of humans (i.e. a population) or
non-humans such as the state or region. It was in the speeches of Takemi that
the gaze of the state was magnified via the assertion that “it is also extremely
important,  however,  that  [human  security]  challenges  be  addressed  from  a
standpoint that gives full consideration to protecting the interests of individual
7 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
8 Ibid.
9 Akiko Fukushima, Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental 
Thinking and Practice, CCHS Human Security Visiting Fellow Paper (Vancouver: Canadian
Consortium on Human Security, August 2004), 16.
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human  beings”.10 More  recently,  in  his  statement  at  the  General  Assembly
Thematic  Debate  on  Human  Security,  Takasu  similarly  argued  that  “all
individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear
and  from  want”,  but  a  clear  picture  of  the  beneficiary  was  lost  when  he
continued to say that human security policy should “protect the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfilment”.11 The
difficulty  is  in  the  fact  that  at  the  same  time  as  speaking  of  individuals'
entitlements, Takasu defines goals of policy in reference to human freedom and
fulfilment;  i.e.  in  using  the  term  human  as  an  adjective  to  freedom  and
fulfilment, it is implied that these two goals of policy must be such that they
apply  to  all  humans,  irrespective  of  individual  differences.  As  Foucault  has
pointed out in relation to biopolitics, a significant expansion of the powers of
the state resulted from the appearance of the idea of a population.12 Insofar as a
characteristic  of  human  security  is  the  postulation  of  “the  individual  as  the
referent object”,13 Japan's version is not unique in implying a further expansion
of  state  power  through  foreign  policy  not  only  because  it  conceives  of
populations beyond sovereign borders as objects of policy, but also because its
view of the object of policy is magnified beyond the level of the population to
include the individual. In terms of the categorisation of conceptions of human
security according to whether the object of policy is within or outside sovereign
borders, Japan clearly fits in the latter group.14 However,  as an aside,  Japan's
10 Keizo Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International 
Order in the 21st Century” (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, 
Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html; Keizo Takemi, “Keynote 
Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity 
of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium on Development, United 
Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html emphasis added.
11 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security” 
(presented at the The General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, United 
Nations General Assembly, May 22, 2008), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2008/un0805-6.html.
12 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 
1977-1978, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
13 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” Security 
Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 358.
14 Thomas, Wesley, and Kim, “Human Security in the Western Pacific,” 2001, 126.
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interest in the human security of non-Japanese nationals abroad does not imply
a corresponding willingness to expose its  own citizens to the  critical  gaze  of
other agents of human security. This is because, as Neary has argued, Japan is
“[not] prepared to allow foreigners to pass judgement on [its] legal system or
custodial practices”.15 
Japan's  conceptual  imprecision  regarding  the  actual  object  of  policy  is  not
unique, as in actual fact it seems that “most definitions of human security do not
clearly distinguish between human security for individuals and human security
for  groups”.16 For  Hudson,  the  ramifications  of  not  adequately  theorising
whether the object is the individual or the group, is that the conceptualisation of
human security at the group level can have the effect of leading to a myopic
policy  which  does  not  recognise  the  security  needs  of  particular  political
identities.  Hudson's  criticism is  aimed at  the inability  of  human security,  in
general, to deal with differences in gender but,17 as will be discussed later in this
thesis, from the perspective of Japan's human security discourse there is scope
for  recognising  differences  between  humans,  although  this  expanded  scope
comes with the risk of undermining the meaning of basing categorisations on
such universal markers of group identity as human.  McDonald also argues that
human security  policy  runs the  risk of  overlooking certain forms of  political
identity, but in contradistinction to Hudson his argument is aimed at excessive
use of the individual, rather than the group, as the focal point of human security
practices. Specifically, he asserts that “treating individuals as the referent object
of  security  does  not  always  represent  the  best  means  of  understanding  a
15 Ian Neary, “Japan’s Human Security Agenda and Its Domestic Human Rights Policies,” 
Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 284.
16 Heidi Hudson, “‘Doing’ Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on 
Gender and the Politics of Human Security,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 
164.
17 For the relationship between gender and security, see: Lene Hansen, “Gender, Nation, 
Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 
3, no. 1 (2000): 55–75; Lene Hansen, Security as Practice (London, New York: Routledge, 
2006).
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particular  situation  of  insecurity,  or  redressing  it”.18 Giving  the  example  of
discrimination against Kurds, McDonald argues that there are cases in which
people are treated unjustly not because of their individual identity, but on the
basis  of  their  affiliation  with  a  group,  and  so  “issues  of  identity  and  ethnic
difference, for example,  may be ignored by a Human Security approach that
effectively  abstracts  individuals”.19 For  McDonald,  the  solution  to  the
tunnel-vision of  either an exclusively  group level,  or  entirely  individual level
expression of human security, is to avoid setting definitively the referent object
of  policy  in  either/or  terms,  but  rather  to  allow  context  to  dictate  which
perspective  should  be  taken.  Japan's  human security  discourse  certainly  has
scope for such a selective application, because it takes into consideration both
levels of analysis and since a context dependent application of policy practice
was advocated by Takasu, who asserted that “threats to human security differ
from  country  to  country  and  individual  to  individual”.20 However,  Japan's
human  security  discourse  omits  to  acknowledge  the  presence  of  unresolved
theoretical tension between individual and group level security interests,  nor
does it suggest a way by which one might go about determining when such a
shift  between the  two  levels  of  analysis  and  practice  might  be  warranted.  A
characteristic problem for Japan's human security discourse in this regard is
also  the  lack  of  theorisation  as  to  a  way  by  which  to  mediate  the  security
interests of different groups or individuals, or how to resolve potential conflicts
of interests between the individual and the group level. 
 
For Foong Khong, one of the difficulties in speaking of human security at the
level of the individual, is that “ironically, in making all individuals a priority,
18 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” Global Society 16, no. 
3 (2002): 281.
19 Ibid.
20 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World” (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, 
Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.
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none actually benefits”, because priorities exist in a relative hierarchy.21 In other
words, to prioritise the interests of some means that the interests of others are
necessarily sidelined or marginalised. Foong Khong's argument is not based on
the idea that individual interests may come into conflict with each other, but
that it  is  by definition not possible to prioritise everyone's  interests.  Indeed,
insofar as prioritisation presupposes a relative perspective, this criticism holds
irrespective of whether human security policy is to be aimed at individuals, or at
humankind; as long as the objective is the security of every person, one cannot
prioritise any particular human's security interests. Foong Khong's critique is
valid  in  principle,  but  only  in  cases  where  there  is  an  attempt  to  prioritise
certain elements of human security over others. In Japan's case, prioritisation of
policy in terms of different beneficiaries has not been a key theme; indeed the
impression is often that Japan would like to address all people's human security
interests  without  claiming that  certain  people  or  certain  elements  of  human
security are more important than others, even though this claim comes with its
own theoretical  problems.22 However,  some prioritisation could be discerned
throughout the corpus of texts examined, though the problem brought up by
Foong  Khong  was  avoided.  For  example,  in  his  speech  on  the  relationship
between  human  security  and  health,  Sumi  has  claimed  that  “for  all  people
health is always the primary concern and they are ready to sacrifice everything
in  order  to  get  proper  health  care”.23 Here  health  has  been  defined  as  the
primary priority for the human security of everyone, and as such the problem of
trying to determine who or what has priority is averted, simply by asserting that
health takes that number one position in spite of all other measures of human
security.
Returning to the discussion about the beneficiaries of human security practice
21 Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,”
Global Governance 7, no. 3 (2001): 233.
22 The problem, inter alia, is that the realisation of all people's human security interests, as 
they are defined by Japan, necessarily leads to conflicts of individual interests.
23 Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html emphasis added.
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in early expressions of Japan's human security discourse, in speaking of human
security policy for the benefit of populations, Obuchi did not speak of the entire
population but rather in terms of “the socially vulnerable segments”.24 Through
his assertion that, with human security in mind, Japan had given assistance to
“the poor, the aged, the disabled, [and] women and children”, vulnerability was
constructed primarily as a matter of economic standing, age, gender, and norms
of ability,  although he hinted at “other” unspecified forms of vulnerability as
well.25 Notably, women were grouped with children in one category, suggesting
that not only is vulnerability a matter of gender and age, but also a function of
one's  role  in  the  family  unit.  In  a  sense  Japan's  human security  texts  are  a
positive response to calls for the engendering of human security26 according to
the idea that “women's security cannot be subsumed under people's security
since [they] have special needs and have been marked as special targets”,27 or
that women and girls experience armed conflict differently to men and boys and
are particularly vulnerable,28 even though the risk of constructing vulnerability
in terms of gender/sex is that women will continue to be perceived as weak and
requiring  the  assistance  of  the  non-vulnerable/strong,  thus  reinforcing
gender/sex as a valid category for discrimination between people.29 This point is
similar to one raised by Christie in his critique of a feminist approach to critical
human security studies, in which he warns that “essentialization of the different
expressions of men and women, as well as youths and adults, [is] likely to result
in ‘solutions’ that reinforce the divisions between these various groups”.30 In any
24 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
25 Ibid.
26 Gunhild Hoogensen and Kirsti Stuvoy, “Gender, Resistance and Human Security,” Security 
Dialogue 37, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 207–228.
27 Anuradha M. Chenoy, “A Plea for Engendering Human Security,” International Studies 42, 
no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 177.
28 Myriam S. Denov, “Wartime Sexual Violence: Assessing a Human Security Response to 
War-Affected Girls in Sierra Leone,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 3 (2006): 319 –342.
29 An alternative construction of vulnerability in regard to human security, which does not 
contain categories based on gender, sex or age is offered by Suhrke. This version of 
vulnerability consists of three categories of the most vulnerable: victims of war and internal 
conflict, those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at 
the edge of socio-economic disaster, and victims of natural disasters. See: Astri Suhrke, 
“Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (1999): 272.
30 Ryerson Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To 
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case, Japan's emphasis on the vulnerable is superfluous because their concerns
– whether they were to consist  of women, children,  or the aged – would be
addressed in an approach that focused upon the level of the individual; as Japan
purports to do, albeit somewhat inconsistently according to the representations
of  policy  beneficiaries  in  its  human  security  texts.  This  is  because  an
individualist  human  security  approach  would  by  definition  take  into
consideration the particular concerns of the person of interest; removing the
necessity of thinking in group level categories such as gender, sex or age.
Whilst Obuchi delineates vulnerable humans as the ones upon which policy is to
focus, he also paints a picture in which, generally speaking, the object of human
security practices is a vulnerable, weak being who is accosted on all sides by
forces beyond his or her control, with the only source of salvation in the hands
of non-human beings such as the state in the first instance, as well  as other
forms  of  agency,  such  as  non-governmental  organisations,  in  the  second
instance. This being would spend its life in an ideal setting undertaking creative
activities  in  a  dignified  manner,  with  no  need  to  be  concerned  with  the
multitude of potentially harmful forces by which it is surrounded or that would
impinge  upon  its  security  if  those  non-human  forms  of  agency  – states,
non-governmental organisations or international organisations – were not there
to care for it. Such a visage makes delineations of policy according to whether
the object  of  concern is  vulnerable  seem redundant,  because the  impression
from  Obuchi's  speeches  is  that  all humans  are  vulnerable.  In  this  way,  the
analytical significance of including the idea of vulnerability within the concept
of human security – at least in the speeches of Obuchi – is actually marginalised
because it does not help in distinguishing between people who might need more
or less assistance. On the other hand the characterisation of all people in terms
of vulnerability and an inability to deal with the threats to their  own security,
certainly  works  to  paint  the  state  and  its  collaborators  as  indispensable,
Critique?,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 179.
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legitimate  agents  in  the  pursuit  of  human  security.  In  this  regard,  Japan's
human security discourse is not inconsistent with a large  body of policy and
academic human security literature which situates the state as a key agent31 in
policy practice.32
The establishment of the individual as the key object of security practice is a
common trope in most definitions of human security.33 For this reason it is of
interest that Japan's very earliest expressions of human security policy focused
more on the level of the population or species than the individual, making it
unique  in  the  field,  despite  the  later  refocusing  away  from  the  group  and
towards the individual. One of the implications of postulating the concern of
policy in terms of  the practically  all  inclusive heading of humankind,  is  that
policy  can  be  extended  to  anyone  and  everyone  who  can  be  legitimately
classified as being of this kind, irrespective of any other forms of identity or
agency with  which they might  be  associated.  However,  this  broad palette  of
human  security  subjects  is  a  two  edged  sword,  since  whilst  it  may  allow  a
legitimate human security promoting agent to apply power to people beyond
such categorisations as citizenship, nationality or legal status, it also comes with
the risk that it may require the agent to act in the name of people whose actions
are directed at the human security agent itself. The conundrum of an agent of
human  security,  acting  in  the  interest  of  a  body  which  is  antagonistically
positioned towards it,  can be avoided if  that agent can successfully  deny the
humanity of such bodies. However, this is obviously a problematic position to
take  as  it  can  effectively  lead  to  the  suspension  of  human  standards  of
31 The issue of agency in the realisation of human security is the focus of chapter five.
32 Satomi Ho, “Japan’s Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of Its Limits and Failures,” 
Japanese Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 101–112; Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,”
April 1, 2010; Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, “‘The Utility of Human Security’: Which 
Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 
373–77; P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human 
Security,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 473–488; Miguel De Larrinaga 
and Mark G. Doucet, “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” Security 
Dialogue 39, no. 5 (2008): 517–537; Lincoln Chen and Vasant Narasimhan, “Human 
Security and Global Health,” Journal of Human Development 4, no. 2 (2003): 181–90.
33 McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” 2002.
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behaviour, leading to policies such as those carried out by Nazi Germany which
led to the the extermination of people who were categorised as sub-human.34
It is interesting to observe that Takasu attempted to reconcile the discrepancies
regarding the object of policy concern, at least in terms of the tension between
the  individual  and  group  level,  by  asserting  that  policy  is  about  both;  that
concern with the individual is an improvement on policy which deals only with
the group level, as “the human security approach is not content with a general
approach  of  aggregating  of  country  or  people  as  a  whole,  but  it  insists  on
improvement  in  the  livelihood  and  dignity  of  individuals  and  the
communities”.35 It  is  because human security is  not content with  addressing
aggregates,  that  one  can  conclude  that  a  form  of  human  security  which
prioritises aggregates and groups36 is considered by Japan to be inferior to one
which  prioritises  both  aggregates  and  individuals.  Nonetheless,  despite
recognition that one of the key debates around human security focuses upon the
line between what Newman has characterised as “universalist and particularist
values”,37 few of  the  texts  examined demonstrated  a  substantial  engagement
with the distinction or the issue of how to realise both sets of interests at the
same time.
In summary, the preceding discussion has aimed to show that the question of
the referent of policy – i.e. the beneficiary of efforts taken in the name of human
security  –  is  ambiguous  and  unsettled  across  the  body  of  Japan's  human
security  texts.  On the one hand,  it  is  not  just  people  who are  positioned as
34 Jerry Bergman, “Darwinism and the Nazi Race Holocaust,” Creation Ex Nihilo Technical 
Journal 13, no. 2 (1999): 101–11; Alexander Alvarez, “Adjusting to Genocide: The 
Techniques of Neutralization and the Holocaust,” Social Science History 21, no. 2 (July 1, 
1997): 139–178.
35 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008 emphasis added.
36 For an example of a human security approach which is concerned with the aggregate level 
see: Thomas, Wesley, and Kim, “Human Security in the Western Pacific,” 2001.
37 Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies 
Perspectives 2 (2001): 247.
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benefiting from policy, but also non-human entities like the state or the region.
Moreover,  whilst  later  speeches  spoke  predominantly  of  the  human security
interests of individuals, it is the case that the earliest texts also conceptualised
the recipient of policy to be vulnerable segments of populations. Whilst  it  is
possible that a change of focus to the individual at the expense of the group
occurred  in  Japan's  human  security  thinking  after  the  Obuchi  period,  from
Takasu's declarations that policy is for individuals and communities, it is more
likely that the individual was simply added alongside the list of potential objects
of  policy  practice.  Acharya  advocates  for  a  concept  of  human  security  that
distinguishes  between,  but  actually  takes  into  account  both  individuals  and
communities, although he asserts that the individualistic aspect, “at least to a
certain Asian mindset, conflicts with the old 'Asian approach to human rights'
developed in the heyday of the 'universalism versus cultural relativism' debates
about human rights in Asia”.38 Clearly this individualistic aspect is not lacking
from Japan's human security discourse, even though its presence leads to the
problem – unconsidered in Japan's human security texts – of how it might be
practical or even theoretically possible to address the interests of all individuals,
whilst maintaining the interests of the group in which those individuals exist,
not  least  in  regard  to  the  conflict  of  interests  between  the  security  of  the
individual in relation to the security of the group. This problem of conflicting
interests was identified quite early in debates on human security by Suhrke, who
asked,  “when  objectives  conflict,  which  interest  are  to  be  served?”.39 This
remains an unresolved and unaddressed issue in Japan's utterances on human
security. However, the inclusion of such a broad range of referent objects serves
to  ascribe  Japan's  discourse  with  a  theoretically  horizon-less  scope  for  the
application  of  human  security  practices  across  the  entire  population  of  the
planet. 
38 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” International Journal 56 (2001): 
449.
39 Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” 1999, 270.
42
The core parameters of human security
This section is concerned with examining the construction of human security as
a state  or condition of  being,  in  Japan's  human security  discourse.  In other
words,  analysis  focuses  around  representation  of  what  it  means  to  say  that
humans are secure.  Another way to conceive of the main analytical concern in
this section is to think in terms of examining the discursive objects which are
presented as making up the state of human security. If in general terms security
can be defined as “the state of being free from danger or threat”,40 it might seem
like a matter of fact assertion that the condition of  human security would be
comprised in terms of an absence of  dangers or threats to human lives so as to
maintain life. However, for Japan human security comes across as being a much
more encompassing condition which goes beyond consideration of only dangers
or threats to biological life, to include a number of considerations about ways in
which  one's  life  should  be  led or  how it  is  to  proceed.41 The most  common
elements  which  are  to  be  secured  are  life  and  survival,  livelihood,  and  a
particular  way  of  life  (most  commonly  one that  is  characterised in  terms of
dignity). Moreover, the experience of living is conceptualised in a complex way
that  involves  the  analysis,  measurement  and  regulation  of  one's  activities,
thoughts and feelings, as well as one's biological state. For the most part the
conditions  of  human  security  have  their  locus  on  the  human  subject  itself,
rather  than  being  on  the  environment  within  which  one  exists,  although
Koizumi provides an exception to this by speaking of a necessity to “build and
sustain  a  society where  individual  human  beings  can  fully  realize  their
possibilities”.42 Whilst Japan's human security discourse is relatively broad in
40 “Security,” New Oxford American Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2005).
41 A similar concern with a “multiplicity” of aspects of life was observed by Ngoma in his 
analysis of non-governmental organisations' representations of human security. See: 
Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In 
Southern Africa,” Journal of Security Sector Management 4, no. 2 (2006): para. 12.
42 Junichiro Koizumi, “Remark at the International Symposium on Human Security” 
(presented at the The International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, Japan, 
December 15, 2001), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0112_pm.html 
emphasis added.
43
terms of the elements of human life that it measures as part of human security –
particularly considering the status of human security policy as a foreign policy
rather  than  domestic  policy  –  the  development  of  these  parameters  is
theoretically impoverished, although concurrently general enough to legitimate
numerous policy agendas. 
Even though human survival is said to be the “most fundamental” element of
human security,43 it is also the case that, for Japan, states of human security also
refer to a way of life. To be able to say that humans are secure, a particular way
of living must be realised.  The corpus of texts  examined constructed human
security in terms of a life that is creative,44 meaningful,45 dignified,46 defined by
43 Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century 
which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium 
on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html.
44 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; Takemi, 
“Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on 
the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human 
Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
45 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Takemi, “Capacity Building for 
Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 
1999.
46 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; Takemi, 
“Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on 
the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Yoshihiro Mori, “Keynote Speech” (presented
at the Palm 2000 (Second Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting), Miyazaki City, 
Japan, April 22, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2000/palm-summit/seika/keynote_mor
i.html; Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000; Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various 
Threats to the International Community” (presented at the International Symposium on 
Human Security, Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_fm.html; Shinako Tsuchiya, 
“Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human 
Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’” 
(presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “ Human Security - Its role
in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, 
Japan, February 25, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html; Koichi Haraguchi, 
“Statement at the Wrap-up Meeting of the Security Council Focusing on the Role of the 
United Nations in Post-Conflict Situations” (presented at the Wrap-up Meeting of the 
Security Council Focusing on the Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Situations, 
United Nations Security Council, April 30, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un0304-3.html; Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the
44
well-being,47 freedom,48 independence,49 chances  and  opportunities,50 agency
(i.e. “the ability to make decisions about one's future”),51 the ability to realise
Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network” (presented at 
the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 
2004), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html; Kenzo Oshima, 
“Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III” (presented at the General 
Assembly, United Nations, New York, April 19, 2005), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2005/un0504-3.html; Sumi, “Human 
Security and Health,” 2006; Representative of the Government of Japan, “Statement at the 
39th Session of the Commission on Population on Development” (presented at the 39th 
Session of the Commission on Population Development, United Nations, New York, April 4,
2006), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2006/un0604-9.html; Yukio Takasu, 
“What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the
Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, 
Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html; Nobuko Kurosaki, “Statement
to the Sixty-second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Item 64: 
Social Development” (presented at the The Sixty-second Session of the General Assembly of
the United Nations Item 64: Social Development, United Nations General Assembly, 
October 8, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0710-8.html; 
Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
47 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Kiyohiko Toyama, “Statement at the
United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development” 
(presented at the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development, United Nations, New York, September 14, 2006), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ps/state0609.html; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at Open 
Debate of the Security Council on Women and Peace and Security” (presented at the Open 
Debate of the Security Council on Women and Peace and Security, United Nations Security 
Council, October 23, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0710-13.html.
48 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the 
International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the 
International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, 
May 8, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html; Sato, 
“Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004; Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of 
Cluster III,” April 19, 2005; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Yukio Takasu, 
“Towards Forming Friends of Human Security” (presented at the 8th Ministerial Meeting of
the Human Security Network, Bangkok, Thailand, June 1, 2006), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0606.html; Toyama, “Statement at the 
United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development,” 
September 14, 2006; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on 
Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
49 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
50 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on 
Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
51 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
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possibilities,52 having one's  individual viewpoint  respected,53 as  well  as  being
respected in general,54 achieving one's potential,55 not having anxiety,56 having
hope and the ability to realise it,57 having rights,58 being safe,59 having welfare
and  self-respect,60 being  healthy,61 being  fulfilled,62 having  gender  equality,63
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
52 Koizumi, “Remark at the International Symposium on Human Security,” December 15, 
2001.
53 Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International 
Community,” February 25, 2003.
54 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
55 Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International 
Community,” February 25, 2003; Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International
Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to 
the International Community’,” February 25, 2003; Takasu, “Statement at the General 
Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
56 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003.
57 Ibid.; Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network,” May 28, 2004.
58 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004; Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of 
Cluster III,” April 19, 2005; Representative of the Government of Japan, “Statement at the 
39th Session of the Commission on Population on Development,” April 4, 2006; Toyama, 
“Statement at the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development,” September 14, 2006; Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on
Human Security in a Globalized World,” May 8, 2000; Takasu, “Statement at the General 
Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
59 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004; Kenzo Oshima, “The Roles of Women in the Consolidation of 
Peace” (presented at the The Open Debate of the Security Council on Women and Peace and
Security, United Nations Security Council, 26 2006), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2006/un0610-13.html.
60 Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of Cluster III,” April 19, 2005.
61 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
62 Ibid.; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” 
May 22, 2008.
63 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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being empowered,64 having a livelihood,65 being happy,  and being allowed to
develop one's ability to the maximum extent.66 As the preceding list shows, the
conditions  of  human  security  are  vast  and  complex,  covering  the  physical,
medical,  psychological,  economic,  political,  philosophical,  and social  spheres.
The only areas of human life which are not included in Japan's human security
discourse are those of the mystical or religious. However, most of these aspects
of a secure human life were only invoked in passing or without elucidation. On
the other hand, some of them – discussed below – were encountered across a
number of texts with enough detail to warrant analysis and discussion.
All people should be born in dignity, should be able to live in
dignity, and should be able to end their lives, still in dignity.67
Japan's human security policy is very commonly presented as in part being a
64 Kinichi Komano, “Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the 
Human Security Network” (presented at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network, Ottawa, Canada, May 18, 2005), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0505.html; Oshima, “The Roles of 
Women in the Consolidation of Peace,” 26 2006; Kenzo Oshima, “Statement at the Open 
Debate of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict” (presented at the The Open
Debate of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations Security 
Council, November 28, 2006), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2006/un0611-5.html; Takasu, “What the 
Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of 
People,” May 18, 2007; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on 
Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
65 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Kawaguchi, “Human Security - Its 
Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community,” February 25, 2003; 
Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003; Haraguchi, “Statement at the Wrap-up Meeting of the Security Council 
Focusing on the Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Situations,” April 30, 2003; 
Komano, “Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network,” May 18, 2005; Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Kurosaki, 
“Statement to the Sixty-second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
Item 64: Social Development,” October 8, 2007; Takasu, “Statement at the General 
Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
66 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
67 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003.
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matter  of  human  dignity.  Dignity  is  a  common  trope  in  human  security
discourse  in  general,  and  its  presence  is  not  exclusive  to  Japanese  texts.68
Acharya  explains  its  prevalence  in  Japan's  context  primarily  in  relation  to
“widespread  poverty,  unemployment,  and  social  dislocation  caused  by  the
economic crises of the 1990s”.69 He also asserts that in Japan's case, to a lesser
degree, dignity is also prominent because of an increase in intra-state conflict,
the  spread  of  democratisation  and the advent  of  humanitarian  intervention;
although, as discussed in more detail in chapter three, it was found that Japan's
human security texts show a tendency to disassociate human security practice
from humanitarian  intervention.  Dignity  as  it  pertains  to  human  security  is
problematic, not least because of the ambiguous, imprecise and under-theorised
form  it  takes  in  Japan's  human  security  texts,  as  well  the  overtones  of
instrumentality through which it is only tentatively related to the life experience
of individual humans. It appears in the earliest speeches, as this example by
Obuchi demonstrates:
It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity,
without  having  their  survival  threatened  nor  their  dignity  impaired.  While  the
phrase "human security" is a relatively new one, I  understand that it  is  the key
which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life,
and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats.70
The postulation of dignity, represented in the above citation as a component of
human security, is troubling due to a number of under-theorised matters. A key
aspect missing in the text is that of the perspective from which dignity is to be
conceptualised and assessed. As such, a precise understanding of the text is not
possible because it is left open to numerous interpretations. Dignity can be felt
in regard to one's self (e.g. like having a sense of pride in one's self), or perceived
68 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36, 
no. 01 (2010): 77–94; Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International 
Law?,” Global Governance 11 (2005): 185–203; Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, 
Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage (University 
of Lancaster, 2004).
69 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001, 450.
70 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
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in regard to others (e.g.  he bowed with great dignity)71, but such difference in
perspective is not discussed or even acknowledged in Japan's official human
security  publications.  This  conceptual  problem  is  significant  not  least  when
formulating policy which is sensitive to different levels of dignity, or concerned
with undertaking actions which might have an effect on it. Nowhere in Japan's
human security texts was there a discussion of – inter alia – whether subjective
or objective levels of dignity are to serve as benchmarks which determine if an
intervention is necessary, what kind of intervention might be appropriate, or
whether manipulation of one form of dignity might affect another form. 
Considering  Japan's  numerous  references72 to  the  Commission  on  Human
Security's report on human security,73 one might imagine the presence of a fuller
exposition of dignity there, but at least in regard to the question of perspective,
it  is  silent  too.74 Other  than  postulating  dignity  as  a  component  of  human
security,  the  only  other  detail  brought  up  is  that  in  regard  to  pursuing  the
human  security  of  refugees,  “the  emphasis  should  be  on  the  productive
capacities of refugees, not on their vulnerabilities, for this will allow them to
71 “Dignity,” New Oxford American Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2005).
72 For example: Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For
the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2007); 
Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006; Sumi, “Human 
Security and Health,” 2006; Komano, “Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh 
Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 18, 2005; The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human 
Security” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 2008); Sato, “Statement on the
Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; 
Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on 
Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
73 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2003.
74 It is interesting that Japan has had some success using the Commission on Human Security
to bolster the legitimacy of its human security policy through association with the United 
Nations. Despite having been established by Japan, a number of researchers in the field 
have referred to the Commission as a part of the United Nations system. See Chenoy, “A 
Plea for Engendering Human Security,” April 1, 2005, 167; Denov, “Wartime Sexual 
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regain their livelihoods and dignity”,75 and that men and women can possess a
“natural dignity”.76  Whilst this tells one that dignity is in some way related to
being  productive,  and  that  dignity  is  seemingly  a  natural  state  of  being  for
people, there is still no indication as to whether dignity is to be a subjective or
objective measure of human security,  nor are there any hints as to  how one
could possibly measure it.
As Schachter points out, whilst references to human dignity have for some time
been included in many international instruments, including the Preamble of the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the idea has never been explicitly defined; its meaning being left to “intuitive
understanding [and] conditioned in large part by cultural factors”.77 Schachter
asserts that the problem of not defining human dignity in a clear way results in
an inability to determine when the concept is being misused and does not allow
one to formulate implications that the concept might have for policy conduct. A
seemingly  apparent  prerequisite  for  pursuing  dignity  as  a  manifestation  of
human  security  might  be  that  of  asking  those  particular  individuals  whose
human security is at stake, how they conceive of their own dignity and what
should be done in order to measure and realise it, particularly since dignity can
be  either  a  subjective  or  objective  state,  as  indicated  by  the  preceding
discussion.78 A similar suggestion for the introduction of a subjective measure
into  conceptualisations  of  human  security  is  spoken  of  as  a  “welcome
innovation”  by  Glasius,  who  argues  that  “a  subjective  approach  to  human
security may not be as wide eyed and unamenable to policymaking as it seems,
[since]  in  crime  prevention,  subjective  notions  of  security  have  long  been
75 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2003, 48.
76 Ibid., 8.
77 Oscar Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,” The American Journal of 
International Law 77, no. 4 (October 1, 1983): 849.
78 For Christie, the failure of human security discourses to take into consideration the voices 
of those who are presented as their main beneficiaries should be “laid bare”. This oversight,
together with the status of human security as a new “orthodoxy”, warrants his assertion that
“we must challenge and attack it”. Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,” April 1, 
2010, 186–187.
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privileged  over  absolute  crime  figures  [and]  require  would-be  providers  of
security to actually ask the victims they intend to save what makes them feel
secure and insecure”.79
Sweet  and  Masciulli80 have  also  indicated  the  preponderance  of  dignity  in
various  international  documents.  Like  Schachter,  they  have  pointed  out  the
similarity of dignity to worth, as well as associating it with the idea that people
should not be used for instrumental ends; rather that they should be an end in
themselves. However, to speak of both worth and the individual as an end in
itself  raises the  possibility  of  a tension that cannot  be resolved according to
Japan's human security discourse because a discussion about perspective in the
conceptualisation of dignity is missing. The tension lies in the fact that if dignity
is  a  matter  of  worth,  measured  from  the  perspective  of  the  Other  (i.e.
objectively), the way is opened for an instrumental use of the human subject,
since the idea of worth is itself associated with value; i.e. a value for something,
as  defined  by  the  Other.  In  other  words,  if  the  dignity  of  the  individual  is
conceptualised in relation to the value or worth it may have for the Other, there
is a risk that it will not be an end in itself but a means to an end. Only if dignity
is measured from the perspective of the Self (i.e. subjectively), and the Other is
not given the opportunity to make judgements about individuals' dignity, can
the idea of the person as a means to an end be ruled out, replacing it with the
idea of human dignity as a means in itself. 
It is possible to glean greater detail about the construction of dignity inherent in
Japan's notion of human security, from a speech Obuchi made at the Institute
for International Relations in Vietnam. In speaking of the necessity of the state
79 Marlies Glasius, “Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job 
Description for a Human Security Worker,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 
37, doi:10.1177/0967010607086822.
80 William Sweet and Joseph Masciulli, “Biotechnologies and Human Dignity,” Bulletin of 
Science, Technology and Society 31, no. 2 (2011): 6–16.
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and market to contribute to the realisation of human security, he claimed that:
Our  experience  has  taught  us  […]  that  both  the  state  and  the  market,  unless
carefully  managed,  may  well  hurt  human  dignity  by  shoving  suffering  on  the
socially  vulnerable.  Asian  society  in  the 21st  century must  be  one  in  which  all
people can truly appreciate peace and prosperity and be convinced that tomorrow
will be brighter than today.81
The implication  from this  statement  is  that  dignity  is  related  to  the  idea  of
egalitarianism and is measured in relative terms. People may lose dignity when
the well-being of others is achieved or maintained through their  suffering and
retain it when all people can live in peace and be prosperous. In other words, in
objective terms dignity is constructed as a condition which is highly dependent
on the state of others' life experiences. At the same time, it is presented as a
concept  which  retains  some  element  of  the  unknown,  thus  leaving  Japan's
exposition  open  to  interpretation.  Obuchi  is  unable  to  provide  certainty
regarding the circumstances under which dignity might be eroded, using only a
conditional modal verb to claim that mismanagement of the market or state
“may well hurt”82 human dignity.
In  associating  human security  with  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  Obuchi  added
economic considerations to the construction of dignity, claiming that “the crisis
[…]  has  been  a  direct  blow  to  the  socially  vulnerable  […]  threatening  their
survival  and  dignity”.83 What  is  missing  from  this  picture  of  dignity  is  a
comprehensive exposition of  how economic crisis  might affect  it;  specifically
regarding the mechanism by which not being in economic crisis means one has
dignity. There is no guarantee that even with affluence one will necessarily act in
a dignified manner; Charles Dicken's character – Ebenezer Scrooge – is a well
known Western literary example of exactly the opposite case, where economic
affluence  is  synonymous  with  undignified  behaviour.  The  attachment  of
81 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.
82 Ibid. emphasis added.
83 Ibid.
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economic measures to dignity functions to represent human security policy as
an objective pursuit,  through the argument that  the  possession of  a  level  of
economic  affluence can facilitate  individuals'  efforts  to  acquire  dignity  when
they  accumulate  material  possessions  and  the  external  trappings  of  wealth.
However, the postulation of dignity as a function of economic well-being brings
to mind the kind of “variable economism” which was decried by Richard Ashley
in his criticism of international theorists' “exaggeration of the economic sphere's
importance  in  the  determination  of  social  and  political  relations  and  a
corresponding underestimation of the autonomy and integrity of the political
sphere”.84
Working to fill the signifier of dignity with  a modicum of meaning,85 Takemi
represents it as a state of being which can exist for “all the peoples of the world”,
presumably  meaning  that  dignity  could  be  experienced  by  all  people
concurrently.86 However, despite his invocation of the period of the 21st century,
Takemi's assertion does not guarantee that all people can or will have dignity at
the same time. This is because a  century can be conceptualised as a period of
time rather than a point in time, and as such, it is conceivable that dignity could
be realised for everyone sometime throughout that period, but not exactly in the
same moment. Without clarifying the temporal aspects of how universal dignity
might come to be manifested, one cannot conclude if  it is to be conceptualised
as something which could potentially be mutually exclusive or corrosive across
individuals, or whether it is something which everybody could have at the very
same  moment.  Since  Takemi's  construction  of  dignity  omits  such
considerations,  the  reader  of  his  text  is  not  able  to  ascertain  whether  the
realisation of the dignity of a particular individual might not somehow impinge
84 Richard K Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 
(1983): 463.
85 For more on the concepts of signifier and signified, see Ernesto Laclau, “Why Do Empty 
Signifiers Matter to Politics?,” in Emancipation(s) (London, New York: Verso, 2007), 
36–46.
86 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
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upon the dignity of another  or how mutually exclusive conceptions of dignity
across individuals might be resolved. 
By  presenting  human  dignity  as  a  grounding  for  “an  age  of  peace  and
prosperity”, Takasu raises the possibility that the concept is indeed conceived of
as something related to value or worth, insofar as its realisation can pave the
way for realising the objectives of peace and prosperity.87 Irrespective of how
ethically or economically appealing peace and prosperity might be, they are not
intrinsic to dignity, and thus the postulation of the latter as presupposition of
the former suggests that the definition of human dignity is bounded by the need
for it to function in a way that is congruent with peace and prosperity; giving the
impression that, in the terms of Sweet and Masciulli mentioned above,88 Japan's
notion of human dignity is conceived of as being instrumental in the realisation
of objectives signified as peace and prosperity.89  However, as discussed above it
is conceivable that dignity can be absent despite economic prosperity, and it is
not unimaginable to envisage a situation in which peace prevails but dignity is
lacking.90 The  presence  of  dignity  as  a  theme  in  Japan's  human  security
discourse is brought up again in the following chapter, where it is discussed in
the context of representations about the reasons for pursuing human security.
To enjoy a healthy and happy life 91
87 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
88 Sweet and Masciulli, “Biotechnologies and Human Dignity,” 2011.
89 I am grateful to one of my examiners for pointing out the texts' lack of elucidation upon 
whether the peace which is invoked should be positive or negative.
90 For example, debates about mandatory detention of refugees in countries which are not in a
state of war have in part involved contest as to whether the practice allows people to 
maintain their dignity. See Dean Lusher and Nick Haslam, eds., Yearning to Breathe Free: 
Seeking Asylum in Australia (Federation Press, 2007); Danielle Every, The Politics of 
Representation: A Discursive Analysis of Refugee Advocacy in the Australian Parliament, 
Ph.D Dissertation (University of Adelaide, August 2006); “Dignity Not Detention,” 
Detention Watch Network, 2012, http://detentionwatchnetwork.org.
91 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
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Life  figures  as  an  important  component  of  Japan's  official  and  public
representation of the condition of human security, though its construction takes
a number of forms. Most notably texts vacillate between the use of the term life
as a state which can be distinguished from death, as opposed to a usage which
emphasises a way of life.  According to Obuchi: 
An unavoidable  fact  is  that  Asia's  remarkable  economic  development  in  recent
years also created social strains. The current economic crisis has aggravated those
strains, threatening the daily lives of many people.92
Here human security policy is said to be concerned with a form of life which can
be identified in temporal  terms.  It is  not the state of  being alive or people's
entire life which is of concern here, but life conceptualised as something which
happens to people on a day-to-day basis. By expressing life as a noun, life comes
across as just another one of the activities people undertake on a daily basis,
rather than as a phenomenon which encapsulates all other human activities; as
would have been implied if the verb to live had been used instead. 
Another expression of life in temporal terms can be found in Sumi's exposition
of the relationship between human security and health:
As of today the Japanese people enjoy the longest average longevity of  over 80
years in the world; however, it is only 50 years ago that the average life of Japanese
people was only 50 years. There are three elements for this success. First, people
have full  access  to advanced health care.  Second,  the provision of  a  safe  water
system leads to the drastic reduction of communicable diseases. The provision of
safe water constitutes a fundamental  condition for health.  Third,  eradication of
parasites.  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  Japanese  success  is  based  upon  the
combination of a health system and a well advanced education system.93
This excerpt expresses the concept of life in human security vis-a-vis health and
longevity, giving the impression that one aspect of life under a human security
92 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998
emphasis added.
93 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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regime is that of life-span; that living longer constitutes, at least in part, the
condition  of  being  secure  as  a  human.  The  idea  that  longevity  is  in  part  a
constituent of the state of human security has the potential for legitimating a
form of human security policy in which people's productive capacity is exploited
for  longer  periods  through such acts  as  delaying the  official  retirement age;
especially if one considers how life under the human security regime has been
expressed in socio-economic terms as well. Sato, for instance, has claimed that
through human security policy, “the HOPE of the ordinary people will enhance
the  resilience  of  each  and  every  individual,  thus  advancing  forward
socio-economic conditions for their life (sic) and helping to realize sustainable
development”.94 Indeed,  Japan's  earliest  texts  on  human  security  contained
such a socio-economic element, through their association of human insecurity
with  the  Asian  Economic  and  Financial  Crisis  and  the  pursuit  of  policy
objectives expressed in terms of prosperity.95 Moreover, as will be discussed in
more detail later in this chapter, the construction of human security in terms of
human potential and capabilities also contributes to creating an image of the
concept in which economic aspects are a core element.
A temporal mode of presenting life can likewise be discerned in a publication by
the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which paraphrases the 1994 United
Nations  Development  Programme's  Human Development  Report,  marginally
filling out the meaning of daily life by representing policy as being a matter of
“protecting  [people]  from sudden and  hurtful  disruptions  in  the  patterns  of
daily  life”.96 The implication of  this  statement is  that people's  daily  lives are
conceptualised in terms of recurring patterns of activity and that being secure
presupposes only changes which retain the integrity of those patterns or affect
94 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
95 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998; Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; 
Obuchi, “Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium,” May 4, 1998.
96 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
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them only in regulated ways. Moreover, what is taken to be a significant change
in the patterns of daily life and thus worthy of an intervention in the name of
human security,  is  measured  in  terms of  the  seemingly  subjective  notion  of
pain/hurt which cannot easily be compared across individuals. Unfortunately,
neither  of  these  aspects  of  daily  life  shed  much  insight  into  exactly  what
activities might be included, other than delineating that it is non-spontaneous
or non-abnormal, patterned activities which are undertaken every day that are
of concern. The use of terms such hurtful and sudden are ambiguous and offer
little  conceptual  precision,  although  they  contribute  to  the  formation  of  an
image of the Japanese state as caring, benign and concerned with stability in a
dangerous  and  rapidly  changing  context.  On  the  other  hand,  Takasu's
paraphrasing  of  former  United  Nations  Secretary-General  Kofi  Annan's
statement that “no calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that
of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to
make their lives better”,97 gives a different image regarding the temporality of
human security  life.  Here  the  emphasis  is  not  so much on regularity  or the
short-term, but about life in general or in its totality. 
Obuchi's characterisation of threats and issues which are said to be pertinent to
human  (in)security  is  also  notable  because  of  its  implications  for  the
construction of human life in terms of temporality. Specifically, in asserting that
“environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for
us but also for future generations”,98 Obuchi transgresses the lifespan of any one
individual and inserts into the concept of human security a consideration of life
in  terms  of  generations.  In  other  words,  Japan's  human  security  policy  is
represented as dealing with numerous temporal dimensions of people's lives.
These dimensions include the short term (daily life), the medium term (entire
life), and the long-term (generation). 
97 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
98 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
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Similarly to the the idea of dignity, the primary difficulty with daily life as a
component  of  Japan's  concept  of  human  security  is  its  theoretical
underdevelopment and inconsistency in the meaning with which it is ascribed
across various texts. For instance, a close reading reveals little about what it is
that actually makes up this aspect of human security. One characteristic of the
problem is that it  is  unclear as to the extent to which daily  life,  whatever it
happens to be, needs to be affected so as to warrant a response. In reference to
this question, it is not possible to conclude whether it is only those things which
lead  to  a  real  or  figurative  death  of  daily  life  that  justify  human  security
practices or whether something less than its death is grounds for preventative or
curative  interventions.  Furthermore,  without  a  specification  of  the  object  of
assessment,  even  in  such  simple  and  intuitive  terms  as  “the  activities  and
experiences that constitute a person's normal existence”,99 there is no possibility
for determining when either death or damage to daily life has occurred. Just
what constitutes the activities and experiences of a normal experience of daily
life is left to readers' imaginations. Moreover, from the formulations of Japan's
documents, one cannot conclude whether daily life is made up of all the things
that one does in a day or whether only certain activities constitute daily life. Nor
is there a consideration of whether these activities,  irrespective of what they
may be, should be carried out every day so as to be regarded as facets of daily
life, or only on certain key, albeit unspecified days. 
As indicated above, the discourse is impoverished regarding the exact meaning
of life and the distinction between life in biological terms and life as a form of
human experience is not always clear. However, the association of the term with
a wide temporal range that spans from the everyday to the generation, works to
open up a space for a similarly wide range of biopolitical interventions which
can thus be legitimately pursued within a human security framework. Insofar as
99 “Daily Life,” New Oxford American Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/daily.
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human security practices are, at least in part, a form of biopolitical regulation,
the discourse is partial to consideration of the individual's entire life span  as
well  as  that of  their  progeny  as a site  for the application of  power aimed at
realising the conditions which make up human security.  Problematically, and
similarly  to  the  absence  of  a  way  by  which  one  might  prioritise  competing
human security interests of numerous individuals, the discourse does not clearly
specify  how to  determine  if  the  security  concerns of  a  particular  individual
trump  those  of  their  progeny,  or  conversely,  if  interventions  which  have  a
negative impact on an individual's security interests might be justified if they
can be shown to promote the human security of their children. This unresolved
tension  is  reminiscent  of  controversy  regarding  the  rights  of  the  unborn,  in
which debate revolves around the question of whether the interests of a foetus
should be ascribed with more or less importance than that of their mother. 
The  indeterminacy  of  the  discourse  regarding  the  question  of  whether  the
human  security  concerns  of  the  individual  should  be  ascribed  the  same
importance as that of their progeny, is not only problematic on its own terms; it
also  has  a  bearing  on  human  dignity,  which  is  a  core  element  of  Japan's
construction of the state of human security. Specifically, the notion of dignity at
the  level  of  the  individual  cannot  be  easily  maintained  if  policy  allows  for
practices which work to enhance the human security of those yet unborn, unless
the  dignity  of  the  individual  is  considered as  homogeneous with  that  of  the
child. Conceptualising dignity in this way is possible but causes problems for the
conceptualisation of human security in individual terms; since conceiving of the
dignity of a person with that of their children serves to destabilise the idea of an
individual human being and individual human security interests.
Speaking of daily life as a component of human security brings with it the sense
that policy is about the mundane yet nonetheless essential elements of human
existence; minutiae which do not necessarily relate to the acts of outstanding
individuals, but manifest their importance through the fact that they are indeed
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common to all people. If this is the case, one can observe a kind of pragmatism
and prudence in the discourse which appeals to the necessity of being able to
govern and direct a population through regulation of its most fundamental and
material concerns. However, policy is not represented as just being about the
unremarkable, routine activities of humans. In expressing his conviction that
“human beings should be able to lead lives of  creativity, without having their
survival threatened nor their dignity impaired”,100 Obuchi went beyond thinking
of life in a utilitarian, pragmatic or functional way, to a conceptualisation which
brings to mind aesthetic, artistic, or constructive acts. But, the human security
picture offered by Japan does not envisage the kind of creativity associated with,
for instance, the archetype of the tortured artist.  For in postulating that it is
“primarily the responsibility of the individual to do his or her best to overcome
any impediment and to try to fulfill his or her potential to lead a  happy life”,
Takasu clarified that whatever the content or direction of the creative lifestyle
might be, it must be such that the individual is “happy”.101 With the addition of
happiness to the parameters of human security, one can discern a psychological
and  spiritual  element  in  Japan's  human  security  discourse,  although  as
symptomatic  of  Japan's  human  security  discourse,  there  is  no  theoretical
clarification  as  to  whether  happiness  is  to  be  measured  subjectively  or
objectively. 
The association of creativity with life in human security policy was also hinted at
in a  text by Takemi. In his Keynote Speech, he also talked about a life that is
meaningful,  although the focus in this  text was the objective of realising the
conditions  under  which  people  can,  if  they  wish,  take  responsibility  for
themselves:
Human beings inevitably possess a rich potential to live creative and meaningful
100 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998
emphasis added.
101 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000 emphasis added.
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lives.  The wisdom of human beings comes from this potential. This wisdom can
only be realized if human beings are provided the freedom to live their lives in a
manner where they can assume their own responsibilities.102
What seems apparent from this excerpt is that the secure human life is one in
which  people  have  the  possibility of  taking  responsibility  for  themselves,
although  it  is  not  revealed  what  those  responsibilities  are  or  under  what
circumstances they might need to be undertaken by people themselves, rather
than being taken on by the state or some other agent of human security. It is
also notable that the way of life  which is being suggested here is not one in
which people are obligated to take responsibility for themselves, but rather one
in which they have the freedom to do so if they wish; this is evident from the use
of the modal auxiliary verb can, which indicates potential for doing something,
rather than an obligation or commitment to it. This excerpt thus explicates life
under  a  human security  regime in  reference to  the  environment in  which a
person  lives,  rather  than  to  people  themselves,  because  it  deals  with  the
conditions under which humans might potentially be able to engage in certain
behaviours, rather than the characteristics of people themselves which might
lead  them  to  undertake  certain  courses  of  action.  As  such,  the  discourse
demonstrates a sensitivity to the context in which human life is experienced, as
well as being considerate of human attributes related to the experience of life
such as the perception of happiness. This element of the discourse – postulating
a  causal  relationship  between  one's  environment  and  one's  behaviour  –
functions to advocate a human security role for bodies which are able to exert
influence upon the environment in which humans live.
Another example which similarly legitimates the engagement and participation
of  non-human agents  such as  the  state  in  the  realisation of  human security
through  the  regulation  of  life/lifestyle,  was  brought  up  by  Takemi  in  his
102 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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association of human security with the “freedom to participate in family life”.103
As such, the aspects of life which are theorised as being under the auspices of
human security policy are relations based on kinship, even though the nature
and extent of such family life is underdeveloped. Whilst the discourse opens up
a space for intervention, control or regulation of family relations by legitimate
agents of human security, there is a lack of specification in regard to what that
family life should look like. This omission is conspicuous because not all forms
of  relations  based  on  kinship  are  universally  regarded  as  legitimate.
Demonisation and preventative policies against nepotism framed as corruption
are evidence of the fact that there are limits to the kinds of family relationships
which are considered to be normal according to the standards of democratic,
elected government. 
The  life  which  is  of  interest  to  human  security  policy  is  sometimes
conceptualised  as  being comprised of  a  vital  core;  a  notion which has been
invoked in a number of texts albeit in different guises. Takemi, for instance,
spoke of it as a non-definitive yet “useful starting point for discussion” about
human security:104
The working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human
Security,  which  was  established  in  June  2001,  states,  “the  objective  of  human
security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive
threats in a way that is consistent with long term human fulfillment.”  While this
characterization  is  not  definitive,  it  is,  I  believe,  a  useful  starting  point  for
discussion. 105
However, the vital core has also been represented conversely; as actually a part
of the definition of human security:
103 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
104 Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in 
Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue
on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International 
Exchange, 2002), 42, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf.
105 Ibid. emphasis added.
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The [CHS] Report defines human security as “[the protection of] the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment”.106
At the outset, three things are worth noting about these conjurations of the vital
core: Firstly, that the status of the vital core in regard to the definition of human
security  is  contested,  even  by  Japan  itself.  As  noted  above,  whilst  the  first
excerpt  presents  it  as  a  non-definitive  point  of  departure  for discussion,  the
second  one situates the vital core as  part of the definition of human security.
Adding to its opacity, Takasu has presented the significance of the vital core in
two distinct ways. In one he suggests that:
It  would be sufficient  to  agree on a  general  operational  definition as  a  base of
collaborative efforts such as: e.g. "To protect the vital core of all human lives in
ways  that  enhance  human freedoms and human fulfillment"  ("Human Security
Now") .107
In this passage, a middle ground is taken between the positions of Takemi in the
first excerpt,108 where the idea is presented as not definitive but rather as a point
of  departure  for  discussing  the  concept,  and  the  Commission  on  Human
Security  position  paraphrased  by  Sumi  and  the  Global  Issues  Cooperation
Division in  the  second excerpt,109 where  it  is definitive.  In  the  exposition of
Takasu, the notion of the vital core constitutes part of a somewhat temporary
and imprecise definition, which is to function as a facilitator of collaboration in
the name of human security. Thus, it is neither a catalyst for discussion, nor the
kernel  of  a  definition,  but  a  heuristic  or  identity  according  to  which
collaboration and cooperative action can proceed. However, in a later text, he
seems to weaken the position of the vital core as part of the definition of human
security by presenting what had earlier been designated as the Commission on
Human Security's (a) definition or (b) general operational definition, as merely
106 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust 
Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 3 
emphasis added.
107 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006.
108 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.
109 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust 
Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 3.
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a “working definition”.110 One can observe a transfiguration of the concept from
a  proper definition,  to  a general  operational  definition and then to merely a
working definition. However it is not in reference to the Commission on Human
Security's definition that Takasu repositions the vital core, as he is not an official
representative of that organisation. Rather, the status of the vital core changes
because of the way in which the Commission on Human Security definition's
equivalence with Japan's official definition (or lack of it) is diluted throughout
the  course  of  three  of  Takasu's  speeches.  In  other  words,  initially  Japan's
concept  was  relatively  equivalent  with  that  of  the  Commission  on  Human
Security,  whilst  in  later  texts  a  distance  can  be  discerned  between  the  two
definitions. Moreover, not only does Takasu appear to jettison the idea that the
vital core is a part of Japan's definition of human security, he also places doubt
as to whether a definition is needed at all for collaboration between agents of
human security. Instead, he supplants a definition of human security with the
idea of a “common understanding”, which is underwritten by the Commission
on Human Security's working definition:
FHS111 has come to the recognition that, rather than focusing on elaborating a legal
definition of the concept, we should pursue concrete collaboration on the basis of a
common understanding of the broad concept contained in the outcome document.
This common understanding is in line with the working definition provided by the
Commission on Human Security; "to protect the vital core of all human lives in
ways  that  enhance  human  freedom  and  human  fulfillment."  The  absence  of  a
legally defined definition will not deter concrete collaboration.112
With  Takasu,  the  vital  core  is  constructed  in  reference  to  a  common
understanding between human security agents, which he offers as a sufficient
replacement for consensus on a definition on human security. This consensus is
to serve as the foundation for cooperation in the realisation of human security
policy. His proposal is based on a self-referential argument because at the same
time as seemingly abandoning the need for an elaborate  definition of human
110 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
111 Friends of Human Security.
112 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006.
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security in lieu of a  common understanding of the concept, he claims that the
common  understanding  is  “in  line”113 with  the  definition  of  human  security
offered by the Commission on Human Security. The only way to resolve this
apparently circular logic, in which a definition is rejected in favour of a common
understanding  based  on  that  very  definition,  is  to  focus  upon  the  kind  of
definition that Takasu rejects: a legal definition. It is a legal definition of human
security which is  not needed,  rather than an outright  one.  However,  neither
Takasu's  speech  nor  any  other  Japanese  human  security  document  has
elucidated upon the difference between a legal definition and a non-legal one,
leaving the matter of what constitutes a definition unresolved and ambiguous. 
Whatever its actual status in regard to a definition of human security or the
nuances of what is actually meant by the term definition, what can be gleaned
about the vital core from Japan's texts is nonetheless quite impoverished. It is to
be protected “in ways” that enhance human freedom and fulfilment114 in  the
long-term.115 Since the prescription is that the vital core should be protected in a
particular way, the interpretive implication is that there may be other ways in
which it could conceivably be protected; ways which are beneficial to the core's
integrity but that are not consistent with long-term human fulfilment. And, even
though one  is  left  with  the  impression  that  the  vital  core  does  not  of  itself
guarantee  fulfilment in the  long term,  Japan's  human security  texts  omit  to
explain  or  specify  the  nature  of  its  apparent  significance to  human security,
human life or human experience. As a result, the concept's invocation comes
across  as  a  rhetorical  strategy  which  functions  to  legitimate  human security
practices  through  the  promise  of  a  way  to  positively  affect  some  ostensibly
hidden, fundamental and indispensable element that makes up the kernel  of
being human. 
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.
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The Commission on Human Security's elucidation upon the vital core is also
vague and only marginally more developed than what Japan has said about it.
Despite  the  object  of  discussion  being  ascribed  with  a  vital character,  the
Commission's report mentions it only twice:
The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What
people consider to be “vital”—what they consider to be “of the essence of life” and
“crucially  important”— varies  across  individuals  and societies.  That  is  why any
concept  of  human security  must  be  dynamic.  And that  is  why we refrain  from
proposing an itemized list of what makes up human security.116
Health security is at the vital core of human security—and illness, disability and
avoidable death are “critical pervasive threats” to human security. 117
At best, the notion of the vital core looks ambiguous and the meanings ascribed
to it  in the two excerpts above are different if  not contradictory.  In the first
example,  a  loose  definition  or  set  of  boundaries  for  the  concept  is  invoked;
embedding it in the context of elementary rights and freedoms. However, it is
also asserted that the vital core is about things which are the essence of life and
crucially important, and that the content of these categories is dependent upon
how individuals and societies construct them. In other words, on the one hand
the vital core is said to be about rights and freedoms, but in the next sentence
this assertion is put into doubt because it is also represented as being potentially
different for every individual or society. The short treatment of the vital core in
the first example is problematic because it seems difficult to reconcile the fixing
of its meaning as a matter of elementary rights and freedoms, with the idea that
its meaning depends on particular individuals' or societies' priorities; especially
if one can conceive of an individual or society that would  not consider either
rights  or  freedoms  to  be  vitally  important  in  relation  to  other  priorities  or
objectives.
116 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 4.
117 Ibid., 96.
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Adding to the logical ambiguity, in the second example, the pseudo concept of
the vital core is constructed not as a part of life itself, but rather as a part of
human security. Whilst in the first example118 the vital core signifies a part of life
which should be protected in order to realise human security,  in the second
example,119 it is not life which has a vital core but human security; and it is a
matter of health. Despite the presence of the same signifier (i.e. the vital core),
the signified brought up in the two excerpts is not the same. The representation
of  the  vital  core  in  the  Commission  on  Human  Security  report  is  thus
inconsistent because it claims to be all of the following things at the same time:
something to do with elementary freedoms and rights, something that varies
according to  individuals  and societies,  something related to  human life,  and
something constituting human security. 
Aside  from  the  aspects  of  life  discussed  above,  one  more  trope  running
throughout Japan's human security texts is notable for its relative commonality.
This is  the association of the state of human security with that of health, as
characterised prototypically by Sumi in his speech entitled Human Security and
Health:
Fr. Akio Nemoto, a Franciscan priest, who has spent many years in a hospice in
South Africa looking after HIV/AIDS patients, once told me a story of a patient. A
mother who knew she was dying with HIV/AIDS wrote a letter to her beloved 3
year-old daughter.  The letter  had the condition that  her  daughter could read it
when she became 16 years old, mature enough to understand the meaning of the
letter in which her mother explained how she was affected by HIV/AIDS through
her husband's adultery, how much she loved her daughter and she really wanted to
see her daughter's first boyfriend. The story tells us that for all people health is
always the primary concern and they are ready to sacrifice everything in order to
get proper health care.120 
What is most remarkable about Sumi's statement is not so much the postulation
118 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2003, 4.
119 Ibid., 96.
120 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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of health as a component of life under a human security regime, as much as the
logical  pathway  he  treads  in  concluding  that  health  is  indeed  the  primary
concern for most people.  In the passage above,  one can discern a discursive
strategy which takes the particularistic example of a mother/daughter plight in
Africa as evidence of a generalised pattern across the entire spectrum of the
world's  population.  Sumi  does  not  moderate  the  breadth  of  his  claim  by
speaking of health care as the primary concern of  most people at  most times,
but gives it universal scope by claiming that it is the the primary concern for
“all” people “always”.121 Underlying this excerpt is an incompatibility between
medicine's self-representation in terms of rigorous scientific methodology, and
Sumi's ability to make a broad general conclusion with only a sample population
size of 1.  Another notable leap of logic which can be discerned in the excerpt
above,  is  the  establishment  of  the  mother/daughter  case  as  evidence  of  all
people's concern with health. In this case, the problem is not the presence of an
unreflective move from the particularistic to the universal – as it was above –
but  that  it  is  not  clear  how  Sumi's  anecdote  actually  proves  that  health  is
anybody's  primary  concern,  let  alone  everybody's.  If  anything,  from  Sumi's
account, the moral of the mother's story is only that adultery can lead to family
tragedy.  One  may  assume  that  the  mother  hoped  to  be  healthy  enough  to
continue  living  with  her  daughter  –  thus  reinforcing  Sumi's  argument  that
health is everyone's primary concern in an indirect way – but the narrative he
provides offers no a priori reason to do so. 
In concluding this section on the representation of life and lifestyle under an
imagined Japanese human security regime, a number of general observations
can  be  made.  For  instance,  despite  theoretical  imprecision,  ambiguity,  and
omission  Japan's  discourse  on  human  security  takes  into  consideration  a
significantly wide cross-section of the elements of human life; ranging from the
psychological, lifestyle and spiritual to the socio-economic, political and medical
121 Ibid.
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realms. It also envisages life in various temporal dimensions, ranging from the
period of a single day to that of the generation. Moreover, there is a discernible
sensitivity  towards  the  social  context  in  which  human  life  is  ascribed  with
meaning. As such, in this regard Japan's human security discourse is fairly rich,
at least in terms of scope and breadth if not detail and thus has the potential to
help  in  the  formulation  of  policies  which  are  sensitive  to  people's  lived
experiences. However, the theoretical underdevelopment of the meaning of life
under a human security regime and the dynamics between its various elements
is  problematic  because  the  presence  of  a  high  number  of  relatively  empty
signifiers  related  to  the  conditions  of  human  security  can  lead  to  various
alternative and contradictory practices that may not prioritise the security of
individuals,  but  which could still  be  justified rhetorically  in  reference to the
broad theoretical base making up the core of Japan's human security discourse.
An example of this exact phenomenon was reported by Pemunta, who found
that  both advocates  and  opponents  of  female  circumcision  in  Cameroon
appropriated  the  language  of  human  security  to  legitimate  and  justify  their
opposing positions.122 Essentially, what seems to be necessary is a more precise
attribution  of  meaning  to  the  numerous  subjective  measures  that  are  found
throughout.  Also,  clearer prescriptions regarding the conditions under which
concepts related to life are to be defined exogenously to the subjects of policy
and when they are to be a matter of definition by human individuals themselves,
would  add  clarity  to  the  discourse  and  allow more  lucid  and  precise  policy
measures to be determined.123
122 Ngambouk Vitalis Pemunta, “Health and Development: HIV/AIDS and the Double 
Appropriation of Human Security Discourse by Practitioners of Female Circumcision and 
Development NGOs in Cameroon,” Journal of Human Security 3, no. 1 (2007): 45–61.
123 It should be pointed out that there is support for a conceptualisation of human security 
which remains purposefully undefined. For instance, Bosold and Werthes see value in the 
use of the phrase human security as a political leitmotif; a “more or less coherent normative
framework for foreign policy [which might] help to orientate, to coordinate, and to motivate
a country’s policy ”. Though Bosold and Werthes seem aware of the consequences – such as 
the kind of appropriation pointed out by Pemunta – of using the phrase human security as 
a kind of rallying call for action, they do not ascribe them with much significance, as their 
motivation appears to be “to help politicians to formulate and legitimize certain policies and
concrete policy goals”. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they could view human security in 
anything but such a rhetorical light, considering that the basis of their position is the idea 
that “human security is not a fixed foreign policy agenda, instrument or process whatsoever 
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Human security means protecting vital freedoms124 
Another  commonly  encountered  element  of  Japan's  representation  of  the
condition of human security is that of freedom:
Human beings have encountered difficulties of every kind throughout history, but
through their wisdom they have been able to overcome those difficulties. I believe
that the source of that wisdom is the freedom of individual human beings to make
choices and assume responsibility for their actions, and their abundant potential to
live creative and meaningful lives. 125
In this except freedom in regard to human security is constructed in terms of
one's ability to make choices and having the option of taking responsibility for
one's actions. This form of freedom is also constructed in functional terms, in
the sense that if it is realised, it will serve as a source of wisdom through which
all humans  can  overcome  all  kinds  of  difficulties.  Furthermore,  it  is
conceptualised  in  terms of  poverty;  the  relationship  being  one of  cause  and
effect, such that poverty “strips human beings of […] their freedom”.126
A number of  observations can be made in regard to this  basic  exposition of
freedom.  Firstly,  to  speak  of  the  making  of  choices  as  a  basis  for  the
development of wisdom makes intuitive sense but it is not clear how the life
[but that] it is, like other political terms, exposed to continuous (re-)interpretation, 
(re-)construction and contestation, and only comprehensible in its (temporal and cultural) 
context”. Therefore, considering that for Bosold and Werthes human security cannot have 
any substantive meaning, that at best it can only be constituted by a loose set of principles, 
it is no wonder that they do not seem to be concerned with the possibility of it being used to 
justify the pursuit of the objectives of a wide array of political agents, through diverse and 
potentially contradictory means. See: David Bosold and Sascha Werthes, “Caught Between 
Pretension and Substantiveness – Ambiguities of Human Security as a Political Leitmotif,” 
in Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas Changes, Concepts and Cases (Institute for 
Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2006), 22,23.  
124 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
125 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
126 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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experiences and experiences of individuals can contribute to the promulgation
of wisdom at the level of the species (i.e. humankind), unless that wisdom were
to be somehow shared with all  other people and could be applied to the life
experiences of others. Moreover, the text provides no specification regarding the
kind of choices which are relevant for the accumulation of wisdom and  which
could thus serve as a solution to the problems of humankind. What is more,
basing the notion of human security on the idea that individuals should be able
to  make  their  own  choices  may lead  to  a  logical  incompatibility  that  could
compromise the pursuit of human security, if individuals chose not to accept the
terms  of  policy  or  its  objectives,  or  if  they  made  choices  which  were
incompatible with the concept of human security as defined by Japan. The point
is not that people making their own choices is incompatible with the idea of
human security  per se, but that  such a situation could  be incompatible with a
state role in the  realisation of human security. This is because, if individuals
were given the freedom to make their own choices regarding human security,
they  might conceivably  choose to  reject  state definitions of human security or
the state's role in realising it.
Secondly, to speak of the freedom to take responsibility for one's own actions or
indeed to make one's own choices does not guarantee that people will indeed
avail themselves of those freedoms; since freedom is about choice rather than
compulsion, it is plausible that individuals might choose  not make their own
choice or take responsibility for their actions, even if given the freedom to do so.
If  this  were  to  be  the  case,  the  provision  of  these  freedoms  would  not  be
sufficient  to  realise  the  wisdom  which  is  promised  through  human  security
policy.
Thirdly, if it were to be the case that individuals did indeed take up the freedom
to make choices and assume responsibility for their actions, another form of
state human security policy de-legitimation – aside from the one raised above –
would materialise. Namely, that if people made the choice to take responsibility
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for their own security, the state's self-ascribed duty for human security would be
relegated only to those instances in which individuals requested its assistance.
In other words, the postulation of freedom to take responsibility for one's self
actually subverts attempts by a state such as Japan to establish itself or other
non-human agents as providers of human security.
Another notable aspect of Japan's discourse on human security is that it asserts
that  people  should  be  provided with  the  freedom  to  take  responsibility  for
themselves. Such a prescription presupposes a body that can give freedom, but
logically  speaking,  can  potentially  also  take  it  away.  The  implication  of
presupposing such a  body is  that  people  are  correspondingly  constructed  as
being reliant on something beyond themselves for this broad notion of freedom;
that  they  are  free  only  so  far  as  permitted  by  systems  of  governance  and
regulation  from  which  they  cannot  separate  themselves.  As  long  as  such  a
relationship of  reliance  provision is  in place,  people's  freedom appears as↔
being at the whim of changing definitions of both responsibility and freedom.
Moreover,  this  kind  of  freedom  is  unstable  since  it  does  not  rule  out  the
possibility that under certain circumstances, such as martial law, the state might
revoke or suspend it. Rather, to make sure that human security in the form of
freedom is not reliant on the changing interests of non-human agents of human
security,  the relationship of reliance  provision should be abandoned; such↔
that  people's  freedom is  not  at  the  whim of  bodies  postulated  as  being  the
guarantors of their  security,  being based instead on individuals'  own choices
about whether they need human security assistance from a third party. In order
for Japan's discourse to be more consistent with its own advancement of human
security as contextually dependent and applicable at an individual level, people's
freedom to make their own choices and take responsibility needs to be divorced
from its reliance on the state. It is conceptually incoherent to promote a concept
of  human security  which  relies  on  personal  freedom,  and at  the  same time
positions the state as having the final say in whether one can take advantage of
this freedom.  
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First, it is a human-centered approach in tackling global issues,
putting the livelihood and dignity of individuals and communities
at the center of our focus. 127
The idea of livelihood as a component of human security was invoked by Takemi
at the International Symposium on Development, although he did not elaborate
on what  was  meant  by  the  term,  other  than  to  say  that  it  is  threatened  by
poverty.128 In other words, a state of poverty is implicated in negatively affecting
one's livelihood. Insofar as livelihood involves the pursuit of the necessities of
life,  particularly  through  work,  the  direction  of  causality  presented  here  is
counter-intuitive, since it  is the inability to make a livelihood which leads to
poverty, rather than the opposite. Nevertheless, if poverty is a threat to one's
livelihood, rather than being outcome of an inability to pursue one's livelihood,
the implication is that, for Japan, livelihood is understood mainly in economic
terms. Aside from this indication of the importance of the economic in Japan's
understanding of livelihood, very little detail regarding this prominent aspect of
human security is forthcoming from Japan's texts on human security. If,  for
instance, livelihood were to be defined simply as “a means of gaining a living”, 129
measures aimed at affecting it would necessitate a discussion of – inter alia –
the constitution of a living as well as thought about what it is not or should not
be,  how  to  measure  it  so  as  to  determine  when  an  intervention  is  to  be
undertaken,  the  conditions  under  which  an  intervention  is  warranted,  and
legitimate  means  for  its  manipulation.  Overlooking  such  questions,  Japan's
discourse merely posits livelihood in relation to economic measures, insofar as
poverty  is  itself  only  an economically  constructed concept.  The treatment of
127 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
128 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
129 Robert Chambers and Gordon R. Conway, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical 
Concepts for the 21st Century” (Institute of Development Studies, 1991), 5, 
http://www.ntd.co.uk/idsbookshop/details.asp?id=35.
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economic factors as “first among equals” in the conceptualisation of poverty is a
widespread occurrence,130 and so in this regard Japan is not unique. If livelihood
were  to  be  conceptualised  holistically  and  more  in  line  with  the  activities
undertaken  by  people  in  societies,  as  “a  combination  of  produced,  human,
natural,  social  and  cultural  assets”,131 its  measurement  and  control  would
necessitate further reflection, both within the realm of the economic and outside
of it, which cannot be found in Japan's human security texts. To maintain parity
with its promises of protecting the security interests of individuals, discourse on
livelihood  would  need  to  include  questions  about  how  people  themselves
conceptualise  their  livelihoods:  for  instance,  whether  it  is  measured  in
exclusively economic terms or if other less tangible or non-financial income can
be a part of it, its importance in relation to other aspects of lived experience, and
how various elements of livelihood, such as those suggested above, affect each
other and should be balanced in order to realise individuals' human security. 
In concluding this second section of the chapter, the exposition and analysis
above has shown that  according to Japan's  official  discourse,  the concept  of
human  security  is  multifaceted,  complex  and  touches  upon  a  wide  array  of
aspects making up the experience of human life. The discussion has attempted
to  show  that  the  discourse  can  be  problematised  in  reference  to  an
under-theorisation of both the nature of, and interplay between, those things
which are raised by Japan as the parameters of human security. It can also be
problematised in regard to the consistency and coherence of representations of
these parameters across the body of the texts examined. Furthermore, as was
revealed throughout the interpretation of these texts, it is possible to discern the
presence of unacknowledged and unexplored logical conclusions which have a
questionable bearing on human security as viewed from the perspective of the
130 Andrew Sumner, “Meaning Versus Measurement: Why Do ‘Economic’ Indicators of Poverty
Still Predominate?,” Development in Practice 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2007): 5.
131 Leo De Haan and Annelies Zoomers, “Development Geography at the Crossroads of 
Livelihood and Globalisation,” Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 94, no. 3
(2004): 352.
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individual human being. The concept of human security as it appears in Japan's
foreign policy speeches and publications is characterised by a detailed and fine
postulation of elements which make up human existence, and these are often
ascribed universally to all people despite numerous representations of policy at
the  level  of  the  human  individual.  By  constituting  a  form  of  life  which  “is
amenable to an exercise of [a] form of sovereign power”132 that “claims the globe
as its field of operation”,133 the discourse makes thinkable complex interventions
by agents acting in the name of human security; both in a myriad of human
activities  and  in  regard  to  an  enormous  population  whose  accessibility  to
regulation  is  not  limited  in  traditional  terms  which  prioritise  sovereign  and
national  categories.  Indeed,  Japan's  construction  of  human  security  is
exceptionally  ambitious because,  whilst  most  versions of  human security are
concerned  mainly  with  “the  basic  sustenance  of  day-to-day  life”,134 it  also
encompasses longer  term and more existential,  philosophical and  qualitative
concerns  like  dignity,  happiness,  fulfilment,  potential,  hope,  happiness  and
creativity.  But,  despite  assembling  a  wide  theoretical  horizon  for  the
conceptualisation of  factors underlying human (in)security,  Japan's  texts  are
impoverished in terms of theoretical development of the metaphysics of these
factors or their measurement and apprehension, the effects that factors have on
each  other  when  they  are  manipulated,  and  the  potentially  negative
ramifications  that  manipulation  of  these  factors  might  have  on  aspects  of
human life experience aside from those associated with human security.
The Idea of Human Security
In  this  section  an  epistemological  perspective  on  human  security  discourse
guides  the  analysis.  The  key  question  is  that  of  how  human  security  is
132 De Larrinaga and Doucet, “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security,” 2008, 
518.
133 Ibid., 534.
134 Ibid., 530.
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represented as an object, source, and field of knowledge. 
Knowledge of Human Security and Threats to It
What  is  human  security? This  is  the  title  of  the  first  section  of  an  official
document about human security published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan.135 The act of asking the question works to establish the text, and thus
Japan, as having the authority and knowledge to speak of the concept's essence,
nature, or identity. Through its role as the narrator of the text,  the speaking
subject is situated in the position of telling or informing the reader about human
(in)security.  The speaking voice of  this  document does  not assert  that  other
answers  to  this  question  are  impossible,  but  nonetheless  its  presence  is
underwritten  by  the  presupposition  that  as  the  all-knowing,  omniscient
narrator, it  knows. One way in which representation of Japan as an expert in
human security is buttressed, is through reference to experience:
I  believe  that  Japan's  experience  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  in
promoting prosperity and the well-being of its people through economic and social
development makes it particularly well-prepared to advocate such a broad concept
of human security. 136
The assertion that co-chair of the Commission on Human Security and former
Japan International Cooperation Agency head Ogata Sadako137 is the “mother of
the very notion of human security”,138 also works to connote the idea that Japan
is in a privileged place regarding knowledge and expertise on human security,
135 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.
136 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
137 “Biography of Mrs. Sadako Ogata,” United Nations News Service, accessed April 9, 2009, 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/hlpanel/ogata-bio.htm.
138 Yasuo Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session
on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’” (Davos, 
Switzerland, January 26, 2008), 
http://www.mofa.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html.
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through Ogata's status as an official of the Japanese state; despite, as dicussed
below, some inconsistency with the representation of origins in Japan's human
security narratives.
The posing of the question – what is human security? – reveals a little about
how  human  security  is  conceptualised;  namely,  as  something  which  can  be
explained by one party to another, through the written language of English. To
come to understand the idea of human security, one needs to be able to read not
Japanese but English – as it is this language of publication which is privileged.
This is despite the fact that most recipients of human security policy are unlikely
to  know  that  language,  as  most  of  Japan's  human  security  policies  are
implemented in countries where English139 is not the native language.140 In other
words, the text as as a pedagogical instrument and the knowledge it purports to
offer  about  human  security,  does  not  cater  for  an  audience  facing  human
insecurity  unless  it  speaks  or  at  least  understands  English.  Moreover,
considering the limited publication and dispersal of this text, it is unlikely to be
read by anyone who has not visited Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any of
the human security themed conferences or seminars that it has organised. The
conditions  of  becoming  knowledgeable  about  human  security  in  Japan's
understanding thus include a particular kind of education which has included
the  English  language,  and  the  position  or  resources  which  would  allow one
access to the places where the text was distributed; mainly the virtual realm of
the Internet, the various symposia or conferences which Japan has held on the
topic,  or  the  diplomatic  forums  at  which  Japan  has  spoken  about  human
139 Moreover, the text presupposes knowledge of American English; e.g. globalization (cf. 
globalisation), liberalization (cf. liberalisation), working towards establishing American 
English as the international norm for the English language, at least as far as the 
dissemination of Human Security knowledge is concerned.
140 “Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance.html; “Other Assistances for 
Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance-2.html; “Assistances through the 
Trust Fund for Human Security Archives,” accessed July 4, 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/archive.html.
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security. None of these conditions are likely to be found at the local sites for the
application  of  human  security  practices,  considering  that  English  speaking
countries are practically the exception rather than the norm when it comes to
the pursuit of human security for Japan.141 Reminiscent of Christie's charge that
human security  discourse  only  “seemingly works  on behalf  of  the  ‘silenced’,
without actually giving them a voice ”,142 one  is left with  the impression that,
conversely,  Japan's  human  security  does  not  even  speak  to  those  who  are
postulated as (partial) beneficiaries of human security praxis.
In  line  with  its  self-ascribed  expertise  on  the  topic  of  human  security,  the
discourse  endeavours  to  answer  a  wide  cross-section  of  questions  which  go
beyond  simply  a  discussion  of  human  security's  essential  characteristics  or
nature.  It  represents  its  expertise  through a  number  of  forms of  knowledge
which  work  to  underwrite  the  authority  of  its  claims  about  the  meaning  of
human security, what erodes it, why it should be pursued and how practices
should be undertaken. These expressions of certainty are made in terms of:143 
Historical narrative: 
Since  the  end144 of  the Cold War,  the international  community  has  experienced
rapid  globalization  accompanied  by  the  economic  liberalization  and  a  marked
progress of information technology.
Theoretical elucidation and ethical rumination: 
The traditional  concept of “state security” alone, whose objective is to protect the
boundaries and people of a state, is no longer sufficient […] additional responses
are  necessary  to  address  diverse  threats  comprehensively,  capturing  the
141 As discussed earlier in this chapter, human security policy is often represented as being 
about all people's interests, although it is also the case that developing countries are 
presented as being the focus of most activities said to be taken in the name of human 
security. 
142 Christie, “Critical Voices and Human Security,” April 1, 2010, 187 emphasis added.
143 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2–15.
144 Emphasis added throughout.
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interlinkages among them […].
Normative prescription:
Each of us […] should be respected as a human person […] once threatened
their  survival,  livelihood and dignity  […] people  can  hardly  realise  their
potential and capabilities.
 Quantitative social science:145
Table 1: Approved Projects by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (as of
February 2007)
One form of knowledge that is missing from Japan's human security discourse is
that of experience; there being no mention, in any of the texts examined,  of
needing to have experienced human insecurity through one's own senses (i.e.
empirically), or even through the senses of others who have directly experienced
human insecurity, to understand the concept. However, as mentioned above, in
other  contexts,  Japan presents  its  own credentials  for  the  pursuit  of  human
security  in  terms  of  its  post-Second World  War  experience.146 One  can thus
discern some tension in Japan's discursive treatment of what is necessary to be
145 The table represents approved funding from the United Nations Trust Fund for Human 
Security for various projects in different parts of the world. Global Issues Cooperation 
Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” 
March 2007, 7.
146 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
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an expert in the field and qualified to act  for human security.  Whilst  in the
earlier discussion Japan's credentials were presented as a matter of personal
experience, in this case the text147 privileges a theoretical form of knowledge that
does not seem to pay credence to the role of experience. Furthermore, the texts
examined did not ascribe any significance to alternative modes of knowing in
which  representation  is  communicated  not  through language,148 but  through
other mediums such as music, graphical art, or storytelling, and which could
contribute  to  a  deeper,  multifaceted understanding  and empathy  for  human
insecurity.  Similarly,  Grayson  has  noted  a  tendency  for  human  security
discourse in general to prioritise “seeking precision, causality and universalism
through  measures  of  human  (in)security”  at  the  expense  of  “indigenous
knowledge”, thus placing limits on the way the concept can be constructed.149
Scientificity
Japan's  human  security  knowledge  and  policy  is  ascribed  with  a  social
scientificity in which threats are represented as factors and parameters that can
be rationally calculated, leading to the determination of appropriate responses:
In developing a concept for human security in the 21st century, it is important to
consider  factors that  threaten  security.  Prime  Minister  Obuchi  highlighted
nonmilitary  threats  to  security  that  have  accompanied  globalization,  including
infectious  diseases,  terrorism,  and  narcotics.  In  mentioning  such  nonmilitary
threats to our security, Prime Minister Obuchi proved to be remarkably prescient.
HIV and AIDS continue to cripple the development of many countries in Africa;
tuberculosis  is  resurfacing around the world,  in  both developed and developing
countries; and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, exhibited beyond doubt
147 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.
148 “A body of words and the systems for their use common to a people who are of the same 
community or nation, the same geographical area, or the same cultural tradition: the two 
languages of Belgium; a Bantu language; the French language; the Yiddish language” 
“Language,” Dictionary.com Unabridged, n.d., accessed April 5, 2010.
149 Kyle Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional 
Debate.,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008): 397.
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the threat to human security posed by indiscriminate acts of brutal terrorism. It is
vital that we all understand the diversity of the threat to human security. 150
Framing  human  security  actions  in  reference  to  social  science  functions  to
legitimate policy by appealing to “the age-old idea that science is better, that
science  is  good,  and  that  science  leads  us  to  the  truth  and  to  an  improved
description of our universe and our future”.151 However, as discussed in chapter
four,  Japan's  human  security  texts  commonly  invoke  threats  and  dangers;
phenomena  whose  manifestation  is  not certain  and  which  thus  destabilise
scientific promises of certainty.  Indeed, one is paradoxically reminded of this
tension between certainty and uncertainty through the representation of human
security knowledge in terms of statistics; an example of probabilistic thinking
par excellence.
Measurement of human security in both relative  and absolute
terms
For Sumi the effects of globalisation on human security can be measured in two
ways. He asserts that:
[Globalisation]  accelerates  the  degree  of  interdependency  of  the  world,  having
brought not only benefits to people, but troubles by widening the gap between the
rich and the poor nationally and internationally.152
Furthermore, he asserts that because of globalisation, “today, as many as 1.1
billion people are forced to live on less than one dollar a day”.153 The two forms
of measurement evident here are those undertaken in relative terms, where the
gap between rich and poor has apparently widened, as well as in absolute terms
150 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44 
emphasis added.
151 Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, “Neutrality Is Overrated,” Post-Autistic Economics Review 24, 
no. 2 (2005): 1, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue24/PardoGuerra24.htm.
152 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.
153 Ibid.
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in which people are presented as being insecure when their income is below an
arbitrary  benchmark which  reinforces  the  position  of  the  United states  as  a
measure of global economic health;  one dollar a day.154 The establishment of
one dollar  as  the  point  dividing  poverty  from non-poverty  is  rhetorical  and
politically motivated because there is no a priori reason why the line should not
be instead two dollars, fifty cents, or some other arbitrary sum. Moreover, it is
questionable whether this  line in the sand has any scientific  utility  either in
predicting or explaining the effects of poverty. For instance, mortality rates from
malnourishment for children living on one dollar a day can vary from 4% to 16%
depending on the country, suggesting that the threshold of one dollar per day as
an indicator can be insensitive to certain forms of well-being.155 Nonetheless,
reminiscent of approaches such as those of King and Murray which focus on
quantitative measures of so-called “generalized poverty”,156 the representation of
human security policy in reference to numerical figures such as  one dollar a
day  works together with the above mentioned scientificity, to portray human
security practices as certain, quantifiable, and measurable; thus legitimising the
pursuit  through  an  appeal  to  the  apparent  truth-determining  properties  of
science. 
Japan's  grounding  of  its  claims  to  having  expertise  in  the  field  of  human
security in relation to the spheres of knowledge indicated above, is in line with
Grayson's assertion that, “as a specific discursive formation, human security has
drawn  upon  security,  medicine,  psychology,  economics,  sociology,  ethics,
criminology,  diplomacy,  environmentalism,  international  relations,  actuarial
science and even humanist ethical modalities, in order to incite discussion and
to invite the production of knowledge of ‘the human’ and of ‘security’, which are
154 'One dollar a day' as a measure of poverty was introduced by the World Bank in 1990 
Sumner, “Meaning Versus Measurement,” February 1, 2007.
155 Adam Wagstaff, “Child Health on a Dollar a Day: Some Tentative Cross-country 
Comparisons,” Social Science & Medicine 57, no. 9 (2003): 1529–1538.
156 Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” Political Science 
Quarterly 116, no. 4 (February 2001): 592.
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necessary to engage in biopolitical management.157 Another aspect of the way in
which  Japan  has  constructed  the  epistemology  of  human  security  can  be
discerned in Takemi's address to the “Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building
Asia's Tomorrow”, in which he spoke of the “evolution of the human security
concept”.158 Of significance here is the characterisation of the presence of the
concept  as  the  result  of  an  evolution  and  the  connotations  this  mode  of
representation  has  for  practices  that  are  undertaken in  reference to  Japan's
human security discourse. Firstly, to frame the concept in this way creates the
impression that it is the result of a smooth, unproblematic and natural process.
However, as Foucault's comparative analysis of the Renaissance, Classical, and
Modern  periods  from an  epistemological  point  of  view suggests,  changes  in
epistemes and regimes of truth can be the result  of processes which are not
smooth transitions, developments or evolutions, but contested, disputed, and
violent dislocations or conflicts.159 In terms of the politics of representation, to
speak  of  an  evolution  –  as  Takemi  has  done in  reference  to  the  concept  of
human  security  –  functions  to  hide  the  rifts  or  sutures  between  discourses
which can be  involved in  the  development of  ideas,  bodies  of  knowledge  or
policy shifts. It has the political effect of hiding schisms and contest from which
current  understandings  of  a  concept  have  emerged  and creates  an image  of
harmony and natural inevitability. 
Framing the introduction of new paradigms as smooth, evolutionary changes or
developments can also work to ascribe them with the political legitimacy and
sense of rightness, truth or common sense acquired by established and stable
systems of thought. In this vein, and reminiscent of an approach to theorising
about  security  advocated  by  Liotta  that  involves  “distinguish[ing]  between
where  interests  and  effects  both  overlap  and  where  they  conflict  with  each
157 Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge,” 2008, 388.
158 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002.
159 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, World of Man: A Library of Theory and Research in 
the Human Sciences (ed: R.D. Laing) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1994).
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other”,160 Japan has explicitly stated that human security is a complement to
what  it  presents  as  a  traditional  and  established  concept  –  state  security  –
rather than as a challenge or replacement for it:
To  overcome  these  direct  threats  to  people,  the  traditional concept  of  “state
security” alone, whose objective is to protect the boundaries and people of a state,
is no longer sufficient. Indeed, the importance of state security will not and should
not shrink at all, but additional responses are necessary to address diverse threats
comprehensively,  capturing  the  interlinkages  among  them  from  a  human
perspective. “Human Security” is to represent such an aspiration.161
With  the emergence  of  these  individual-centered  human problems,  concepts  of
security have accordingly been evolving over the past decade, with the concept of
state security increasingly challenged, or perhaps one should say complemented, by
other concepts, namely, cooperative security and human security. 162
It is notable that, due to its representation of the relationship between state and
human security in terms of similarity, Japan's human security discourse can be
distinguished from other forms which are articulated through an “invitation to
identify  the  inherent  rupture  that  the  concept  and  its  practices  mark  in
comparison to previous articulations of national security in terms of its referent
object  (the  individual  subject)  and  the  phenomena  to  be  securitized.”163
Constructing the concept of human security in terms of an evolution indicates a
particular  approach  to  epistemology  regarding  the  supposed  way  in  which
processes of knowledge production occur: in this case, as a natural procedure
which involves an inevitable survival of ideas which are in some way the most
fitting.  Such a visage cloaks not only the political  nature of the “business of
160 Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” December 
1, 2002, 477.
161 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2 emphasis added.
162 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 43 
emphasis added.
163 Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge,” 2008, 386 As indicated above, the 
distinctiveness of Japan’s human security discourse can also be discerned in the postulation
of the individual as only one – and not always the primary – referent beneficiary of policy 
practices. .
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science”,164 but  also  its  agonistic  aspects:  active  contest  and  machination
between  political  agents  advocating  different  views;165 observable  when  the
boundaries,  limits  and  taboos  of  a  concept  or  body  of  knowledge  are
established.166 In  short,  the  image  of  an  evolution  of  the  concept  of  human
security champions unity and simplicity whilst taking attention away from the
possibility  that  numerous alternatives,  nuances or details  were marginalised,
overlooked or silenced in the emergence of what now constitutes Japan's official
human security policy. The point being made here is not in regard to whether
the concept of human security discussed by Japan is  in reality the result of a
smooth  development  characterised  by  consensus  and  agreement,  or
alternatively  whether  it  has  come  about  through  a  number  of  violent
dislocations or political upheavals. Rather, what is being highlighted here is that
the representation of the concept of human security in terms of an evolution
ascribes  human  security  practices  with  consensus,  stability  and  agreement,
legitimising  them  insofar  as  these  characteristics  figure  as  normatively
attractive  signifiers  in  the  communication  between  international  relations
agents. 
With the preceding discussion in mind, it is notable that stability and agreement
are  both  common  tropes  in  Japan's  human  security  texts.  The  presence  of
agreement can be observed in the following examples:
The [2005 World Summit] outcome document agreed that [human security] is to
be defined based on a common understanding.167
We  should  rather  concentrate  on  achieving  cooperation  among  interested
countries,  broaden areas of  agreement and partnership rather than focusing on
164 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, Third (London ; New York: Verso, 1975), 14. 
165 For more on agonism and its relationship to the practice of politics, see: Chantal Mouffe, 
“Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?,” Social Research 66, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 
745–758.
166 For more on boundaries and limits of different disciplines and knowledge claims, see: 
Ashley, “Three Modes of Economism,” 1983.
167 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008 emphasis added.
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different emphasis; practicing the concept, taking concrete actions, implementing
joint  projects  and  combining  efforts  and  resources  together,  to  improve  the
situation of vulnerable people who are under severe threats.168
The Trust Fund for Human Security is managed in accordance with the Guidelines
agreed between the Government of Japan and the UN Secretariat.169
In regard to stability as a figurative device of the discourse, there are numerous
examples throughout the corpus of texts asserting it as a goal of human security
practices:
It  is  therefore  incumbent on Japan to  fulfill  its  obligations to the international
community in helping all people to live free from want, with greater peace of mind,
greater stability, and greater prosperity. 170
I believe it behooves us to make efforts in three areas if we are to realize our vision
for Asia - "a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity" - upon the
foundation  of  peace  and  stability and  collaborative  relations  among  the  major
countries. 171
Indeed, it is my view that the further development of this idea of "human security"
will  lead to  the rethinking  of  the international  system itself,  going  beyond just
responding to situations as they arise. Under the existing international order, the
state  has  been  the  basic  constituent   component,  and  within  this  framework,
international peace and stability as well as economic prosperity have been pursued,
with the advancement of the national interest as the key motivating factor. 172
[The Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia], recalling their on-going beneficial
cooperation on regional and global security challenges, including terrorism and the
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and their  means  of  delivery,  and
human security concerns such as disaster relief  and pandemics, as well as their
168 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006 emphasis added.
169 “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009), 8, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html emphasis added.
170 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 46 
emphasis added.
171 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998 emphasis 
added.
172 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.
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contributions to regional peace and stability.173
***
Another common element of Japan's representation of human security is that of
newness. For the most part the concept has been presented as a new one, with
the notable exception of one speech in which it is said to be a traditional part of
states'  national  policies.  However,  the  newness  aspect  of  Japan's  human
security policy has not appeared uniformly. For example, the object of newness
varies between texts; at times it is the  concept whilst at other times it is the
phrase which is presented as novel. For example, Obuchi asserted that:
While the phrase "human security" is a relatively new one, I  understand that it is
the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival,
daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those
threats.174
In this example, it is the phrase which is ascribed with newness, rather than the
concept  itself.  However,  in  other  sections  of  Obuchi's  speech  newness  is
ascribed to other aspects of policy, either implicitly or explicitly. For instance, he
stated  explicitly  that  it  is  important  to  “seek  new strategies for  economic
development which attach importance to human security”. He also implied an
attribution  of  newness  to  the  concept by  speaking  in  temporal  terms  and
situating the necessity of human security policy in the present through the claim
that it is “in our times [that] humankind is under various kinds of threat”.175
Aside from the above mentioned economic development strategies, newness has
also been ascribed to other policy practices said to have been mobilised for the
realisation of human security. For instance, in a speech entitled “New Forms of
Development  toward  the  21st  Century  which  Focus  on  the  Dignity  of  the
173 “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” 2009 
emphasis added.
174 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998
emphasis added.
175 Ibid. emphasis added.
87
Individual”, the speaker claimed that he had “organized [the] symposium with
the view of exploring the possibility of the concept of "Human Security" as a
policy idea”, and that it was expected that the discussions there would serve as
“an occasion to study a  new form of international  cooperation”.176 Here – in
distinction to examples discussed above in which the signified of newness was
the  concept  or  phrase  human  security –  it  is  forms  of  practice  such  as
development and cooperation which are explicitly signified as being new. Also,
by  speaking  of  “the  possibility”177 of  creating  policy  based  on  the  notion  of
human security,  the image of  a  new policy  or set  of  practices is  once again
connoted  because  the  speaker  suggests  that  the  use  of  human security  as  a
policy idea is yet to come. 
Notably, there was one instance in the corpus of texts examined in which human
security  as  a  concept  was  characterised  as  not being  new.  In  light  of  the
presence of passages discussed above, in which newness figures clearly as an
attribute of human security discourse, the characterisation of human security as
a concept with a tradition in the practices of statecraft introduces an element of
conceptual dissonance to Japan's human security discourse:
Human security is not a brand-new concept. While the ultimate responsibility of a
state  is  to  protect  its  territory  and safeguard the survival  and well-being of  its
people,  sound governments  have  long pursued human security  as  part  of  their
national  policy.  However,  in  my  view,  the  level  of  attention  and  high  priority
accorded to human security internationally these days are a reflection of several
developments.178
Aside from situating the concept of human security in a historical context, this
passage also represents human security as being particularly important in the
present, through the use of the temporal indicator “these days”.179 The present
176 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.
177 Ibid.
178 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000 emphasis added.
179 Ibid.
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and the  idea  of  now – discussed below – both  appear  as  tropes  in  Japan's
representation of human security and in this case they have been substituted for
newness.  Despite  the  presence of  this  one case,  the  majority  of  texts  in  the
corpus of Japan's human security documents prioritise newness of the concept
rather  than  its  lineage,  with  the  trend  having  continued  despite  the
uncharacteristic turn in Takasu's text. For instance, an official publication on
human  security  compiled  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  after  Takasu's
speech  announced  that  human  security  was  a  “new  concept”;180 whilst  in
addressing  the  audience  at  a  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  human  security
symposium,  Tsuchiya  implicitly  ascribed  the  concept  with  newness  in
speculating that:
Perhaps  many  of  us  here  today  are  already  familiar  with  the  term,  "human
security." But there may be some among us who are hearing it for the first time,
though they would instantly recognize the term, "state security."181
Despite  attributions  of  newness  to  a  number  of  aspects  of  human  security,
Japan's human security texts do not actually specify what is new about either
the concept or the practices associated with it. However, as Nuruzzaman has
indicated, human security advocates' affirmations of novelty are problematic for
a number of reasons.182 Firstly, the claim that the concept of human security can
be distinguished from earlier concepts and approaches to security on the basis
of its placement of the human individual, rather than the state, as the focus of
security  practice,  is  undermined  by  similar  and  earlier  efforts  to  do  this  in
Critical Theory and feminist approaches to international relations. This point of
contest  is  not  entirely  applicable  in  Japan's  case  though,  because it  has  not
represented  human  security  practices  as  being  exclusively  about  the  human
individual.  As  the  preceding  discussion  has  demonstrated,  for  Japan  the
180 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
181 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003.
182 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict: The Contested Claims of Human 
Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 3 (September 1, 
2006): 285–303.
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individual is merely one of a number of objects of security practice. The only
elucidation  regarding  newness  in  human  security  thought,  which  exists  in
Japan's human security discourse, is in the form of the claim that it is threats
which have diversified:
Japan believes that to overcome new and direct threats, the traditional concept of
state security alone is no longer sufficient. 183
Nonetheless, the discourse omits to indicate what it is about threats to human
security which makes them new. Nuruzzaman also problematises asseverations
regarding the newness of human security thought and praxis by highlighting
their relationship to certain elements of realist thought. Firstly, the concept of
human security shares with Waltz's neo-realism a commitment to a “positivistic
problem-solving approach”.184 Japan's human security discourse also contains
elements of positivistic  thought, which aims to ascribe a scientific  sensibility
and rigour to the study of the social world,185 because, as was discussed above, it
is  enunciated in  terms of  a  scientificity  which promises  certainty  and truth.
Secondly, “in perfect consonance with the realist security paradigm ”,186 human
security thought is characterised by a commitment to the status quo through the
maintenance of social and political structures of power at both the national and
international  level.  Indeed,  Japan's  human security  texts  also  have traces  of
such conservative thought. They are noticeable in representations, discussed in
chapter three, which invoke a religious imagery to promote the continuance of a
structure made up of a polity and governing body. They can also be found in
assertions,  examined  in  chapters  three  and  four,  which  imply  that  future
generations will not differ significantly from current ones in regard to what they
perceive as a threat. 
As indicated above, temporality figures as a trope in Japan's representation of
183 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
184 Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict,” September 1, 2006, 300.
185 Ted Benton and Ian Craib, Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Social Thought, Traditions in Social Theory 1 (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001).
186 Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict,” September 1, 2006, 299.
90
human security.  It  is  common to see policy and associated issues framed as
existing  in  the  present,  even  though  in  actual  fact  the  idea  of  now is  an
imprecise, subjective, and constantly shifting point of reference. For  example,
Sato  has  claimed that  the  Commission on Human Security  “report's  call  for
human security is a response to the challenges of today's world”,187 and Sumi's
account of the relationship between human security and health, contains the
claim that “today a new consensus on security is really needed”, that “today, as
many as 1.1 billion people are forced to live on less than one dollar a day”, and
that “tomorrow can be better than today”.188 Considering that the period of time
between the speeches of Obuchi and Sumi was around eight years, one can see
that the temporal signifier today has been used in an imprecise way to point to a
notably  long  period  of  time  which  is  presented  as  the  present/now.189 The
presence of this temporal signifier functions together with representations of
human security as being new to ascribe policy with a sense of urgency, novelty,
necessity and positive difference from an imagined past.
It is notable that the presence of the trope of newness in Japan's human security
texts  is  intertwined  with  representations  of  the  concept's  origin.  In  general,
Japan has rarely presented an image of itself in which it figures as the point of
origin for the notion of human security, although, to an extent inscriptions of
the  newness  of  human  security  create  the  impression  of  a  Japan  that  is
particularly forward thinking and sensitive to the security needs of both people
and states. Indeed, Takemi adds to this visage in his presentation of a synopsis
of Japan's human security policies and practices, invoking the ghost190 of Obuchi
Keizo  to  highlight  the  apparently  long  period of  time that  had passed  since
187 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
188 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.
189 It is understood here that the assertion that eight years is a long time depends on one's 
point of view, and the nature of the observer. For states, eight years is merely a moment in 
comparison to what that period represents for individual human beings. 
190 Obuchi had died two years earlier in 2000. “Obuchi, Keizo,” The Columbia Encyclopedia 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), Credo Reference, 
http://www.xreferplus.com.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/entry/columency/obuchi_keizo.
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Obuchi had been “remarkably prescient” in formulating a conception of human
security in which non-military issues figured as significant sources of threat.191
However, for the most part, Japan has tended to situate the genesis of human
security thought vis-a-vis the United Nations Development Programme, as the
following excerpts show:
The  epoch-making  1994  UNDP  Development  Report  discussed  the  concept  of
human security in depth, and identified seven main categories of human security.192
Japan's understanding of human security is very similar to the comprehensive and
inclusive concept originally advocated by UNDP in its 1994 human development
report .193
From December 1998, therefore, the term “human security,” which had first been
used in the early 1990s by the United Nations Development Programme, officially
and irrevocably became a part of the lexicon of the Government of Japan.194
The  1994  “Human  Development  Report”  by  the  United  Nations  Development
Programme  (UNDP)  was  the  first  to  mention  human  security  publicly  in  the
international community. 195
As  well  as  pointing  to  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  as  the
source  of  human  security  thought,  these  passages  also  position  Japan's
approach as particularly close to it;  thus ascribing Japan's concept of human
security with a significance that is based on the apparent “universality of the
[United Nations']  185 members and its wide-ranging authority over not only
political security issues but also issues related to development, human rights,
humanitarian affairs, the environment, and social development in  general”.196
191 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.
192 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
193 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
194 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.
195 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
196 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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Interestingly,  a  close  reading  reveals  that  every  one  of  these  fragments  also
expresses the United Nations Development Programme's role vis-a-vis human
security  in  noticeably  different  ways,  thus correspondingly  compounding the
legitimacy  of  Japan's  human  security  policy  from  a  number  of  related
perspectives: as a body whose detailed discussion of the topic was seminal and
started a new epoch, as having been  the first to advocate human security, as
having been the first to use the term “human security”, and as having been the
first to speak of human security in the international community. This image of
Japan garnering legitimacy for its human security policies by representing the
United Nations as the initiator of the human security movement is reminiscent
of Hook  et  al.'s  characterisation of Japanese diplomacy as being of a “quiet”
type, in which it “obfuscates” its own power or interests by appearing merely on
“the periphery” of diplomatic designs and initiatives and “allowing established
institutions to provide a cloak of legitimacy”.197
However,  despite  positioning  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme,
rather  than  itself,  at  the  beginning  of  the  human  security  narrative  in  the
excerpts above, Japan's drawing of legitimacy from the United Nations for its
own  policy  objectives  is  destabilised  by  Fukuda's  characterisation  of  Ogata
Sadako198 as  “the  mother  of  the  very  notion  of  human security”.199 As  such,
Fukuda countered the images above by suggesting that human security is an
idea which has its origins in Japan.  Interestingly, whilst the invocation of the
United Nations Development Programme as the source of the human security
concept  is  common in human security  discourse in general,200 Acharya gives
197 Glen D. Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 2nd
ed. (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 80–81 and 447. 
198 Ogata, an offical of the Japanese government, has been closely associated with the 
Commission on Human Security and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, as well 
as having served as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Biography of Mrs. 
Sadako Ogata.” 
199 Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on 
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’,” January 26, 
2008.
200 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001. See also Suhrke, “Human Security 
and the Interests of States,” 1999, 269.
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some credence to  Japan's  claim to  originality  by  arguing that,  “unlike  other
security  concepts  of  the  post-cold  war  era,  human  security  can  claim  a
significant  Asian pedigree”,  although he does  not  go so far  as  to  give  credit
specifically  to  Japan.201 On  the  other  hand,  insofar  as  the  idea  involves  a
“permissive  or  pluralistic  understanding  of  security  as  an  objective  of
individuals  and groups as well  as  of  states”,  it  has also been represented as
“characteristic, in general, of the period from the mid-seventeenth century to
the French Revolution” in Europe;202 an argument which is problematic for the
suggestion that human security had its beginnings in Asia.
In  concluding  this  third  section,  the  preceding  analysis  and  discussion  has
revealed a number of points regarding Japan's representation of human security
in terms of its epistemology. Firstly, the presence of human security as a concept
has been represented as the result of an evolution. Representing human security
in this way not only associates the concept with rationalism and scientificity, but
serves to take attention away from the concept as a result of contest, converging
political interests, and pragmatic compromises. As such the concept appears in
a guise  which highlights  its  robust  intellectual  pedigree  and natural  right  of
being. Secondly, the genesis of the concept has been framed as a matter of a
consensus in an imagined international community. This image works to create
and  impression  of  human security  as  a  solid  norm of  international  activity.
However,  the  idea of  human security  as  a  norm of  statecraft  is  problematic
because it  is  in  tension with  a  common pattern  of  representing it  as  a  new
concept, which works to highlight human security policy as something which is
apt in the present, in distinction to the apparently inadequate approaches of the
past. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that texts focus more on the newness of
201 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001, 459. Acharya seems to advocate 
human security as consistent with so-called Asian values by undertaking a rhetorical 
strategy which effaces the apparent differences between East and West that might hinder 
the concept's acceptance in Asia. However, this strategy relies on an overly facile and 
uncritical use of the adjective 'Asian'. 
202 Sarka Waisova, “Human Security-the Contemporary Paradigm?,” Perspectives 20 (2003): 
58 Presumably this apparently “characteristic” state of affairs was observable in Europe, 
although the writer did not specify a geographical delineation.
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the concept than on its status as a traditional activity of statecraft. All of these
representations function together to legitimate the idea of human security and
thus give credence to Japan's human security practices.
This chapter has examined three aspects of Japan's official representation of
human security. Firstly, the texts were examined in regard to the question of
who is to be the beneficiary of practices taken in the pursuit of human security.
It  was  found  that  three  types  of  beneficiaries  were  invoked:  the  human
individual, the human at the group level, and the non-human being. Whilst it is
feasible to conceive of policy practices which aim at realising the interests of
these three discursive subjects concurrently, the texts examined did not clearly
specify how to resolve potential conflicts of security interests between them.  As
a whole, Japan's human security discourse is unique because it does not clearly
prioritise the human being, at either individual or group level, as the primary
concern of  policy  practice.  Instead,  texts  fluctuate  between numerous policy
beneficiaries including, but not limited to, the human individual. Aside from the
difficulty  such  indeterminacy  poses  for  determining  just  whose  security
interests should receive most attention, the most obvious problem with such a
posture is that it subverts the main tenet of human security: that of focusing on
the security of the individual rather than of  the state. This does not mean that
human security practices should subvert the security of the state, but that if they
are to be legitimately associated with the idea of human security at more than
just a surface level, they should at least definitely work towards human security
as a goal rather than as a means to realising the security or interests of the state.
However,  at  the  same time one should acknowledge that  this  indeterminacy
regarding the beneficiary of human security practice is not entirely inconsistent
with some other tendencies which were observed in the discourse. The most
obvious one is the conflation of state interests with that of individual ones; or, to
put it another way, the lack of acknowledgement that an individual might not
identify with the interests and objectives of the state. If the state takes it as an a
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priori assumption that individual's interests are in line with national ones, then
the conceptualisation of human security as a means to ends envisioned in terms
of state interests no longer seems so counter-intuitive. However, this kind of
position  destabilises  the  idea  of  individuality  – which  Japan  has  clearly
announced as making up the core of its human security concept – and forces
one to consider the question of whether Japan's human security practices are
indeed  human security  practices  and  not  merely  a  form  of  comprehensive
security or enlightened self-interest. 
Secondly, analysis was concerned with the core parameters of the condition of
human  security,  as  enunciated  by  Japan.  It  was  found  that  the  majority  of
Japan's  official  texts  on  the  topic  of  human  security  invoked  a  core  set  of
elements – livelihood, life, and dignity – whose position as key conditions of
human security  was  buttressed by a  large  number of  supplemental  concepts
which spanned social, psychological, economic, and biological aspects of human
experience.  In  positive  terms,  Japan's  broad  conceptualisation  of  human
security should be welcomed because the discourse opens up a wide horizon of
possibilities for ways in which human security can be assessed, measured and
thus  affected.  As  such,  the  discourse  represents  a  step  forward  for  human
security on the theoretical side.  However, lack of elucidation on how different
elements  of  human  security  might  affect  each  other,  not  to  mention  the
unresolved  tensions  and  contradictions  that  are  present  in  Japan's  human
security texts, do not allow one to move beyond a consideration of possibilities
towards determining how a set of human security practices should be assembled
in specific contexts of human insecurity.  In negative terms,  the postulation of
such  a  broad  range  of  aspects  of  human  security  can  serve  to  justify  and
legitimate a broad range of interventions for cynical state policies which aim
merely to promote state interests only in the name of human security, whilst
leaving  the  individual  human being's  security  interests  unfulfilled  or,  in  the
worst case, eroded. 
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Finally,  the  discussion  focused  on  human  security  as  a  body  of  knowledge.
Japan was presented as particularly suited to the pursuit of human security on
account of its  experiences and the apparent key role of Ogata Sadako in the
development of human security. However, neither of these representations was
unproblematic  because  texts  also  privileged  theoretical  forms  of  knowledge
rather that personal experience of human insecurity and represented the origins
of human security thinking outside of Japan.  The most obvious problem with
disregarding  personal  experience  of  human  insecurity  is  that  the  practices
which are derived become divorced from individuals' particular needs, or that
the  human element  of  human  security  practice  is  supplemented  with  a
non-human  scientific or purely  theoretical  approach which does not take into
account  people's  intangible  emotions,  feelings,  desires  or  needs  and  which
leaves  closed  the  possibility  for  human  empathy. It  was  also  found  that
particular  conditions  were  presupposed  for  becoming  knowledgeable  about
Japan's  version  of  the  human  security  concept.  These  conditions  include
knowledge of American English and resources which would allow one to access
the sites at which this knowledge is disseminated. Whilst these conditions would
seem to pose minor, if any, problems for states or non-state agents working in
the name of human security, it leaves those posited as beneficiaries of human
security in a compromised,  weak position because of  their inability to express
their human security needs in Japan's specific human security lexicon, to play a
role in determining the agenda or aim of human security practices, or to express
resistance to practices which they deem to be ineffectual or to be against their
own human  security  interests.  Official  texts  were  found to  have  framed the
concept and resultant policy in reference to notions of international consensus,
newness, tradition, rationality and scientificity, and smooth evolution.  Whilst
this  kind  of  framing  certainly  works  to  present  human security  practices  as
natural  and  warranted,  it  can  also  have  the  effect  of  marginalising  the
alternative or dissenting views which are vital  for the continued presence of a
healthy and self-critical body of knowledge.  Similarly to texts'  framing of the
parameters making up the concept of human security, it was found that  these
notions  were  mutually  problematic  and  existed  in  relations  of  theoretical
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tension  which  subverted  texts'  self-representation  in  terms of  authority  and
expertise. 
The next chapter examines the way in which Japan's human security texts have
explained and rationalised the pursuit of human security. 
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Chapter III: The Grounding of the Human Security 
Imperative
The previous chapter was concerned with an analysis of Japan's human security
discourse in terms of the representation of its meaning, its beneficiaries, and its
status as a body of knowledge. It was found that human security is defined in a
complex  way  which  goes  beyond  considerations  of  safety  and  biological
well-being,  but  that  the  discourse  contains  significant  tension  based  on
representational  ambiguity  and  contradiction,  as  well  as  theoretical
underdevelopment.  This  chapter  examines  Japan's  representation  of  actions
taken in  the  name of  human security,  in  regard  to  the  explicit  and  implicit
reasons which are put forward to legitimate those actions.  
The texts examined presented a vast array of reasons and rationales for why
actions said to be in the name of human security should be undertaken. Those
reasons which are given can be delineated into two general types; those which
see  human  security  as  a  means  to  an  end  beyond  the  immediate  needs  or
interests of individual human beings, and those which focus on human security
as an end in itself. By far the most commonly given reasons are of the former
category. There is also a third kind of category which can be distinguished from
the other two because it  is  not comprised of  rational  reasoning;1 rather it  is
characterised  by  appeals  to  beliefs  or  convictions  regarding  the  aptness  of
human security as a policy pursuit. As such, legitimation in the corpus of texts
examined can be conceptualised along two axes; one defined according to the
beneficiary of policy (i.e. human  non-human), and the other being based on↔
1 It is acknowledged that to speak of rational reasons is somewhat tautological, insofar as 
reason is rational by definition. However, in contemporary language use one can discern an 
ascription of unconscious motive to the idea of a reason; a common occurrence in popular 
psychological discourses in which reason is conflated with cause, such that the reason for 
behaviour is said to be something which is non-rational or unconscious, such as reflex or 
unacknowledged desire. Thus, the term rational reason has been used simply in order to 
delineate it from a reason – in popular usage – which is closer to a cause than a reason in 
the traditional sense of the word. 
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the extent to which legitimation was rooted in reason and rationality rather than
in  pre-modern  or  non-rational  sensibilities.  In  general,  a  correlation  can  be
observed in regard to these axes. Specifically, legitimation which appealed to the
non-human beneficiary tended to include reason, rationality, and pragmatism;
three  forms of  thinking associated with  the idea of  a conscious and rational
subject. On the other hand, legitimation of policy which worked by pointing out
benefits to the human subject, were more likely to be couched in language which
brought to mind non-rational  modes of  thought that appealed to conviction,
belief  and  feeling.  What  could  be  taken  for  a  third  mode  of  expression  of
legitimation can also be discerned, although it could be categorised as a point of
contact or overlap between the two groups;  that is,  calls  for human security
based on the concept of need. This is a concept which has a firm place in social
scientific study such as psychology or medicine, but it is also closely related to
the antithesis of rationality and thought; i.e. passion and desire. 
A brief note on the use of the word reason is necessary here for clarification. In
this  thesis  it  has  been  used  in  two  ways;  initially,  to  refer  to  a  text  which
functions  to  legitimate  or  justify  policy  irrespective  of  the  level,  register,  or
mode at which it functions. Secondly, it has also been used to refer to a specific
kind of discursive formation which can fulfil the legitimation function; namely,
it has been used to point to a sort of epistemology which is formed around the
idea  of  a  thinking,  conscious  being  who operates  in  rational  terms that  can
incorporate things like pragmaticism, utility, calculation, or control to various
extents. For the purposes of this dissertation, reason can be distinguished from
non-reason, in terms of the extent to which motivation for actions taken in the
name of human security emphasise consciousness, logic, utility, knowledge or
science, or whether they fall beyond the realm of thought through their status as
conviction, belief, feeling or passion.
I believe we should make the 21st century 
a human-centred century
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Japan's  human  security  discourse  legitimates  policy  in  a  multifaceted  way,
invoking  numerous  frames  in  order  to  construct  rational  and  reasonable
imperatives for the pursuit of human security. A number of texts in the corpus
examined are remarkable because of their invocation of non-rational, intangible
reasons  for  the  pursuit  of  human  security.  Such  representations  continued
sporadically  throughout  the  entire  chronology  of  documents  examined.  For
instance, Obuchi asserted that “the 21st century for Asia should be a century of
peace and prosperity built on human dignity”,2 but without specifying exactly
why this  should  be  the  case.  Similarly,  in  situating  the  so  called
“human-centered approach” in relation to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, he
asserted the aptness of human security as an imperative through the use of the
auxiliary verb must:
We  must deal  with  these  difficulties  with  due  consideration  for  the  socially
vulnerable segments of population, in the light of "Human Security," and that we
must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to
human security.3
Whilst both should and must fulfil the same role as auxiliary verbs, albeit with
differing  levels  of  urgency,  neither  contain  an  implicit  reason  which  would
explain  why  actions  should  or  must  indeed  be  pursued.  Obuchi  framed  the
imperative in non-rational terms; namely the “deepest belief that human beings
should  be  able  to  lead  lives  of  creativity,  without  having  their  survival
threatened nor their dignity impaired”, and that he “believe[d] we should make
the 21st  century a human-centered century”.4 In other words,  the pursuit  of
human security was not represented in terms of reason or rational argument
which might  focus  on –  inter  alia –  economic,  ethical,  or  security  benefits;
rather  it  was  done in  reference  to  the  idea  that  human security  was  apt.  A
2 Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” (Hanoi, Vietnam, 
December 16, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html, emphasis 
added.
3 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”
(presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html emphasis added.
4 Ibid. emphasis added.
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similar imperative to act can be found in Takasu's  2008 speech at the United
Nations General Assembly, in which the pursuit of human security was explicitly
presented as a matter of conviction rather than rational argument:
Human security is, in essence, the belief that a human being, irrespective of where
he or she is born, is entitled to live a healthy, dignified, fulfilling life, and should be
allowed to develop his or her ability to the maximum extent possible.5
Another example of a non-rational grounding of the reasoning behind human
security can be found in a  speech by Sumi,  where he invokes a parable-like
narrative  in  which  a  “heavenly  father"  looks  after  his  "flock".6 As  far  the
legitimation of human security policy is concerned, the shepherd's (i.e. state's)
mandate is tacitly divine; the pursuit of human security (defined here in terms
of the interests of a stray sheep and its belongingness to the polity) is implied as
being the volition of God,7 since "it is not the will of the heavenly father that one
of these [sheep] is lost".8
Sumi's  speech  is  exceptional  in  that  it  is  the  only  example  in  the  corpus
examined of the representation of human security policy in terms of a heavenly
mandate. To speak in religious terms where the impetus for action is divine is to
speak in an unproblematic way about undertaking human security, insofar as
religious precepts based on the will of a God are – similarly to beliefs – beyond
question  and  beyond  the  reasoning  of  man.  Whilst  Japan's  legitimation  of
human security practices is generally undertaken in unproblematic ways which
demonstrates  little  reflectivity  regarding  their  appropriateness,  Sumi's
5 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security” 
(presented at the The General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, United 
Nations General Assembly, May 22, 2008), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2008/un0805-6.html emphasis added.
6 Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html.
7 For the emergence and development of pastoral power, which represents the relationship 
between God, the sovereign and the population in terms of shepherds and flocks, see Michel
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978, ed. 
Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
8 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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implication of the divine is particularly notable because it implies a lack, if not
rejection of, a critical attitude to the aptness of human security practice due to
its grounding in the unquestionable will of God.
There is an urgent need that the objectives of a 
human security agenda are fulfilled
The  pursuit  of  human  security  is  often  presented  as  a  need  or  imperative,
although the content of these categories is usually left unfilled. The presence of
need  as  a  justification  for  human  security  in  the  “Asia  Pacific  context”  was
observed by Acharya, who explained its presence in terms of the “aftermath of
the regional economic crisis”.9 As far as Japan's discourse on human security is
concerned, there is a speech by Takasu which is exceptional because it provides
a reason for why human security policy is apparently a need and a must:
At  the  same  time,  with  the  promotion  of  democracy  and  good  governance
throughout the world, and with instant global communication, governments have
had to become more accountable to the needs of their people. Some human security
concerns  can  no  longer  be  kept  hidden  from  critical  global  scrutiny.  The
performance of governments will be judged increasingly by the extent to which they
seriously and effectively deal with human security concerns. These are some of the
reasons why the 21st century must inevitably become a human-centered century.10
At the outset, a number of presuppositions regarding the reasoning behind the
pursuit of human security are evident here. Firstly, that the state is positioned
as working for the benefit of its people. This idea of government pursuing the
interests of its polity is discussed again below, in regard to similar claims that
Japan's human security policy is a matter of political leaders' commitments to
an  imagined  public.  Secondly,  the  construct  of  the  people is invoked  as  a
9 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” International Journal 56 (2001): 
448.
10 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a 
Globalized World” (presented at the International Conference on Human Security in a 
Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, May 8, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html emphasis added.
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distinct,  identifiable and bounded group;  as if  it  was distinguishable in kind
from the state which is said to serve it.  It is this notion of the people which is
ascribed  with  having  needs.  Needs  are  similar  to  the  beliefs  which  were
discussed above because they are also non-rational phenomena. They are often
associated  with  processes  of  life  which  would  not  be  possible  without  their
satisfaction, but distinguishable from desires or wants; these latter two ideas
being  superfluous  regarding  physiological  needs,  although they  may also  be
non-rational or unconscious.
Though  Takasu  does  not  provide  an  explanation  regarding  why  people
themselves  might  need  to  have  human  security,  he  does  assert  that  human
security needs to be realised by the state. In other words, he is not speaking
about people's need for human security, but rather – in the words of Newman –
the  state's  need  to  pursue  it  because  the  “international  legitimacy  of  [its]
sovereignty rests not only on control of territory, but also upon fulfilling certain
standards of human rights and welfare for citizens”.11 From the way in which
Takasu has expressed this idea of “conditional sovereignty”,12 one is left with the
impression  that  the  necessity  of  pursuing  human  security  is  based  on  the
self-interest of government in maintaining its position via positive assessments
by other states, rather than being a response to the needs of people per se; as if
it was more important  to be seen to be promoting the interests of individuals,
than  actually  promoting  them  for  their  own  sake.  Whilst  it  is  somewhat
perplexing to come across the representation of human security – an idea which
ostensibly prioritises individual human interests, rather than those of the state
– as a way by which to realise the needs of the state, one should keep in mind
that by Japan's own account, human security practice is not – as was discussed
in chapter two – exclusively focused on the human. Indeed, the use of the idea
of human security as a way to pursue state objectives is not exclusive to Japan;
11 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” Security 
Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 358.
12 Ibid.
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Canada having “used the idea […] to distinguish itself as a progressive middle
power” at the United Nations Security Council, and Norway to strengthen its bid
for  a  seat  on  there.13 As  an  aside,  Takasu's  exposition  of  this  imperative  is
self-serving, in the sense that the underlying presupposition which is reinforced
here unproblematically and without elucidation, is that it is the responsibility
and role of the state to undertake human security policy; a position at odds with
other  expressions  by  Japan  –  taken  up  in  chapter  five  –  in  which  human
security  practices  are  expressed  as  involving  non-state  actors.  Moreover,
following McDonald,  such facile presuppositions are problematic because this
kind of reification of the state as the most legitimate provider of security is a
problem which “Human Security  sought in part  to  address”.14 In actual  fact,
Takasu's  discussion  of  this  role  in  terms  of  the  apparent  new  level  of
transparency, accountability and democracy that is said to be pre-eminent in
the context of human security – albeit with no indication as to when these levels
are supposed to have risen and where – functions not as a reason for why states
should undertake human security policy, but rather as a reason to propel them
to return to it or raise their standards in its pursuit. 
A somewhat more rational grounding for the pursuit of human security can be
found in  Sato's  invocation  of  a  14th century  description  by  the  traveller  Ibn
Battuta of “a very high level of human security for children, women and men in
the  Mali  Empire,  where  the  rule  of  law,  justice  and  mutual  respect  among
people were the basis of prosperity and glory”.15 Of note in this instance, is the
implication that human security can serve as a foundation for benefits measured
13 Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 
(1999): 266–267. In his assessment of Canada’s apparent “use” of the concept of human 
security, Suhrke asserts that, indeed, "an interest-based interpretation [...] again seems 
persuasive. Ibid.
14 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” Global Society 16, no. 
3 (2002): 280.
15 Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network” (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html.
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according to the economic and political notions of prosperity and glory. The
representation of human security policy in reference to prosperity is something
which was present in the earliest human security texts examined. For instance,
Obuchi framed policy in terms of his belief that “the 21st century for Asia should
be a century of peace and  prosperity built on human dignity”.16 However, the
construction of the human security concept which Ibn Battuta is said to have
described in the past, only partially corresponds to the way in which Japan has
conceptualised  it  in  the  present.  The  point  of  convergence  is  in  regard  to
respect, even though for Japan this figures as something which should be a part
of the non-human attitude to the human, rather than as a property of human
behaviour vis-a-vis each other. In other words, whilst Ibn Battuta was said to
have spoken of mutual respect between people, in Japan's case the realisation of
human security is premised on the state respecting individuals. For example,
the realisation of human security is said to necessitate policy which involves
“respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations
”,17 that “each human being be fully respected as an individual”,18 and that “each
human being […] should be respected as a human person”.19 However, none of
these  prescriptions clearly states the perspective from which respect is  to  be
measured nor who should be taking on a respectful attitude, and the texts do
not specify how a situation in which people can be manipulated into respecting
each other might be realised. What can be discerned then, is that despite dealing
with significantly different notions of respect, the rhetorical strategy employed
here is  one of  comparison,  with the aim of  promoting contemporary human
security  policy  as  a  way  to  realise  prosperity  and  glory.  Moreover,  in  this
particular instance there is no specification as to who would be the beneficiary
of this glory or prosperity, although taking into consideration other expressions
16 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998 emphasis 
added.
17 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
18 Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century 
Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium 
on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html.
19 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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of prosperity in Japan's human security documents which  situate the state or
region as beneficiary, it is possible to conclude that in this instance prosperity
and glory are also conceptualised from a non-individual, non-human point of
view.
In order to justify  the pursuit  of  human security as  a need, in the following
excerpt, Takemi constructs a logical connection between his characterisation of
human security in reference to the Commission on Human Security, and then
recent events associated with United States' foreign and security policy:
The working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human
Security,  which  was  established  in  June  2001,  states,  “the  objective  of  human
security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive
threats in a way that is consistent with long term human fulfillment.” While this
characterization  is  not  definitive,  it  is,  I  believe,  a  useful  starting  point  for
discussion. Indeed, as the terrorist attacks in the United States and recent events in
Afghanistan  have  demonstrated,  there  is  an  urgent  need to  ensure  that  the
objectives of a human security agenda are fulfilled.20
Legitimation  of  policy  functions  through  the  use  of  the  logical  sentence
connector adverb indeed, to construct an image in which these events speak for
themselves as proof of the necessity of human security policy. In other words,
the impetus to pursue human security is represented as being warranted by the
apparently obvious significance of “terrorist attacks in the United States”.21 This
attempt at  legitimisation comes across as rhetoric because there is no way in
which the apparent logic can be seen in the structure of Takemi's statement. The
events he has invoked are imprecise, particularly the ones said to be occurring
in Afghanistan, and therefore there is no way to determine what the relationship
between those events and human security might be. The ambiguity of the link is
20 Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in 
Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue
on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International 
Exchange, 2002), 42, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf 
emphasis added.
21 Ibid.
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also confounded by the leap from speaking of the present lack of a  definitive
characterisation of the concept, towards an attempt at proving the necessity of
policy. It is doubly difficult to see how the events which Takemi invoked could
function to legitimate policy when by his own words, a definition is lacking.
In the following example, need for the pursuit of human security is constructed
via the idea of consensus and the representation of human security policy as an
existing, legitimate pursuit:
Recent international cooperation efforts in the area of health care, have been done
to ensure the provision of  adequate  health care services to individuals who are
considered socially  vulnerable  segments  of  the population such as  poor people,
women, and children. These efforts include, when necessary, ensuring the services
are  located in  accessible  locations.  In this  regard,  I  get  a  strong sense that  the
human security viewpoint really is needed after all.22
Here,  an  impression  of  international  consensus  regarding  the  aptness  of
pursuing human security is implied through the use of the adjective  recent  to
invoke a historical context for policy. By presenting certain international efforts
as being  recent, it is logically reasonable to assume that there have also been
efforts which are  not recent; i.e. events which happened earlier.23 As such the
pursuit of human security comes across as being an activity with pedigree and
tradition, since it has apparently been happening longer than since just recently.
Moreover  these  efforts  are  also  signified  as  being  both  cooperative  and
international,  thus  contributing  to  the  construction  of  an  external  source  of
legitimacy  by  implying  the  existence  of  numerous states,  aside  from  Japan,
acting  in  the  interests  of  human  security  since  sometime  in  the  past.  This
implication of tradition and international norms is made despite a significant
22 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.
23 As discussed in regard to the use of the future in legitimating human security policy, 
expressions of temporality in the discourse are problematic because no grounds are offered 
by which one might be able to clearly distinguish between the past, present, and future. 
Similarly the use of the term recent is problematic because the discourse does not indicate 
the temporal boundaries of what is recent and what is not recent.
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measure of resistance to the pursuit of human security among states, on the
grounds that it “provides a pretext for developing countries to meddle in the
domestic affairs of the developing world”.24 Cuba, for instance, has asserted at
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  that,  regarding  human  security,  it
“reject[s]  attempts  by  some  to  impose  and  implement  ambiguous  concepts,
which are not clearly defined, for that could turn them into easily manipulated
instruments to justify any action and attempt against the sacred principles of
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of
states”.25 Nevertheless, to speak of recent efforts works to imply that not only is
the pursuit of human security based on a precedent at the international level,
but also that it is still legitimate, since it has apparently been occurring lately. As
such, this example of policy legitimation is related to texts which invoke human
security as a traditional and normal part of statecraft, as well as those which
frame policy as a matter of consensus regarding the concept of human security.
Moreover, that these efforts are said to be  recent, works to legitimate human
security  further  by  presupposing  a  difference  between  earlier  and  current
actions, thus implying a continuing development of human security policy.26 As
such, the excerpt functions to legitimise human security practices by bringing to
mind existing norms of policy as a basis for action, rather than presenting them
as totally new forms of foreign policy.
Another  instance of  representing actions to be taken in the name of  human
security as a matter of need was undertaken and reinforced by Takasu when he
paraphrased an earlier speech by Obuchi:
Prime Minister Obuchi delivered a policy statement in Hanoi in which he stressed
24 Paul M. Evans, “Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning.,” Journal of East Asian 
Studies 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 272.
25 Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz, “Statement by Ambassador Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz, Permanent 
Representative of Cuba, at the Thematic Discussion of the United Nations General 
Assembly on Human Security,” May 22, 2008, 1, 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/humansecurity/statements.shtml.
26 Insofar as development and change are similar to evolution, they function in a similar way. 
As discussed in the second chapter, the representation of the human security concept in 
terms of evolution works to ascribe policy with consensus and natural (scientific) processes.
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the  need to make the 21st century an age of peace and prosperity grounded on
human dignity. In other words, we must make it a human-centered century.27
Takasu  represented  this  apparent  need  as  being  logically  connected  to  the
imperative of pursuing human security, by using the phrase in other words. As
such, the argument was constructed along the lines that since human security is
a  need, it  must be pursued. However, it is worth pointing out that such logic
only applies if one establishes a responsibility for one's self in this regard. One
must only intervene in the presence of a responsibility to do so; otherwise needs
on their own do not constitute an a priori imperative to act. 
We must seek new strategies for economic development which
attach importance to human security
The pursuit  of  human  security  is  variously  legitimated  through reference  to
regional, economic, or human development. The presence of development as a
trope  in  Japan's  human  security  discourse  was  found  in  the  earliest  texts
examined. For example, a 1998 speech by Obuchi at the “Intellectual  Dialogue
on  Building  Asia's  Tomorrow”  functions  to  associate  human  security  with
development  through the  assertion  that,  “the  process  of  development  is  not
primarily one of expanding the supply of goods and services but of enhancing
the  capabilities  of  people”.28 The  enhancement  of  people's  capabilities  or
capacities has been presented as a way in which to realise human security in a
number of Japan's human security texts, such as in the following excerpt:
In order to ensure human security and create a new international order in the 21st
century, the efforts of citizens, particularly NGOs, made on their own initiative, are
indispensable. This will require that the capabilities of each individual be raised. 29
27 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000 emphasis added.
28 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
29 Keizo Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International 
Order in the 21st Century” (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, 
Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html.
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However, this juxtaposition of development and human security is ambiguous if
not problematic. It implies an instrumental role for the latter in the realisation
of the former,  despite the presence of statements within the same speech in
which Obuchi expresses a belief in the aptness of pursuing human security as an
end in itself.30 Ambiguity results because it is not clear whether development is
presented as being synonymous with the pursuit of human security – as defined
in terms of capability – or whether it is being implied that human security is a
perquisite for the successful realisation of development objectives. 
Ambiguity  is  compounded  when  one  examines  Obuchi's  further  elucidation
upon the relationship between human security and development:
An unavoidable  fact  is  that  Asia's  remarkable  economic  development  in  recent
years also created social strains. The current economic crisis has aggravated those
strains,  threatening  the  daily  lives  of  many  people.  Taking  this  fact  fully  into
consideration,  I  believe  that  we  must  deal  with  these  difficulties  with  due
consideration for the socially vulnerable  segments  of  population,  in the light  of
"Human Security," and that we must seek new strategies for economic development
which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term
development of our region.31
Indecisiveness, regarding the question of whether priority should be ascribed to
human security or development, appears to have been resolved here in favour of
latter. Because Obuchi advocates human security as merely a  consideration in
the search for new economic development strategies aimed at enhancing long
term regional development, the impression is that whilst human security might
be an important aspect in determining the best way to go about undertaking
development, it is nonetheless in a subordinate position to development itself. 
30 As discussed above, Obuchi framed the pursuit of human security in terms of his “deepest 
belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their 
survival threatened nor their dignity impaired”. See Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An 
Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.
31 Ibid.
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Similarly to Obuchi,32 Takemi's postulation of development as a process which
primarily involves the enhancement of people's capabilities was attributed to
the work of economist and Commission on Human Security Co-Chair Amartya
Sen, although neither document indicated the source of this idea via reference
to Sen's work:
Professor  Amartya  Sen,  the  winner  last  year  of  the  Nobel  Prize  in  economics,
observed that "the process of development is not primarily one of expanding the
supply of goods and services but of enhancing the capabilities of people."33
Takemi's framing of the pursuit of human security in terms of Sen's theory of
development – as the enhancement of people's capabilities – thus worked to
reinforce the connotation made by Obuchi that human security was at least in
part  a  means  to  an  end,  rather  than  a  goal  in  itself.  However,  there  is  a
difference  between  Obuchi  and  Takemi's  speeches  in  regard  to  how  the
invocation of Sen's theories on development work to legitimate actions taken in
the name of human security. Obuchi spoke of the pursuit of human security in
the context of dealing with problems ascribed to economic crisis in the Asian
region, and his reference to Sen, regarding economically and developmentally
driven enhancement of people's capabilities, was related to the economic and
financial crisis of which he spoke. On the other hand, Takemi invoked Sen in the
context  of  a  wider  discussion  of  human  security,  in  which  the  notion  of
enhancing people's capabilities was presented as a blanket approach for dealing
with various human security threats, rather than ones predominantly associated
with the economic sphere or economic crisis. 
Justification of policy practice through the representation of human security as
a means to economic development came up again in an explicit form in a 2002
speech by Uetake Shigeo:
It  is  important  to  adopt  an  approach  that  places  people  at  the  center.  The
32 Ibid.
33 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
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foundation for nation-building is "human resource development." Human resource
development is essential if a developing country is to assert ownership of its own
development.  Even  when  the  time  comes  at  some  point  in  the  future  when  a
developing  country  no  longer  needs  aid,  it  will  still  be  true  that  people  are  a
country's most valuable asset. We have a duty to strengthen and enhance human
resources - so important for a country's economic and social development.34
Uetake mixes terms which have been used in the context of human security
elsewhere.  For  example,  he  seems  to  delineate  human  security  from  “an
approach that puts people at the center”, by claiming that such an approach is
necessary and that “at the same time,  the concept  of  human security […] is
growing”.35 This is despite the fact that at other times human security itself has
been spoken of as a  human or people-centered approach.36 Indeed, he himself
goes on to characterise human security as an approach “which calls for greater
importance to be attached to each individual's  viewpoint”,  thus adding more
ambiguity to the text whilst taking away from its conceptual clarity.37 Imprecise
language notwithstanding, Uetake's speech creates an image in which whatever
the merits of the realisation of the state of human security for people might be,
its  achievement  is  primarily  motivated  by  its  utility  in  the  service  of  nation
building and economic/social  development,  through the conceptualisation of
the human individual as a resource. To speak of human beings as resources in
state  development  functions  to  make  the  condition  of  human  security  an
instrument  in  the  realisation  of  non-human  aims,  and  is  reminiscent  of
legitimation which works through the ascription of human beings with value, as
can be discerned in the assertion that “all measures aimed at human security are
based on the premise that each individual human should be valued”.38 As such it
is the apparent intrinsic value of people which serves as the reason for pursuit of
34 Shigeo Uetake, “Statement at the International Conference on Financing for Development” 
(presented at the International Conference on Financing for Development, Mexico, March 
22, 2002), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/svm/uetake0203.html.
35 Ibid. emphasis added.
36 For example Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the 
Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004.
37 Uetake, “Statement at the International Conference on Financing for Development,” March 
22, 2002.
38 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 45.
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policy. However, as discussed in chapter two, the postulation of humanity in
terms of value is problematic because none of the texts encountered specified
the meaning of this value or how it might be measured.
As  was  also  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  one  of  the  consistent
characteristics of Japan's human security discourse is a vacillation between a
number of different implied beneficiaries of policy. In the following example,
there is a distinct sense in which the pursuit of human security comes across as
praxis from which the state is to benefit, with people implicitly positioned as
resources in the realisation of objectives conceptualised in reference to it:
The Japanese notion of human security is to complement traditional state security
by being people-centred and addressing insecurities that have not been considered
as state security threats.39
Here the impetus for the pursuit of human security is expressed in terms of the
relationship  between  the  concepts  of  human  security  and  state  security;  a
relationship  defined  in  terms  of  complementarity,  where  the  former  is  to
support  the  latter.  By  speaking of  a  complementary  relationship  directed
towards state security,  the pursuit  of  human security policy comes across as
being constructed in terms of the objectives of state security, insofar as the idea
of complementarity implies a hierarchical relationship in which the existence of
the complementary element is defined according to its supporting role in the
realisation  of  the  agenda  of  the  dominant  element.40 Whilst  Sato's
characterisation of the human security imperative includes the representation of
people as the centre of policy, thus giving the appearance that the relationship
39 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
40 McDonald has identified a similar problem: that “If states supplement traditional security 
concerns with Human Security, there exists the potential for the mechanisms and priorities 
of security to remain fundamentally untouched [with] states [benefiting] from positive 
perceptions of Human Security without seeking fundamentally to institutionalise Human 
Security concerns ”. In Japan's case, the potential is particularly noticeable as – according 
to the excerpt above – human security comes across as being an instrument which 
prioritises state security. See: McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of 
Security,” 2002, 281.
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between human security and state security is not strictly constructed in terms of
a  relationship  between  subordinate  and  superordinate  elements,  the
significance  of  the  people-centered trope  is  ambiguous  because  there  is  no
specification as to the purpose of having people as a focus, and thus there is no
way to  make a  conclusion as  to the envisioned balance of  interests  between
human and state security concerns. Whilst to speak of people as the centre of
policy  concern  does  contain  a  rhetorical  prioritisation  of  their  interests,  in
actual fact without a statement of purpose and in light of the characterisation of
the relationship between state and human security in terms of complementarity,
there is no a priori reason to exclude the possibility that to focus upon people
reflects more of  an emphasis on developing and exploiting them as resources,
rather than placing their interests at the top of the policy agenda.
A  similarly  ambiguous  expression  of  human security  interests  in  relation  to
development is visible in the following excerpt, where policy is represented as
promising both peace and development at regional and global levels:
Japan will steer its way towards becoming a country with high aspirations that does
not hesitate to toil for the common interests of the region and the world, playing its
role as a "Peace Fostering Nation" that contributes to peace and development in the
world. 41
As can be seen in this excerpt, Fukuda has formulated legitimation of the will to
human security through the image of peace and development, conceptualised in
terms  of  common  interests  at  both  the  global  and  regional  level.  The
legitimation of human security in terms of either global or regional interests is
problematic as far as the pursuit of human security at the level of the individual
is concerned, simply because if creates a conflict of interest between individual
interests on the one hand, and group level interests on the other.
41 Yasuo Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session
on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’” (Davos, 
Switzerland, January 26, 2008), 
http://www.mofa.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html.
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The representation of human security in terms of “[the] concept that a small
interest of one stray sheep will not be sacrificed in the name of state security but
rather that one sheep's care is all sheep business”,42 reveals a communitarian
element to the discourse, even though neither the nature of these cares nor the
interests that might be served for individuals who consider themselves as having
a stake in the security of others, is detailed in Japan's human security texts.
Furthermore,  this representation is related to the earlier  point regarding the
realisation  of  state  security  through  actions  signified  in  terms  of  human
security, working towards the security of the state by re-emphasising its right to
exist. As discussed above, the communitarian element can be found in relation
to the presentation of human security as having a heavenly mandate; namely,
that “it is not the will of the heavenly Father that one of these [sheep] is lost”.43
As such, the idea that human security interests are a matter of mutual concern
for individuals comes across as being a precondition for the maintenance of the
integrity of the polity. In other words, the reason for undertaking policy implied
here  is  a  conservative  idea  regarding  the  necessity  of  sustaining  a  structure
consisting of a polity and a body that governs it. Actions to be taken in the name
of the human security of individuals, in this case expressed as their “interests”,44
are  legitimated  through  the  idea  that  the  integrity  of  the  flock  should  be
maintained by preventing or discouraging members' departure. But, insofar as
those individual interests have to be weighed in accordance to the interests of
the group, there is a limit regarding the extent to which the interests  of the
individual can be realised without impinging upon those of the group. A similar
conservatism can be observed in the legitimation of human security practice
according to the argument that in the wake of a lack of human security, “even
the future of a society as a whole could be at risk”;45 or in the assertion that the
pursuit  of  human  security  is  to  be  undertaken  in  the  interests  of  future
42 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2007), 2.
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generations.46 In  the  latter  case  a  conservative vision can be seen when one
considers the discursive construction of future generations' concerns as being
the  same  as  those  of  current  generations;  that  the  concerns,  worries,  and
agendas  of  future  generations  will  remain  unchanged in  the  future.47 In  the
former case, to speak of the risks to the future of society associated with human
insecurity, is to promote the continued existence of society in its current form,
without allowing for the possibility that future generations might want change
or that they may become accustomed to new forms of society by overcoming
adversity.
Continuing with the theme of justification in Japan's human security discourse,
Sumi also spoke about "small interests of a stray sheep [being] a core value and
[deserving]  to  be  given  careful  attention".48 What  is  of  note  here  is  the
invocation of  core values,  reminiscent  of  the  idea of  the  vital  core that  was
discussed  in  the  second chapter  on  the  meaning  and  parameters  of  human
security. As discussed in that chapter and brought up again above, the idea of
the pursuit  of  human security expressed in terms of its value is  problematic
simply because Japan's human security texts contain no elucidation as to the
nature of  that  value in terms of  political  interests,  or  indeed in reference to
anything at all. Aside from the idea of  intrinsic  value, value is a notion which
exists  in  relationship  to  something  else;  it  is  a  relative  notion  just  as  when
speaking of size, largeness is conceptualised in relation to smallness.49 To speak
of  value  necessitates  a  consideration  of  the  perspective  from  which  it  is
constructed (i.e. value for whom?), and what can be exchanged for the interests
46 For example, Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s 
Tomorrow,” 1998; Ryuzaburo Sato, “Statement at the Fortieth Session of the United 
Nations Commission on Population and Development” (presented at the The Fortieth 
Session of the United Nations Commission on Population and Development, United 
Nations, New York, April 10, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0704.html.
47 Issues relating to the trope of future generations are taken up again in chapter four, which 
deals with the representation of threats to human security. 
48 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
49 “Value,” Dictionary.com, accessed September 18, 2012, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/value?r=75&src=ref&ch=dic.
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of individuals in an economic system of production and exchange. Even though
there is no specification as to how value might be measured – either in relative
or absolute terms – essentially the argument which is implied through the use of
this trope runs along the line that, human security should be pursued because
individual  human  interests  (i.e.  a  component  part  of  human  security),  are
intrinsically valuable.
The idea of value comes up not only in reference to people, but also in regard to
the pursuit of human security in general. For instance, Takasu frames practice
in reference to the notion of “added value […] to address global challenges”, thus
appealing to opportunism but without resolving questions about priority that
are  implied.50 Specifically,  the  problem  is  that  in  advocating  the  pursuit  of
human security in terms of added value, there is a risk that those things which
are ostensibly at the core of human security come to be compromised due to
prioritisation  of  elements  which  were  initially  conceptualised  as  unplanned
benefits. In other words the danger for the realisation of human security is that
those things which are only of cursory and added value begin to figure as the
primary drivers of action. As was discussed earlier, there is an antagonism in
Japan's  human security  discourse  regarding prioritisation of  human security
goals defined in the interests of humans, in distinction to goals defined in terms
of non-humans like the international community, regions, or individual states.
In his statement to the United Nations General Assembly, Takasu speaks of the
added  value  that  comes  from  the  human  security  approach  in  reference  to
pursuits such as the Millennium Development Goals, which are also represented
as being a matter of measurement at the level of the individual.51 The Millenium
Development Goals  and human security  policy are  related in regard to their
determination, at least in part, according to the agendas and interests of the
50 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
51 United Nations Development Programme, “Millennium Development Goals | UNDP,” 
Millenium Development Goals, accessed September 17, 2012, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html.
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human individual rather than the state. However, the two are also significantly
different. For example, in Japan's case human security is commonly said to be
about  the  individual  interests  of  all humans,  albeit  with  a  focus  on  the
vulnerable. Alternatively, the Millenium Development Goals are focused upon a
particular  subset of  people,  identified  by  their  citizenship  of  developing  or
under-developed states.  Just  as  the  legitimation of  human security  policy in
reference  to  both human  and  non-human  bodies  comes  with  the  risk  of
prioritising one over the other in the wake of unresolved conflicts of interest, the
problem with justifying human security objectives in relation to any added value
that may result from human security practice, is the potential for conflicts of
interests between human security and the added-value policy objectives. 
Similarly to examples discussed above in which human security practices were
framed and defended in relation to development, in 2004 Sato Keitaro spoke of
hope as being a constituent part of the notion of human security, situating it as a
necessary component for the realisation of developmental goals:
I am confident that the glory of Tombouctou or Gao of ancient Empire of Mali will
return to the banks of  the Great  River  Niger,  where the HOPE of  the ordinary
people will  enhance the resilience of  each and every individual,  thus advancing
forward socio-economic conditions for their life and helping to realize sustainable
development.52
Furthermore, in this case human security policy is also framed in normatively
attractive terms: the advancement of socio-economic life conditions.  However,
the pursuit of human security is not only legitimated on its own terms, but again
in  regard  to  promises  regarding  development  aims.  However,  this  excerpt
speaks of  development objectives conceptualised at  the level  of  the region –
Africa – which corresponds to instances in which development was said to be in
the interests of the Asian region,53 rather than benefiting people or individuals.
52 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
53 That human security practices are represented in reference to various beneficiaries, 
including regions, was discussed in chapter two.
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On  the  other  hand,  the  following  excerpt  brings  up  a  form of  development
conceptualised in reference to humans:
The concept of human security has been already put into practice. In these difficult
times of crises and uncertainties, Japan believes human securities (sic) offer hope.
Hope is a key for the development of people who are under severe conditions. This
is a concept that a small interest of one stray sheep will not be sacrificed in the
name  of  state  security  but  rather  that  one  sheep's  care  is  all  sheep  business.
Partnership, protection and empowerment are key words for human security and
Japan hopes that this new security concept will be widely accepted to meet new
challenges.54 
As in Sato's  exposition above,  Sumi incorporates  hope into the  definition of
human security and localises it as a precondition for the development of people,
rather than economies or regions. Whilst Sumi's human development refers to
selective subsets of populations signified as those under severe conditions, it is
also the case that human security policy promises development for  all people,
through the use of the all-inclusive signifier mankind:
The  development  and  prosperity  of  mankind  have  been  sustained  with  the
accumulation of creative ambitions of  people themselves.  Once threatened their
survival, livelihood and dignity, either individuals or group of people can hardly
realize their potential and capabilities.55
As  discussed  in  the  second  chapter,  Japan's  human  security  texts  situate  a
number of different discursive objects as beneficiaries of policy. This section has
problematised  the  legitimation  of  human  security  policy  in  reference  to
development, by pointing out how development is conceptualised in reference
to a number of non-human as well  as human beneficiaries,  and how human
security policy comes across as a means for the realisation of development goals,
rather than being primarily concerned with the achievement of human security. 
54 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
55 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
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In a similar manner as the legitimation of actions taken in the name of human
security through signification in terms of prosperity or development, the idea of
modernisation also appeared in the discourse, functioning to create an image of
policy as natural and desirable, particularly though appeals to the economic and
material benefits implied as stemming from the realisation of human security.
Modernisation appeared explicitly only once in the corpus of texts examined,
but it  is  symptomatic insofar as many of the goals  to  which human security
policy is said to lead are also associated with modernity. These include the ideas
of  growth,56 progress57 and  improvement,58 inherent  in  things  such  as
development and the construction of international order, the idea of humanism
and  the  unproblematic  inviolability  of  its  corporeal  boundaries,  science  as
expressed through appeals to  evolution, natural processes, and knowledge of
“man”  in  –  inter  alia –  the  realm  of  the  psyche,  humanitarianism,
egalitarianism, and the imposition of order on chaos: 
Reading, writing, and arithmetic--the three R's--are the most fundamental skills
56 For example Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st 
Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Shinako Tsuchiya, 
“Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human 
Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’” 
(presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “ Human Security - Its role
in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka Prince Hotel, Tokyo, 
Japan, February 25, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html; Obuchi, “Toward the 
Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998; Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends 
of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by Change in the Lives of People” 
(presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ljubljana, 
Slovenia, May 18, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html; 
Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
57 For example Yoshihiro Mori, “Keynote Speech” (presented at the Palm 2000 (Second 
Japan-South Pacific Forum Summit Meeting), Miyazaki City, Japan, April 22, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2000/palm-summit/seika/keynote_mor
i.html; Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress 
by Change in the Lives of People,” May 18, 2007; Katsuya Okada, “Statement by H.E. Mr. 
Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, At the Open Debate of the United 
Nations Security Council on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” April 16, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/fm_state1004.html.
58 For example Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st 
Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999; Sumi, “Human 
Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for 
Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007; Takasu, “Statement
at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
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that a person needs in order to enhance his or her capabilities and potential. In
Japan, from long before the beginning of its  modernization in the middle of the
19th century, it was not only the elite samurai class that could read; basic education
covering  the  three  R's  was  diffused  throughout  the  country  even  among  the
ordinary  people.  It  is  said  that  from  the  beginning  to  the  middle  of  the  19th
century, there were more than ten thousand small schools for the common people.
Japan's  modernization was achieved based on this widespread diffusion of basic
education. 59
Notably, Japan's own modernisation in the 19th century was presented as the
model for this visage of human security policy as leading to change, newness,
progress, and the rejection of an antiquated past.
The 21st century for Asia should be a century of peace and
prosperity built on human dignity
In a similar vein to the promise of modernisation, Obuchi framed the pursuit of
human security in terms of working towards something that is yet to come and
promising a change for the better in speaking of the “future outlook of Japan
and East Asia”:60 
What kind of Asia should we build in the 21st century? I believe the 21st century for
Asia should be "a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity". People
should  lead  a  creative  life  infused  with  individuality  without  their  survival
threatened and dignity violated. The state and the market must contribute to that
end.61
To speak in terms of  the future  functions to ascribe policy and the agents of
policy with a sense of vision and planning, thus working towards conjuring up a
semblance of order and certainty. Moreover, in framing proposals as being in
the interests of East Asia, which here is said to  include Japan, the idea that
59 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.
60 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
61 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.
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human  security  policy  might  be  about  the  parochial  interests  of  Japan  is
de-emphasised. 
The following excerpt shows that the trope of the future does not function only
to frame policy as a matter of shared interests and foresight:
In  our  times,  humankind  is  under  various  kinds  of  threats.  Environmental
problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for
future generations.62
To speak of policy in terms of a concern for  future generations brings a filial,
generational element to the discourse which appeals to the idea that parents
have  a  responsibility  for  the  well-being  of  their  progeny.  In  this  case,  the
category of parent is  a metaphor for the role of government and politicians,
whilst the polity and people are signified as children. In other words, the pursuit
of human security is justified in terms of the prevention of problems for future
generations to whom the metaphorical parent has a responsibility, similarly to
the shepherd/flock metaphor discussed earlier. Such use of this trope can be
contrasted with the idea of human security contributing to a better tomorrow:
I  am confident  that  Human Security  will  give  HOPE to ordinary people,  and I
would most humbly like to point out that HOPE is what gives us courage to work
towards the realizations (sic) of a better tomorrow.63
These  two  forms  of  legitimation  that  utilise  the  idea  of  a  future  which  is
distinguishable in some unspecified way  from the present, differ in that their
beneficiary is different. In the former case, it is primarily those people who are
yet  to  be  born,  although the  current  generation  can  also  be  said  to  benefit
insofar as they are gratified in knowing that their children's future is secure. In
the latter case the equation is reversed,  with focus being on the benefit of a
better future for those currently  living,  although future  generations will  also
62 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
63 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
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benefit, insofar as their lives are better than those of their parents due to the
improved conditions in which they will live. Missing from these invocations of
the future is an indication of  the things which are to be better or how such
improvements  might  be  measured;  considerations  which  could  aid  in
determining when an intervention is necessary or justified. Also, one wonders
whether future improvement is conceptualised between individuals or groups of
people (e.g. populations or sub-populations such as the vulnerable), or whether
comparison might be undertaken in a longitudinal manner in relation only to
the particular, individual unit of interest. 
The following excerpt demonstrates another variation in the functioning of the
future trope to implicitly legitimate actions undertaken in the name of human
security: 
But it is extremely difficult for individuals to realize their potential and capabilities
when their lives and livelihoods are threatened and their dignity is trampled. In
such circumstances, the future of individuals, indeed the future of entire societies,
is at stake. For people to achieve their own potential, societies must first enable
them to live in dignity. This is the goal of human security.64
Whilst  in  the  previous  example  human security  was  said  to  presuppose  the
realisation  of  a  better  future,  in  this  passage  human  security  is  said  to  be
necessary for the  maintenance of  present conditions beyond the present and
into  the  future.  Furthermore,  whilst  it  is  the
human-security-as-potential-and-capabilities of individuals which is presented
as the object of concern, the object which is to  benefit in the future is not the
individual. Instead it is an object which is only in part made up of individuals or
groups of people; i.e. society.  
As  discussed  in  the  first  analytical  chapter,  the  texts  examined  vacillated
64 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003.
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between a number of discursive objects as beneficiaries of the objectives and
promised  benefits  of  actions  taken  in  the  name  of  human  security.  The
discussion above shows that in a similar manner, talk of the future is embedded
in a context which shifts in terms of the implied beneficiary.  The individual,
societies, generations, and ordinary people are all situated at the receiving end
of policy actions. 
Related to Takemi's ideas about building a new international order through the
development of people's capabilities,65 encountered earlier in this chapter, is his
speech  which  represents the  pursuit  of  human  security  in  Africa  as  a
prerequisite  in  “efforts  […]  to  build  a  global  community  toward  the  21st
century”.66 Besides  the  presence  of  a  promise  for  an  improved  future,  this
passage also offers  the  same policy beneficiary as  texts  – discussed below –
which  promise  a  new  international  order:  an  imagined  international
community. However, there is a difference between the idea of a new order and
a  future  community.  Whilst  the  former  construct  creates  an  impression  of
orderliness and hierarchy, the latter one brings to mind harmony and shared
interests. For Takemi, this community is conceptualised at the non-human level,
since  his  talk  of  a  global  community  was  made  in  the  context  of  Japan's
apparent  efforts  to  “engage  Africa as  a  (sic) equal partner  in  the  global
community”.67 In other words, irrespective of what human security might mean
for human beings, it is implied here that the condition is a means to an end; that
of the African continent taking on the role of an equal partner in the global
community. If it were otherwise – that the objectives of human security policy
were an end in themselves – there would be no need to assert that the pursuit of
human security in Africa was being done in order to engage Africa as an equal
partner. Logically speaking, it would be enough to express the pursuit of human
65 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
66 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
67 Ibid. emphasis added.
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security in Africa on its own terms by simply stating, for example, that human
security should be pursued there, without adding that it is so as to have Africa
join the global community. Nonetheless, in this instance one is informed that
the  realisation  of  human  security,  at  least  in  Africa's  case,  serves  as  a
precondition of joining the global community. As such, the impression created
in this text is that the ultimate objective of policy is that of bringing the African
continent into a system of international relations, rather than that of realising
the human security of individual people. 
The representation and justification of human security policy as a way towards
building a new international order or global community relies on the imagery of
harmony  and  single-mindedness  between  various  international  actors.  The
following example similarly rests on the assumption of like-minded consensus
in the international community. Specifically, it constructs Japan's participation
in international politics, in particular the pursuit of human security, vis-a-vis an
apparent expectation by the international community that it do so:
Japan  is  expected  to  play  an  ever  increasing  role  in  the  global  community  as
international society progresses towards the 21st century and the building of a new
international order. In assuming this role, Japanese diplomacy will strive towards a
fundamental  objective  of  securing  the  confidence  of  neighbouring  and  other
countries.  It  is  vital  for  Japan  to  express  our  ideas  in  a  clear  manner  and  to
undertake the implementation of concrete policies which are founded on the basis
of  these  ideas.  One  such  idea  that  we  can  cultivate  is  the  concept  of  "Human
Security."68
The text's unproblematic invocation of a monolithic international community
which is  presented  as  being in  consensus  regarding a  larger  role  for  Japan,
functions to legitimate the quest  for human security as  international policy,
whilst downplaying the possibility that there might be a multitude of positions
held by states regarding Japan's role in international politics or the desirability
of  a  more  assertive  or  influential  Japan.  The  construct  of  an  international
68 Ibid.
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community is present throughout the body of Japan's human security discourse
and its usage in this example is consistent with the trend of using it to frame
Japan's actions as being in line with some implied, though unspecified norms of
international politics and diplomacy. Notably, there is a conspicuous tension
implied in  expressing an international expectation for a larger Japanese role,
whilst at the same time representing policy as being in part about building trust;
namely that the claim of an expectation for a larger Japanese role presupposes a
measure of trust and confidence. In other words, to assert that policy is about
building confidence actually works to undermine the claim that a larger role for
Japan is widely supported.
The following excerpt shows another instance of the representation of human
security policy in terms of the ideas of creating  a new order  or  international
system:
Indeed, it is my view that the further development of this idea of "human security"
will  lead to  the rethinking  of  the international  system itself,  going  beyond just
responding to situations as they arise. Under the existing international order, the
state  has  been  the  basic  constituent  component,  and  within  this  framework,
international peace and stability as well as economic prosperity have been pursued,
with  the  advancement  of  the  national  interest  as  the  key  motivating  factor.
However, in coping with these many new problems, it has become apparent that
this kind of framework is no longer a panacea. That is to say, non-state players--for
example, international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, and so on
—are beginning to play a much greater role in every aspect of efforts to solve these
problems--from information gathering and the enlightening of public opinion to
the  mobilization  of  resources  and activities  in  the  field.  For  example,  I  believe
everyone is well aware of the tremendous role that the UNHCR, in collaboration
with NGOs, is playing in providing assistance to the Kosovar refugees. 69
The passage above – conspicuously omitting to indicate who exactly is to benefit
most from the new order promised by human security practices – is notable for
69 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
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two  reasons.  In  the  first  instance,  the  new international  system  invoked  by
Takemi is characterised in terms of going beyond just responding to situations
as  they arise.  This  expression is  consistent  with  the  presentation of  human
security practice in terms of prediction,  control  and prevention of undesired
occurrences or phenomena, as was indicated above. However, characterisation
of policy vis-a-vis a new order says little about whose interests that order will
prioritise, conspicuously omitting to reveal the perspective from which order is
to be conceptualised. Secondly, Takemi shifts from characterising the new order
as a matter of new norms of action (i.e. preventative activities), to hint at the
possibility that state actors cannot deal with certain, so-called  new problems
without the assistance of non-state actors. In other words in the second instance
the new order is characterised not in terms of norms of behaviour, but in regard
to the question of legitimacy or right of being and participation in international
affairs. It is notable that at the same time as Takemi seems to support the idea
that non-state actors should be allowed on to the world stage, he implies that
the resolution of problems towards which non-state actors are also working, are
to be determined and defined by states. It is as if he were allowing non-state
actors  a  place  on  the  stage,  but  leaving  the  tasks  of  writing  the  script  and
directing  the  actors  exclusively  to  states.  As  such,  this  new  order  of  which
Takemi speaks  creates  the  impression that  there  is  to  be  an increase  in  the
number  of  participants  involved  in  the  realisation  of  an  agenda determined
prior to the arrival of those new participants; in short, working in the interests
of state derived goals. 
The  idea  of  a  new  order  is  also  used  to  promote  human  security  policy
specifically in relation to a human beneficiary, such as when Takemi asserts that
“efforts […] from the perspective of human security […] offer a vision for a new
order of existence for  humankind”, which “humankind is seeking”  itself.70 As
such, the pursuit of human security comes across as a response to the desires of
70 Ibid.
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all humans; as, indeed, a form of “foreign policy that moves hand-in-hand with
the people”.71 The invocation of the need for a new order, due to the apparent
desires of humankind, is notable because this form of argument is an extension
of typical acts of legitimation in which political actors claim to be working in the
name  of  the  people.  This  strategy  is  often  heard  in  the  sphere  of  domestic
politics, where the people is for the most part taken to mean citizens, or at least
those within the sovereignty of the state in which such slogans are used. With
the claim that policy is being undertaken for humankind, legitimation of human
security  practice  is  extended  to  function  beyond  the  national  limits  of  the
meaning  of  the  people;  limits  established  according  to  sovereignty  and
citizenship,  and  the  oft  invoked  demarcation  within  international  relations
discourse between the domestic and international realms.72 A similar example in
which the pursuit of human security is legitimated in reference to the nebulous
notion of the people can be observed in the following example:
In  the  outcome  document  of  the  World  Summit  in  2005,  our  political  leaders
committed themselves "to discussing and defining the notion of human security in
the General Assembly." By meeting here today, we are honoring our commitment
and availing ourselves of an important opportunity to initiate that discussion. 73
Whilst in this excerpt a public is not explicitly invoked, it is implicit in Takasu's
assertion that the pursuit of human security is a result of the commitment of
political leaders. 
The idea  of  a  new global  order appears  in  different  guises  in  two speeches
delivered by then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Takemi Keizo in 1999. In
the  following  excerpt,  the  new global  order does  not  figure  so  much as  an
objective which is to be realised through the pursuit of human security policy, as
71 Ibid.
72 Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” 
Review of International Studies 17, no. 1 (January 1991): 67–85; Steve Smith, “Singing Our 
World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11,” International 
Studies Quarterly 48, no. 4 (2004): 499–515.
73 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
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much as it seems equivalent to at least a partial definition of human security;
that of human dignity:
Now, as we approach the turn of century, we are struggling through a whirlwind of
fundamental  change.  That  change is  reflected  in  the substantial  transformation
which  the  international  society  is  experiencing.  In  the  midst  of  such  changes,
humankind is seeking, from an array of positions and perspectives, a new global
order in which human dignity is protected. Out of this search there is emerging the
profile  of  such  an  order.  In  Japan,  the  Obuchi  Government  is  cultivating  the
concept of "human security" as a new element in its foreign policy with a view to
enhancing this new international order.74
Insofar as human dignity is a defining characteristic of Japan's notion of human
security,  the  pursuit  of  a  new  global  order  is  not  so  much  the  motivation
enacting  human  security  practices,  as  much  as  it  equates  with  a  partial
condition of human security. However, the following excerpt implies a different
relationship between human security and a new global order: 
Japan  is  expected  to  play  an  ever  increasing  role  in  the  global  community  as
international society progresses towards the 21st century and the building of a new
international order. In assuming this role, Japanese diplomacy will strive towards a
fundamental  objective  of  securing  the  confidence  of  neighbouring  and  other
countries.  It  is  vital  for  Japan  to  express  our  ideas  in  a  clear  manner  and  to
undertake the implementation of concrete policies which are founded on the basis
of  these  ideas.  One  such  idea  that  we  can  cultivate  is  the  concept  of  "Human
Security." 75
The  difference  in  the  way  that  a  new  global  order is  treated  in  these  two
examples  hinges  on  a  distinction  between  human  security  as  a  means,  and
human  security  as  an  end.  In  the  second  excerpt  from  June  1999,  human
security policy is associated with obtaining the confidence of other countries so
as  to  facilitate  a  larger  role  for  Japan  in  the  project  of  building  a  new
international order. On the other hand, in the first excerpt from September 1999
74 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
75 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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human security makes up an element of the  new global order, and the actual
legitimation  of  the  pursuit  of  security  is  not  confidence  building  but
humankind's  apparent search for this new order and Japan's response to the
wishes of all humans.  
Similar  to  the rationalisation of  policy through a vision of  a new and better
order or future, is the idea that the pursuit of human security will lead to a new
era.  As  discussed  earlier,  for  example  in  reference  to  the  rationalisation  of
human security according to the accumulation of wisdom and freedom, Japan's
human security discourse contains numerous examples of the use of temporal
signifiers  which  are  problematic  because  of  a  lack  of  indication  as  to  when
changes from the past, the present or the future are to have happened or are to
occur.  The  discussion  above,  regarding  the  accumulation  of  wisdom  in  the
interests of all people, was characterised by the presence of a monolithic and
imprecise notion of history. In a similar manner, Takemi's assertion that “it is
the  actions  of  free-thinking  individuals  that  open the  door  to  a new era”,76
invokes the idea of  a future which is  better  than the present,  albeit  without
specifying when this new era is supposed to begin, or what its characteristics
are. 
In the following excerpt one can discern an indirect but imprecise declaration of
the benefits of pursuing human security defined in relation to freedom, which is
part  of  a  legitimation  repertoire  that  highlights  the  importance  of  human
security for the future:
I would like to now stress the importance of "Human Freedom." Human beings
inevitably possess a rich potential to live creative and meaningful lives. The wisdom
of human beings comes from this potential. This wisdom can only be realized if
human beings are provided the freedom to live their lives in a manner where they
can assume their own responsibilities. This necessitates that each human being be
76 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.
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fully respected as an individual. In this regard, the Government of Japan, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, has elected to make human security
one of the essential principles for the conduct of Japanese foreign policy, with the
intention of making the 21st century a truly "human-centred" century.77
Namely, it is said that by making sure that people are able to assume their own
responsibilities,  they  will  be  able  to  develop  wisdom.  That  is  to  say,  the
generation of wisdom depends on two factors; firstly, a  rich potential to live
creative and meaningful lives and secondly the freedom to live life in a way in
which one is able to assume one's  own responsibilities.  The second factor is
intuitively straightforward to understand because according to Takemi it  is a
matter of fact that in the absence of this particular freedom, wisdom cannot be
generated. However, the first factor is somewhat ambiguous as the text does not
specify whether it  is  enough just to be endowed with the  potential to lead a
creative  and  meaningful  life,  or  whether  this  potential  actually  needs  to  be
fulfilled. Furthermore, it is the case that a life led in congruence with a state of
human  security  is  presented  as  the  basis  for  the  continuation  of  both  the
“development and prosperity of mankind”, as well as “the future of society”.78 In
other words, the justification for human security policy is expressed in terms of
its  necessary  role  in  the  development  of  human  wisdom,  which  is  itself  a
precondition of benefits measured in terms of humans at the group level, as well
in  regard  to  society.  This  legitimation  trope  is  a  theoretical  elucidation  on
justification offered in relation to economic prosperity and a better future, both
of which function by making human security appear as beneficial not only to the
human individual,  but  to  all  people,  as  well  as  non-human entities  such  as
states. 
With the assumption of one's own responsibilities as a prerequisite, wisdom is
said to come from humans' potential to live creatively and in a meaningful way,
77 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
78 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
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but it is not clear how anything can spring from the potential for action except
for the action, rather than from the action itself. Potential is an unfulfilled state
related to the notion of probability; something may happen, but with the caveat
that even in the apparent absence of factors which might prevent the realisation
of the event, there is no guarantee that it will in fact manifest itself. Similarly as
with the case of  threat, potential refers to a state prior to action or something
happening; a possibility or theoretical space, rather than assurance. It is not
easy to marry the idea of wisdom as a form of knowledge based on personal
experience, with the notion that it can also come not from action, but from an
unfulfilled freedom to take action.
In another invocation of the wisdom/freedom/potential equation as a vehicle
for the legitimation of  policy,  Takemi presents human security as  a  timeless
concept applicable to all contexts and societies and one which makes up a vital
condition for the entire history of humanity: 
Human beings have encountered difficulties of every kind throughout history, but
through their wisdom they have been able to overcome those difficulties. I believe
that the source of that wisdom is the freedom of individual human beings to make
choices and assume responsibility for their actions, and their abundant potential to
live creative and meaningful lives.79
In  this  instance,  legitimation  functions  through  an  equivocal  reference  to  a
construction  of  history  which  is  both  monolithic  and  imprecise.  It  ascribes
humans' apparent historical ability to overcome difficulty as a function of a two
step  equation,  in  which  having  security  leads  to  the  freedom  to  take
responsibility  for  one's  self,  thus  leading  to  the  accumulation  of  a  kind  of
wisdom that permits overcoming all sorts of difficulties. Takemi's statement is
notable for the level of generality which underlies the argument. The history
which he invokes appears homogeneous and inexact, since there is no indication
as to exactly whose history he has in mind, what the object of that history might
79 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
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be, or what time frame is under consideration. If it is the case that in speaking of
history  a  narrative  of  overall,  all  inclusive  human  existence  was  being  put
forward, then the so-called difficulties that  all humans throughout  all of time
have experienced could only  be  conceptualised in  such a  broad way that  no
theoretically pertinent conclusions could be drawn, other than the recitation of
truisms regarding the difficulties experienced by all  people throughout all  of
human existence. Indeed, it seems that this is exactly what Takemi has done;
and  whilst  in  principle  it  is  generally  valid  to  assert  that  humans  have
historically encountered all sorts of difficulties, to do so says nothing about what
those difficulties might have been, whether they are comparable across people
or contexts, what the ramifications of  not overcoming them might be or what
actions  are  necessary  or  superfluous  in  dealing  with  specific  issues.  The
representation  of  policy  in  such  general  terms  can  be  useful  as  a  way  of
persuading audiences about the positive attributes of human security as an idea
or  policy  objective,  but  it  offers  little  analytical  or  pragmatic  value  for
understanding human (in)security or determining appropriate responses to it.
A form of legitimation which is similar to the invocation of wisdom – insofar as
it refers to a property or attribute of people – can be discerned vis-a-vis the idea
of fulfilment:
Human  security  aims  to  protect  people  from  critical  and  pervasive  threats  to
human lives, livelihoods and dignity, and thus to enhance human fulfillment. 80 
Here legitimation functions in relation to the human as a beneficiary, rather
than the non-human. Importantly, the meaning of fulfilment is left undefined,
except for the implication that there are a number of forms of fulfilment which
can be distinguished in temporal terms: 
The working definition of human security, as used by the Commission on Human
Security,  which  was  established  in  June  2001,  states,  “the  objective  of  human
80 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2 emphasis added.
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security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive
threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.” 81
In other words, the kind of fulfilment to be pursued with reference to human
security  can  be  identified  by  its  status  as  long-term fulfilment;  which  is
presumably different from fulfilment conceptualised in other temporal terms,
though in the texts examined there is no evidence of conceptualisation of either
the  units  of  measurement,  or  criteria  for  distinguishing  between  them.
Fulfilment takes two different positions in regard to human security: in the first
excerpt  above,  human  security  has  a  causal  relationship  with  it,  since  the
realisation of the former – through the protection of people from critical and
pervasive threats – promises to “enhance” the latter.82 On the other hand, the
second excerpt above implies a different relationship between fulfilment and
human  security,  because  measures  aimed  at  realising  human  security  are
defined  only  in  terms  of  a  lack  of  a  negative  correlation;  but  without  the
invocation  of  a  positive  one.  In  speaking  of  “consistency”83 between  human
security and human fulfilment, the relationship comes across not as a causal
type, but as one of congruence; where the two states are to exist side by side but
without necessarily influencing each other.84
This notion is to be defined based on a common understanding
As mentioned earlier, human security policy has been represented as something
which is already being pursued legitimately, thus revealing another instance of
the situation of policy vis-a-vis temporal markers and norms of international
81 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42 
emphasis added.
82 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
83 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.
84 Similar examples of the representation of human security in this way can be seen in Yukio 
Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security” (presented at the 8th Ministerial 
Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bangkok, Thailand, June 1, 2006), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0606.html; Sumi, “Human Security and 
Health,” 2006; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human 
Security,” May 22, 2008.
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behaviour. Consider the following excerpt:
A large number of NGOs, some of them representing Japan's younger generation,
are currently taking action on a number of fronts. This includes assistance for the
refugees  from  Kosovo  as  well  as  other  humanitarian  and  development-related
causes, all in an effort to pass along the task of providing assistance down to the
individuals  who  are  (sic)  truly  needs  it,  and  propelled  by  the  initiative  of
individuals. The sort of finely detailed activities required from the standpoint of
human security would be impossible without the involvement of such NGOs. I am
convinced that it will be utterly essential to make full use of the knowledge and
powers of NGOs in order to pave the way for tomorrow's world.85
Human  security  is  said  to  be  an  existing  pursuit  of  both  many
non-governmental organisations – although the number is left unspecified – as
well  as  the  youth  of  Japan.  As  such  this  excerpt  is  an  example  of  the
representation  of  human  security  in  a  way  which  functions  to  build  up  its
legitimacy through an appeal  to consensus between various non-state actors,
with the implication of an established and unproblematic level of legitimacy of
human security practice. The argument is simple and runs along the lines that,
it must be a good thing, considering how many people are already doing it. A
reference  to  youth  is  also  included,  which  functions  to  suggest  that  human
security practice is something which is wanted not just by elder generations or
government,  but  by  young people;  giving  the  appearance  of  a  wide  base  of
popular  support.  As  such  youth is  ascribed with  the  role  of  a  barometer  or
measure of what is appropriate for the actions of government. At the same time
one can also  see  another  example  of  a  general  tendency for  Japan's  human
security discourse to ascribe importance to the actions of non-state actors by
highlighting their initiative or participation, whilst also implying that their role
is  limited  to  the  implementation  of  concepts  and  agendas  determined
exogenously to them. This can be discerned if one considers how the realisation
of human security is positioned as being “impossible” without the participation
of  non-governmental  organisations,  that  are  concurrently  conceptualised
85 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development toward the 21st Century which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’.”
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merely as objects whose knowledge and powers it is “essential to make full use
of”.86 Additionally, whilst some texts build up consensus in regard to the pursuit
of human security by arguing – inter alia – that “the concept of human security
has continued to develop and grow in importance within Japan and among the
countries of the world”,87 thus using the idea of an international community of
states  as  a  reference,  in  this  example  consensus  is  constructed  vis-a-vis  the
activities of non-governmental organisations; functioning to disassociate policy
from charges of state parochialism by expanding the visage of agreement about
the aptness of human security efforts to a larger group of international relations
actors. 
Whilst  outlining the  meaning of  human security  and Japan's  credentials  for
pursuing it, Takasu asserted that Japan is “confident, moreover, that this is the
direction  in  which  the  world  will  be  heading  in  the  21st  century”.88 This
statement also functions to add legitimacy to the pursuit of human security in
reference to international norms and consensus in an imagined international
community, and it also creates an image of a forward oriented, social scientific
Japan  able  to  predict  the  future.  Whilst  the  statement  does  not  explicitly
provide  a  rationale  or  reason  for  the  pursuit  of  human  security,  it  does  so
implicitly in line with the above mentioned trope regarding consensus; namely,
that if the whole world thinks human security is a good idea, then it must be
legitimate. Indeed, this form of argumentation` was continued in reference not
just  to  the  world,  but  also  to  a  particular  agent:  the  United  Nations.89 The
following statement posits the pursuit of human security as based upon a United
86 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
87 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.
88 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
89 Similarly, t he derivation of legitimacy for human security practice through an “apparent 
consensus it appears to have amongst the states of the world” was noted by Ngoma in 
relation to the discourse of the United Nations General Assembly. See: Naison Ngoma, “The
Challenges Of Civil Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In Southern Africa,” 
Journal of Security Sector Management 4, no. 2 (2006): para. 9 emphasis added.
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Nations mandate:
We are gratified that the Secretary-General of the United Nations takes a similarly
broad view, as described in his recent Report for the Millennium Summit. Although
he does not specifically use the term human security, the Secretary-General accords
equal  priority  to  measures  to  achieve freedom from want  and those to  achieve
freedom from fear. He declares that we must put people at the center of everything
we do. As he stated, "No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than
that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world,
to make their lives better."90
This  association  of  Japan's  policy  with  an  apparent  acknowledgement  of  its
legitimacy  by  the  United  Nations  Secretary  General,  although  ironically,  “he
does not  specifically  use the  term human security”,  works  to  urge  on policy
practices by signifying them as a “noble calling” and “great responsibility”.91 As
such, the responsibility is underlined through the figurative, rather than literal
words of the United Nations. To speak of policy as a  calling brings with it a
sense that it is something which must be done, almost irrespective of the desires
of the actor; bringing to mind the idea of martyrdom and self-sacrifice in the
pursuit of goals larger or more important than the individual interests of the
self.  The legitimation evident here is similar to expressions of the pursuit  of
human  security  as  a  belief,  need,  or  want;  in  the  sense  that  these
representational drivers of human security action are beyond rational thought
and  argument,  appealing  instead  to  emotion,  spiritual  conviction  or
unconscious desire, rather than opportunity or rational calculation.
Takasu  adds  impetus  to  the  pursuit  of  human  security  as  a  normal  and
unquestionable  activity  in  the  international realm,92 by  ascribing  an
90 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
91 Ibid.
92 Human security discourses' transference of human security issues “from the shadows of 
domestic affairs onto the international political agenda ” has been pointed out by Duffield. 
See: Mark Duffield, “Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of 
Terror,” in New Interfaces Between Security and Development (presented at the 11th 
General Conference of the EADI, Bonn, 2005), 1.
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anthropomorphic sense of responsibility to the state and asserting the presence
of a change in the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War; justifying
practices in the name of people rather than non-human beneficiaries such as the
state or the international community:
Changes in the nature of conflicts -- from inter-state to intra-state conflict -- in the
post-cold   war  era  and  break  down  of  government  authority  have  seriously
threatened human security in many parts of the world. When a conflict breaks out
in a country where no single government authority is in place, it is meaningless to
appeal  to  the  sovereign  state's  sense  of  responsibility  to  protect  the  lives  and
dignity of its people. 93
Whilst the idea of a change in the nature of conflicts since the end of the Cold
War  is  a  common  theme  in  human  security  discourse  in  general,  it  is
questionable  both  on  quantitative  and  qualitative  grounds.  For  instance,  in
quantitative terms, Duffield and Waddell assert that “[having emerged] at the
same time as  the idea of  human security,  this  ‘changing nature of  conflict’94
refrain has since become an established truth monotonously recycled in policy
documents,  academic  works  and  the  media  [even  though]  it  is  a  matter  of
statistical  record that  during the Cold War the majority of  all  conflicts  were
internal”.95 Qualitatively  speaking,  the  changing-nature-of-conflict  argument
does  not  address  the  issue  of  why  a  relative  increase  in  civil  wars  should
automatically  warrant  the  pursuit  of  human  security  beyond  one's  own
sovereign  borders.  The  argument  which  Takasu  puts  forward,  is  that  this
apparent  change  in  the  nature  of  conflicts  results  in  “a  break  down  of
government authority”, and it is for this reason that “the level of attention and
high priority accorded to human security internationally these days” should be
increased.96 As  such,  the  argument  presupposes  a  certain  esprit  de  corps
93 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
94 For example: Mary Kaldor, “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror1,” 
International Politics 42, no. 4 (December 2005): 491–498.
95 Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a 
Governmental Assemblage (University of Lancaster, 2004), 13.
96 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000.
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between states; according to which the inability of a government to carry out its
duties  is  supplemented  on  its  behalf  by  other   agents.  Human  security  is
constructed as being based on a measure of trust between states that are not
exclusively  self-interested;  posing  a  problem  for  realist  and  neo-realist
traditions  of  international  relations  which  posit  that  states  are  either
aggressively predisposed to each other or are in relations of mutual distrust and
insecurity.97 A  similar  presupposition  is  made  by  Tsuchiya,  who  speaks  of
situations in which “individuals cannot be protected solely by application of the
concept of state security”, because of the inability of “state functions [to] operate
reliably under major transformation of  political  and economic systems [and]
economic stagnation [with] social upheaval”, such as those which occurred at
“the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union”.98 Such
assertions of an understanding between states, are themselves based on the idea
that international relations are at least partially characterised by the presence of
consensus on how states should handle their affairs and what those affairs are.
On  the  one  hand,  the  suggestion  of  such  an  international  sense  of  spirit  is
consistent  with  common  expressions  within  Japan's  human  security  texts,
which appeal to an imagery of international  community. Nonetheless Takasu's
argument is circular in the sense that by a priori defining the pursuit of human
security as a normal activity of sound government, the idea of states taking on
other  states'  responsibilities  in  the  case  of  internal  conflict  appears  to  be
unproblematic and facile. However, a warrant for why increased internal war or
conflict  should  result  in  more  efforts  at  realising  human  security,  is  not
provided. In other words, one is not told just why the inability of a government
to keep authority in the wake of  civil  war should result  in any more human
insecurity  than  in  the  case  of  inter-state/international  war.  Whilst  civil  war
might  result  in  a  decrease  in  human  security  due  to  a  government  being
preoccupied with challenges to its hegemony or position, it is plausible that a
97 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Hans J.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Seventh (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).
98 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’.”
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similar level of insecurity might arise in cases where said government diverts
resources to inter-state war efforts at the expense of domestic human security
practices. 
Takasu's representation of the imperative to pursue human security was once
more couched in relation to the notions of international norms and consensus,
when he spoke of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document
as having “affirmed the importance of relevance of human security and [that
member states] have agreed to discuss further and define the notion of human
security  in  the  UN”.99 As  discussed  in  chapter  two,  whilst  on  numerous
occasions Japan has  represented itself  as  a  pioneer  regarding the  pursuit  of
human  security,  there  has  been  some  ambiguity  regarding  this  point,
particularly in regard to the apparent genesis of the idea of human security.
Nonetheless,  for the most part  the majority of  Japan's  human security  texts
highlight its role, commitment and importance regarding the idea. For instance,
in the following example Takasu reproduces the image of Japan as a leader and
facilitator in the realm of human security; moreover this role is presented as an
established fact and common knowledge:
As far as I am aware, Japan is the only country that has appointed a full-fledged
Ambassador in charge of Human Security.  This is another testimony to Japan's
strong  commitment  to  promote human security,  which  is  widely  known in  the
world:  Japan  has  taken  and  is  taking  many  initiatives  to  promote  human
security.100 
As it constructs an image of Japan as being relatively autonomous and forward
thinking  in  regard  to  the  pursuit  of  human  security,  Takasu's  talk  of
international affirmation101 of the relevance of human security functions less as
a  reason  for  beginning  to  pursue  human  security,  as  much  as  a  reason  for
continuing to pursue it more vigorously; thus presupposing the prior existence
99 Takasu, “Towards Forming Friends of Human Security,” June 1, 2006.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
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of  human  security  norms.  Considering  that  his  speech,  entitled  “Towards
Forming Friends of Human Security”, was presented in the context of a forum
which represents itself as already committed to the pursuit of human security,
such a conclusion seems logical, as justifying the pursuit of human security to a
diplomatic forum which defines its activities in terms of human security – as the
Human Security Network does102 – would have been, speaking figuratively, a
case of preaching to the converted. At the same time as implying that human
security  is  already a  legitimate  pursuit  –  at  least  for  the  Human  Security
Network -  the invocation of the United Nations, as a marker of international
consensus and legitimacy for the pursuit of human security, works to legitimate
human security praxis for all states.103 This, in turn, makes the proposal for the
establishment  of  an  alternative  forum,  for  the  “many  countries  that  are
interested in some aspects of  human security but do not necessarily  wish to
become members of the HSN”, come across as a fairly facile and matter-of-fact
undertaking.  Notably,  this  particular example of  legitimating human security
activity  through  the  invocation  of  the  United  Nations  as  a  marker  of
international  orthodoxy  –  undertaken  in  2006 –  appears  as  an  example  or
pro-active construction of discursive reality by Japan, if one considers that only
two years earlier, Timothy had argued that “various efforts have been made to
establish  a  human-security  discourse  but  it  has  not  yet  been  aggressively
promoted by the UN nor widely embraced by the international community.”104
The following excerpt is notable because it brings to mind the rationalisation of
actions taken in the name of human security in a way which is similar to their
legitimation  in  relation  to  international  norms  and  consensus  which  was
102 The Human Security Network has “the common goal of identifying concrete areas for 
collective action in the area of human security”; “Human Security Network,” The Royal 
Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa, accessed March 19, 2012, 
http://www.emb-norway.ca/Embassy-and-Consulates/norwaycanada/Initiatives1/humans
ecurity/.
103 Japan is not a member of the Human Security Network, and thus cannot appeal to its 
legitimacy in the pursuit of Japanese human security objectives.
104 Kristen Timothy, “Human Security Discourse at the United Nations,” Peace Review 16, no. 
1 (2004): 19.
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discussed above:
On August 17th [1999], a powerful earthquake inflicted serious damage on Turkey.
The number of casualties has reached more than 39,000 so far. In response, the
Government  of  Japan  promptly  sent  a  rescue  and  medical  crew  of  the  Japan
Disaster Relief Team as well as a team of experts for rehabilitation of life-lines, and
decided to extend emergency and humanitarian aid of approximately three million
dollars,  composed  of  funds  and  materials  such  as  medicines,  tents,  blankets,
generators, and carpenters kits […] In so doing, Japan  recalls with appreciation
the assistance it received from the United States and other countries at the time of
the earthquake in the Kobe area a few years ago.105
The  contextualisation  of  Japan's  human  security  practices  in  reference  to
appreciation of  similar assistance that it  had previously received from other
states  creates  the  impression  that  the  behaviour  of  states  can  in  part  be
attributed  to  anthropomorphic  emotions  that  are  also  beyond  those  usually
attributed by theories of international relations which have emerged from the
realist tradition and emphasise insecurity complexes or aggression.106 In other
words, the impression created is one in which Japan's actions are the result of a
human-like reciprocation which is a  normal aspect of international  relations
practice and the relations between states. 
Another form of implied rationalisation for policy which is related to that of
international  norms,  is  the  idea  that  the  pursuit  and  realisation  of  human
security is a matter of responsibility:
I  firmly  believe  that  it  is  crucial  for  Japan  to  help  people  in  all  countries  and
regions, regardless of differences in basic conditions in social, economic, technical,
health,  and  hygiene  aspects,  to  elevate  their  capabilities  and  realize  their  full
potential.  It  is  therefore  incumbent  on  Japan  to  fulfill  its  obligations  to  the
international community in helping all people to live free from want, with greater
peace of mind, greater stability, and greater prosperity.  As a responsible member
of the international community, Japan must start to give serious thought to how to
105 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
106 Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations.
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respond to the challenges posed by human security issues. It accordingly follows
that in establishing a firm future oriented concept for Japan’s peace diplomacy in
the 21st century, human security is of vital significance.107
In this excerpt, obligation is said to be incumbent on Japan in particular, rather
than on states in general, and it is to be manifested not in relation to human
individuals  themselves,  but  in  regard  to  the  international  community.  The
actual reason as to why Japan should be obliged in this way more than other
countries is left undisclosed in this speech. At the same time as obligation and
responsibility towards the international community are presented as reasons for
the pursuit of human security, it is also stated that human security is a condition
for the realisation of Japan's peace diplomacy. As such, here human security
policy is expressed as something which is to constitute the realisation of state
objectives in international relations. What is also of interest in the excerpt above
is  the use of  the connector  therefore,  to  situate the preceding paragraph, in
which the reason for pursuing human security is expressed in terms of belief, as
a warrant for the assertion that Japan has the obligation and responsibility to
pursue  human  security.  In  other  words,  the  argument  appears  to  be  that,
because Japan  believes  it  should  help  people  to  realise  their  potential  and
elevate their  capabilities,  it  is  incumbent on it  to  fulfil  its  obligations to the
international community by helping all people to be free from want and fear and
to realise other elements of human security. The use of this connector functions
to establish the first paragraph as proof or evidence of what is asserted in the
following one, but to speak of belief in the aptness of human security policy as
evidence of Japan's mandate to pursue it, is a circular, self serving and illogical
argument. In other words, Japan's human security practice is warranted only in
terms of its belief that it has a responsibility to do so.  
The benefits of globalisation have not been extended to the more
107 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 46 
emphasis added.
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vulnerable members of the global village
As  the  following  excerpt  demonstrates,  egalitarianism  and  fairness  are  also
legitimation tropes in Japan's discourse on human security:
While  economic  globalization has  certainly  brought  about  a  higher  standard  of
living for many people in many different countries,  it  has also enlarged the gap
separating  its  beneficiaries  from  the  people  and  countries  that  have  been  left
behind.  Poverty  is  a  force  that  strips  human beings  of  their  potential  and this
applies as well to human survival, human well-being, and human freedom.108
In this excerpt, Takemi has invoked economic globalisation as a positive force,
albeit one which has not spread evenly, thus leading to inequality amongst its
beneficiaries.  The  presence  of  this  legitimation  trope  is  in  agreement  with
Acharya's109 assertion that the pursuit of human security is often presented as a
matter of offsetting the inequities of globalisation.110 The passage functions to
support the pursuit of human security by appealing to the idea of egalitarianism
or  equality  between  people  in  economic  terms.  The  inequality  which  is
expressed in this text is measured in relative terms, and can be contrasted to the
absolute measure of inequality that is  present in the Trust Fund for Human
Security Pamphlet, which explains that “today, as many as 1.3 billion people are
forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day”.111 As discussed in chapter four,
globalisation has a somewhat ambiguous, although generally positive image, in
Japan's  human  security  texts.  However,  the  discourse  is  silent  in  regard  to
Ahmed's  charge that  not only  “national,  [but also] human security  has been
fundamentally  undermined  by  policies  promoted  by  the  key  institutions  of
globalization”.112 Not  only  is  this  critique  of  globalisation  problematic  for
108 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
109 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001.
110 As the speeches of Obuchi Keizo demonstrate most clearly, Japan's rationale for the pursuit 
of human security is also consistent with Acharya's claim that human security is also often 
said to be about dealing with economic crisis. For example, see Obuchi, “Opening Remarks 
at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998.
111 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
112 Nafeez M Ahmed, “The Globalisation of Insecurity: How the International Economic Order 
Undermines Human and National Security on a World Scale,” Historia Actual Online no. 5 
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Japan's  positioning  of  the  process  itself  as  being  congruous  with  human
security, it also creates an unresolved tension for its pursuit of human security
through economic development together with the simultaneous promotion of
globalisation. This is because one of the pillar's of Ahmed's critique is the idea
that  globalisation  fosters  uneven  economic  development  and  thus  erodes
human security. 
Takasu  also  invokes  the  idea  of  an  uneven  spread  of  “the  benefits  of
globalization”,113 to  argue  for  the  pursuit  of  human  security  as  a  matter  of
egalitarianism in reference to the realisation of one's potential; in contrast to the
idea of egalitarianism in the economic sphere, which was highlighted above:
Moreover,  while  globalization  has  given  many  individuals  unprecedented
opportunities  for  realizing  their  potential,  the benefits  of  globalization have not
been extended to the more vulnerable members of the global village.114
As  with  other  texts  in  which  egalitarianism  is  evoked  in  relation  to
globalisation,115 there is an ambiguity in regard to whether the uneven spread of
the benefits of globalisation is of most concern to humans or non-humans. The
excerpt above indicates that, whilst on the one hand globalisation is said to have
been of  benefit  to  many  individuals,  it  is  also said to have bypassed certain
members of the global village. In terms of the logic of the level of the sentence,
individuals and  members of the global village represent the same object; i.e.
those  postulated  as  actual  or  hypothetical  beneficiaries  of  the  benefits  of
globalisation. However, in consideration of the context of the speech and the
(Fall 2004): 113.
113 Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” May 8, 2000; Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on 
Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human 
Security in a Globalized World” (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building 
Asia’s Tomorrow, Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.
114 For instance: Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a 
Globalized World,” May 8, 2000.
115 For example Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st 
Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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hegemony  of  an  international  relations  discourse  which  tends  to  recognise
predominantly,  non-human  state  bodies  as  legitimate  international  actors,
charges of conceptual dissonance would not be out of place if it was indeed the
case  that  the  term  member  of  the  global  village was  meant  to  indicate
individual humans rather than nation-states. The point is that it is difficult to
determine whether members of the global village are posited as people or states.
As discussed in chapter two, Japan's human security discourse is ambiguous
across texts in regard to the the object which is envisaged as a beneficiary of
human security practice, and Takasu's invocation of a global village is another
example of  this.  Moreover,  Takemi's  assertion of  a  need for  human security
practice  due  to  a  lack  of  egalitarianism  is  also  ambiguous  and  indecisive
regarding the actual object of concern, since in the one sentence he speaks of
both “people and countries that have been left behind”.116 
In a  related vein to legitimation based on the  idea of  egalitarianism, Sumi's
conjuring up of the claim that “today, as many as 1.1 billion people117 are forced
to  live  on less  than one dollar  a  day”,118 associates  the  pursuance of  human
security with the idea of standing up for the benefits, rights or interests of the
Other in line with an altruistic impetus. Passive voicing of the verb to force – i.e.
as to be forced – functions to present Japan's proposed actions as a response to
the plight of people who are living on less than one dollar per day against their
will; who are in a situation which is imposed on them by a nameless and faceless
cause of human insecurity. That is to say, the implied vision is one of Japan
standing  up  for  those  who  have  no  choice  but  to  live  in  conditions  whose
negativity is measured in economic terms, due to the malevolence of unspecified
others.
116 Ibid. emphasis added.
117 Interestingly, an excerpt discussed earlier indicated that it it 1.3 billion rather than 1.1 
billion people who are said to be living on less than one dollar per day. See: Global Issues 
Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st 
Century,” March 2007, 2.
118 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.
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Insofar as the form of egalitarianism implied in Japan's human security texts is
associated with a concern for the Other, it is related to the promotion of policy
through  the  idea  of  humanitarianism;  a  trope  which  also  appears  in  the
discourse, albeit not without a measure of haziness:
A  symposium  entitled  "Health  Initiative  in  Asian  Economic  Crisis  --A
Human-centred Approach--" […] which was co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, brought together representatives
from  developing  countries,  NGOs,  and  international  organizations,  as  well  as
officials in charge of economic cooperation policies from donor nations and other
people involved in these matters. In recognition of the fact that the Asian economic
crisis was adversely affecting health conditions for socially vulnerable segments of
the population, which,  for humanitarian reasons, could not be ignored, vigorous
discussions  were  held  to  try  to  determine  means  and  ways  to  respond  to  the
problem. 119
This example shows how justification of a response to the Asian Financial Crisis,
contextualised  in  reference  to  human  security,  is  made  on  humanitarian
grounds.  Whilst  in  this  excerpt  humanitarianism  is brought  up
unproblematically to promote and justify the pursuit of actions in the name of
human security, is it also the case that in other texts humanitarianism plays a
role in de-legitimising actions signified as humanitarian intervention. Namely,
in some instances humanitarianism is represented as being an  inappropriate
justification  for  intervention,  and  humanitarian  intervention  itself  is
represented  as  a  “deeply  troubling  concept  for  a  number  of  developing
nations”,120 and spoken of as a “double-standard approach” which has “nothing
to do” with human security:121
I would like to sound a note of caution on another issue, however. Recently, the
concept  of  human  security  has  been  equated  or  associated  with  acts  of
119 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.
120 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 49.
121 Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network,” May 28, 2004.
148
humanitarian  intervention.  Humanitarian  intervention  is  a  particularly
individual-centered activity, allowing as it does for the international community to
intervene into the sovereign affairs of a nation, from the viewpoint of supporting
the  rights  of  the  individual  or  a  group of  individuals  within  that  country.  The
concept  of  human  security  combined  with  humanitarian  intervention  has  been
particularly  promoted  by  Canada  and  its  allies  in  North  America  and  Europe.
However, humanitarian intervention—and I stress here humanitarian intervention,
and not human security—is a deeply troubling concept for a number of developing
nations, which are still embroiled in the process of nation building, the leaders of
which  are  concerned  that  humanitarian  intervention  provides  a  passport  for
developed nations to meddle in the internal affairs of weaker developing nations.
We should be careful that the true meaning of human security is not confused with
the more controversial issue of humanitarian intervention.122
The idea of humanitarianism thus occupies an ambiguous position in Japan's
human  security  discourse  because  it  both  legitimates  and  prohibits  certain
practices  associated  with  human  security.  The  ambiguity  is  a  result  of  the
indeterminacy of what is meant by humanitarian intervention; since it is said to
“take various forms, ranging from persuasion, good offices, public expression of
concern,  sanctions,  to  intervention by use of  force.123  Japan's  invocations of
humanitarianism seem to suggest not that humanitarian intervention as part of
human security practice is illegitimate per se, but that it should not include the
use of force or military instruments of foreign policy, as these are a breach of
state sovereignty.
The conflict could probably have been avoided
As  was  discussed  in  the  third  analytical  chapter,  conflict  is  presented  as
something which threatens human security. However, conflict prevention is also
brought up as a general benefit in the pursuit of human security in a way which
is reminiscent of Takasu's justification of human security practices in terms of
122 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 49.
123 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
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their  “added  value”,  as  was  discussed  earlier.124 In  other  words,  whilst  the
presentation of conflict as a threat to human security  functions to justify actions
taken to prevent or stop conflict, the pursuit of human security in general is said
to be justified because its realisation can have “positive contributions to conflict
prevention” and “strengthen the foundations of the peace process”:125 
If  the  international  community  and  the  developed  countries  had  extended  to
Somalia  economic  cooperation  based  on  the  idea  of  human  security  ten  years
earlier, the conflict could probably have been avoided.126
A number of points are of note regarding the representation of human security
policy in regard to its preventative effects on conflict. Firstly, the social scientific
notion  of  probability  as  a  foundation  for  action  is  conveyed  through  the
statement that conflict “could probably have been avoided”. As discussed in the
fourth  chapter,  probabilistic  thought  in  the  discourse  can  most  clearly  be
discerned in regard to the invocation of threats and dangers; phenomena which
are defined by potential, rather than certainty, of manifestation. Secondly, this
excerpt indicates the presence of the idea that problems should be prevented
before they become manifest,  rather than being addressed after they become
real issues. The idea of prevention has some pedigree in Japan's security policy
at the domestic level, having been found within the notion of comprehensive
security.127 In fact, Acharya explains Japan's advocacy of human security as a
continuation  and  development  of  comprehensive  security.128 Indeed,  Takemi
explicitly speaks of the possibility of incorporating prevention in human security
policy, claiming that “further development of this idea of "human security" will
lead  to  the  rethinking  of  the  international  system  itself,  going  beyond  just
responding to situations as they arise”.129 In other words, the discourse works to
124 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
125 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
126 Ibid.
127 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in 
Postwar Japan (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Acharya, “Human 
Security - East Versus West,” 2001.
128 Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” 2001.
129 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
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represent  human  security  policy  not  just  as  something  which  will  alleviate
already existing problems, but also as a way to prevent certain phenomena such
as conflict, from turning into concrete problems for human security. 
In summary, the objectives of this chapter have been to bring to the fore, and
problematise,  the  various  forms  of  legitimation  that  are  present  throughout
Japan's corpus of texts on human security. A very wide repertoire of discursive
strategies  functioning  to  naturalise,  add  impetus  to,  and  unproblematically
facilitate actions taken in the name of human security, are evident throughout
the  texts  examined.  Over  twenty  analytically  distinguishable  discursive
strategies,  working  to  make  policy  seem warranted  and matter-of-fact,  were
encountered  through the  discourse.130 Whilst  it  is  possible  to  separate  these
constructs on an analytical level, in practice they usually appear together and
constitute  a  more  or  less  coherent  narrative,  depending  on  the  text  under
consideration. However, as the analysis and discussion has shown, not only are
there contradictions both within and across texts regarding the tropes and ideas
invoked  to  spur  on  policy,  there  are  also  significant  theoretical  omissions,
silences, tensions, and ambiguities regarding the representation of reasons for
why human security should be pursued.  From the perspective of the state, the
vast repertoire of legitimating strategies and tropes which are evident in Japan's
human security discourse are certainly effective because of the way in which
they associate human security practices with a large cross section of established
and  normal  pursuits  of  states  such  as  development,  conflict  prevention,
peacekeeping,  economic  development  or  cooperation  in  the  international
sphere. Japan's human security texts promise the realisation of these objectives
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
130 Normative imperatives, peace and prosperity, development, a better future, need, 
consensus, egalitarianism, wisdom, humanitarianism, global community, expectations of a 
greater role, confidence building, conflict prevention and peace, a new order/structure, a 
new era, modernisation, responsibility, value, state security, the integrity of the political 
community, fulfilment. 
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either as direct results of the realisation of human security or as added benefits
of  pursuing  it.  However,  if  one  takes  the  perspective  of  the  human  whose
security  is  ostensibly  the  point  of  human  security  practices,  a  number  of
problems come to the fore. Firstly, even in cases where alternative pursuits such
as conflict prevention are deemed to be merely added benefits, the discourse
leaves  open  the  possibility  that  human  security  objectives  can  become
marginalised if the alternative pursuits receive higher priority on foreign policy
agendas than does human security. Secondly, tying human security to state level
objectives can lead to regressions in levels of human security due to changes in
human security practice that may come about when the agenda or objective of
these other practices are redefined. Thirdly, pursuing human security in unison
with  other  pursuits  is  problematic  in  relation  to  the  realisation  of  human
security because the end goals and methods of practices such as development,
conflict prevention or economic growth are not always entirely complementary,
nor do they utilise means which have the same relationship to human security.
Indeed, these so-called added benefits of human security do not have the same
kind of relationship to the conditions of human security and thus there is no
guarantee that their pursuit will, in the aggregate, enhance human security. 
As  a  result,  if  human  security  practices  are  indeed  supposed  to  realise  the
security of humans, then they need to be announced and justified on their own
terms rather than in reference to other activities which are more related to the
interests of states than individuals.  Japan needs to determine whether it really
is interested in human security as a goal rather than as a means. However, as
indicated in the previous chapter, human security is potentially compromised in
Japan's case because of the  conflation of state interests with  those of private
individuals. As such, unless a firmer understanding and engagement with the
idea  of  individual  rights  and  interests  is  given  credence  in  Japan's  political
discourse,  one is left  with the lingering question of whether human security,
particularly at the level of the individual,  can indeed be a real pursuit of the
Japanese state. As it stands, and from the perspective of the framing strategies
Japan has employed in its human security texts rather than in terms of who and
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what  it  has  explicitly  announced as  being the  beneficiary  of  human security
practice, Japan's human security discourse clearly prioritises pursuits related to
national, rather than human security, interests. 
Having discussed textual justification, rationalisation and legitimation for the
pursuit of human security, the next chapter is concerned with an exposition,
analysis  and  problematisation  of  the  discursive  representation  of  threat,
problems  and  issues  positioned  in  a  relationship  of  antagonism  with  the
condition of human security.
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Chapter IV: The Corrosion of Human Security
The  previous  chapter  was  concerned  with  Japan's  representation  of  human
security policy from the point of view of legitimation and justification. As such,
analysis was focused upon the rationale and reason given explicitly or implicitly
for why actions ostensibly taken in the pursuit  of human security should be
undertaken.  This  chapter  aims  to  explore,  reveal,  discuss  and  problematise
Japan's representation of phenomena which are said to have, or are implied as
having, an adverse effect on human security. 
Japan's human security discourse is theoretically impoverished in regard to the
things which are said to have a negative effect on human security. Whilst texts
frequently recite lists of phenomena which are said to either threaten or directly
affect  human security,  there  is  little  discussion of  the mechanisms by which
human security might be eroded, the conditions under which this is most likely
to happen, measurement or assessment of these antagonistic phenomena, the
dynamics and interplay between them, or the criteria for prioritising responses
to  them.  This  chapter  begins  with  an  introductory  discussion  about  the
implications of signification in the construction of discursive reality and the idea
of securitisation. Focus then turns towards the representation of threats and
problems in Japan's human security texts.  Analysis  is  particularly concerned
with the discursive construction of these objects in terms of their characteristics
and effects.  The final part of the chapter deals with discursive ascriptions of
agency in the creation of human insecurity.
The Significance of Signification
There is a notable point to be made about the discursive signification of issues
which are said to be associated with human security; that little attention is paid
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in Japan's human security texts to the ramifications of signification of discursive
objects in different ways,  even though, “policy makers […] function within a
discursive space that imposes meanings on their world and thus creates reality
[thereby  making]  various  practices  possible”  and  some  less  likely  or  even
unthinkable.1 For instance, certain texts speak of human security as  problems,
whilst  others  invoke  human  security  challenges,2 but  without  clearly
distinguishing between them or indicating whether they differ in any way; as if
challenges were  interchangeable  with  problems.  Whilst  remaining
unacknowledged in the texts  examined,  the  significance of  such a  seemingly
facile act of signification can be discerned when one considers the differences in
actions which are implied when thinking in terms of  issues-as-challenges,  as
compared with thinking in terms of  issues-as-problems. These differences can
be  vast,  considering  that  whilst  challenges point  to  phenomena  which  are
positive insofar as they contain the potential to bring about self-improvement
through their successful resolution and might thus be desired,  problems point
to things which are undesirable since they highlight the potential for bringing
about harm, rather than good.  As a result it is conceivable that a response to
challenges will  be  drastically  different  to  a  response  to  problems.  Thought
directed by the idea of  challenges, in distinction to  problems, can be found in
regard to the idea of  agonism3 or martialism;4 where opponents are respected
and held  in  high regard because of  the  opportunity  that  battle,  conflict  and
1 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of 
U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 
3 (1993): 303.
2 Inter alia: Keizo Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” (Hanoi, 
Vietnam, December 16, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html; Keizo 
Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in Health 
and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on 
Building Asia’s Tomorrow, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International Exchange, 
2002), 42–51, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf; “The Trust 
Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html; 
Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html.
3 Stephen Metcalf, ed., Hammer of the Gods: Selected Writings by Friedrich Nietzsche 
(London: Creation Books, 1996).
4 Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2005).
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fighting  provide  for  the  improvement  of  the  Self.  Insofar  as  challenges  can
provide opportunities for self improvement in a discursive hegemony marked by
martialism, to signify issues associated with human security in this way comes
with the potential that those issues will not be removed in their totality; that a
modicum of value will be seen in their continued presence. Indeed, there is a
sense in Japan's human security texts whereby the signification of actions to be
undertaken in the pursuit of human security as management meets paths with
the idea of human security challenges; that skilful management of these issues
will allow the retention of the potential inherent for self improvement, through
the tackling of challenges to human security.5 A similar form of thought can be
discerned  in  popular  arguments  supporting  the  existence  of  military  forces,
which focus upon the necessity of their participation in conflict for the sake of
maintaining, if not honing, their skills and capabilities. The risk for the human
in thinking of these issues as  challenges,  is that they will not be removed in
totality because their continued presence will be seen as having value, despite
the subsequent result of keeping people in a constant state of managed threat.
Not only is Japan's human security discourse characterised by an insensitivity
or silence to the nuances of signification and its consequences, it is also the case
that  categorisation  of  things  which  are  explicitly  or  implicitly  presented  as
hindering  human security  occurs  without  a  significant  measure  of  reflection
regarding the question of  how inclusion of  disparate  phenomena within one
5 The management of threats was invoked in a number of texts; most notably Keizo Obuchi, 
“Japan and East Asia: Outlook for the New Millennium” (Singapore, May 4, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1998/5/980504.html; Keizo Takemi, 
“Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on 
the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium on Development, 
United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html; Keizo Takemi, “Capacity 
Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st Century” 
(presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, Asia Society, New York, 
September 1, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html; Yukio 
Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World” (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, 
Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.
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category might be justified:
[Human  security]  problems  include  poverty,  environmental  degradation,  and
international  organized  crime,  including  illicit  drugs  and trafficking.  Additional
problems brought  about  by  regional  and domestic  conflicts  have  also  emerged,
such as the danger from antipersonnel landmines and the proliferation of small
arms and the involvement of children in armed conflicts.6
In examining the  representation of  human security  in  regard to  the  various
problems which are said to threaten it, there is the lingering question of whether
there is a substantive relationship between them such that it would make sense
to speak of them all in relation to human security, and to undertake a course of
action which is said to be founded upon the concept. For it seems that there is
meaning in categorising a set of objects under a single heading only if there is
something that links those objects, aside from their arbitrary inclusion under
one heading. Indeed, as Newman has pointed out, such a “broad approach to
human security  […] has  attracted the  greatest  degree  of  criticism” primarily
because “in considering potentially any threat to human safety […] as a concept
it becomes meaningless [and thus] it does not allow scholars or policy makers to
prioritise  different  types of  threats,  it  confuses  sources and consequences  of
insecurity,  and  it  is  too  amorphous  to  allow  analysis  with  any  degree  of
precision”.7 Newman's  observations regarding human security in general,  are
clearly  also  applicable  to  Japan's  interpretation  of  the  idea,  which  shows  a
tendency  to  categorise  a  wide  range  of  issues  as  threats  to  human security,
speaking of them as “interrelated” or “interconnected”, but without rumination
upon whether there is anything that actually links these phenomena together at
a  conceptual  level  other  than  their  apparent,  hypothetical  effects  on  human
security.8 This difficulty seems to have been inherited from the 1994 Human
6 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
7 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36, 
no. 01 (2010): 82.
8 For example see: Kenzo Oshima, “Statement on the Informal Thematic Consultation of 
Cluster III” (presented at the General Assembly, United Nations, New York, April 19, 2005),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2005/un0504-3.html; Sumi, “Human 
Security and Health,” 2006; Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for 
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Development Report;  a key  source for  human security discourse in general.9
Roland Paris  has  characterised the  concept  of  human security  in  a  similarly
critical manner:
The scope of [the] definition is vast: Virtually any kind of unexpected or irregular
discomfort could conceivably constitute a threat to one's human security […] this
list is so broad that it is difficult to determine what, if anything, might be excluded
from  the  definition  of  human  security.  Indeed  the  drafters  of  the  report  seem
distinctly  uninterested  in  establishing any  definitional  boundaries.  Instead  they
make a point of commending the "all-encompassing" and "integrative" qualities of
the human security concept, which they apparently view as among the concept's
major strengths. 10
As Paris observes, such conflation of disparate phenomena under one rubric is
undertaken without theoretical elucidation regarding the relationships between
these elements, thus making it difficult to formulate a clear policy approach or
agenda based on the concept. For Pettman, the solution to the problem raised
by  Paris  and  encountered  in  Japan's  human  security  texts,  is  to  invert  the
relationship between human security and strategic studies; so that the latter is
considered  a  subset  of  the  former,  contrary  to  traditional  thinking.11 Whilst
Pettman's  argument  certainly  makes  sense  in  terms  of  a  wider  attempt  to
develop  human  security  as  a  concept,  it  does  not  explain  the  conceptual
indeterminacy found in Japan's texts, because for Japan human security does
not  clearly  stand  above  strategic  or  security  studies  in  hierarchical  terms.
Rather, it is often constructed as a supplement to theories which promote the
Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, March 2007), 2; “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 
21st Century,” 2009, 1; Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 
21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
9 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” International Journal 56 (2001): 
442–460; Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies 
Perspectives 2 (2001): 239–51; Des Gasper, “Securing Humanity: Situating ‘Human 
Security’ as Concept and Discourse,” Journal of Human Development 6, no. 2 (2005): 
221–245.
10 Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” International Security 26, no.
2 (Autumn 2001): 89–90.
11 Ralph Pettman, “Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies,” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2005): 137–150.
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security of the state.12 The question of inter-linkage is important, because a side
effect of joining together potentially disparate phenomena under the category of
threats to human security, when or if the pursuit of human security becomes a
normal  activity  of  international  and  domestic  agents,  is  the  legitimation  of
increasingly broad intervention in, and regulation of lived human experience. As
Ferks has pointed out, the extreme end of such acts of categorisation, in which
an overly wide range of “normal” and “non-politicised” issues are “securitised”,
is  the  opening  up  of  ever  wider  aspects  of  human  experience  to  so  called
“extraordinary  measures”  which  are  outside  of  legislative  frameworks.13
Moreover, in Japan's case this “risk of securitisation”14 is compounded by what
Gilson and Purvis have called Japan's “political pragmatism”; the development
of  a  “safe  umbrella”  of  human  security  by  which  Japan  can  overcome
constitutional constraints on its participation in international affairs.15 This safe
umbrella consists  of  nothing  more  than  the  conscious  categorisation  of
previously non-security elements of social reality under human security so as to
make room for a Japanese role in the resolution of such human insecurities.
Threats or Problems?
The  introductory  discussion  above  has  pointed  out  the  general  lack  of
reflectivity  regarding  the  signification  of  events,  practices,  and  phenomena
posited as being in an antagonistic relationship with human security,  that is
present in Japan's  human security texts.  In this  section,  analytical  emphasis
shifts to textual representation of events, issues, problems, or phenomena which
are said to erode human security. 
12 See for instance Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security 
Concept,” 2002.
13 Georg Frerks, “Human Security as a Discourse and Counter-discourse,” Security and 
Human Rights 19, no. 1 (2008): 13.
14 Ibid., 13.
15 Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, “Japan’s Pursuit of Human Security: Humanitarian 
Agenda or Political Pragmatism,” Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 193–07.
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As discussed in chapter two, Japan's human security texts contain a measure of
ambiguity in regard to the representation of the origin of the idea; with both
Japan  and the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  being  alternatively
situated in this position across different texts. In a similar vein, the following
excerpt works to establish an intertextual relationship between the meaning of
threat  in  Japan's  human  security  discourse,  and  the  approach  of  the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe:16
Next,  in  addressing  security  challenges,  the  OSCE  has  placed  importance  on
adopting  various  perspectives  inclusive  of  economy,  environment  and  human
rights rather than focusing only on political and military aspects. This approach
coincides with the concept of Human Security that Japan is advocating.17
In other words, threats to human security are presented and paraphrased in
reference to an older text in which threats to security – and by extension human
security – can be found in the fields of economics, environment, and human
rights,  rather  than  only  political  and military  aspects.18 Aside  from situating
human security threats in a wide sphere of social relations and phenomena, the
excerpt works to link Japan's approach to that of the Organisation for Security
and  Co-operation  in  Europe,  and  thereby  to  garner  legitimacy  for  itself  by
referencing an established definition of the spheres in which security threats are
said to exist. 
The range and scope of events and phenomena represented in Japan's human
security texts as being in an antagonistic relationship with human security is
16 Similarly, Acharya also points to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
as a precursor to human security thought; see: Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus 
West,” 2001.
17 Yutaka Banno, “Remarks by Mr. Yutaka Banno, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Japan 
at the OSCE Summit (2 December, 2010),” December 2, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/osce/state1012.html.
18 Specifically, most recently the OSCE presents its security mandate as being comprised of 
three “dimensions”: the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human.
See: OSCE, “What We Do,” Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2011, 
http://www.osce.org/what.
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extensive, but the following example shows how the notion of threat actually
takes a mediating position between the invocation of problems on the one side,
and erosion of human security on the other:
This globalization has helped to bring about economic growth and higher standards
of living. But it has also had negative effects, and has brought forth an awareness of
problems  that  threaten  the  dignity  of  people--problems  such  as  poverty,
environmental  degradation,  international  organized  crime,  including illicit  drug
use  and  trafficking  and  human  smuggling,  and  so  on.  Additional  problems
resulting from regional and internal conflicts have also emerged, such as  dangers
of antipersonnel land-mines and small  arms and the involvement of  children in
armed  conflicts.  These  conflicts  inflict  severe  suffering  on  civilian  populations,
particularly women and children.19
Whilst  remaining  unacknowledged  in  the  text,  this  elucidation  on  human
insecurity positions problems not as  being a definite  cause of  the erosion of
human  security,  but  as  a  threat to  it.  The  invocation  of  threat  covers  up
significant under-theorisation of how various problems might lead to a change
in human security, in either positive or negative terms. Instead, problems are
ascribed  with  only  the  potential to  affect  human  security,  albeit  in  an
unspecified  manner  or  direction.  As  far  as  the  exact  meaning  of  threat  is
concerned, this is also left to the reader's imagination; as to whether the concept
points  to  the  presence  of  something  which  has  the  potential  to  (a)  merely
impinge upon or damage some or all components of human security (such as
livelihood, life or dignity), or (b) destroy them totally. Indeed, the conditions
under which threats transform into tangible problems are for the most part left
undisclosed in the  entire corpus of  texts,  as  is  specification of  the degree to
which human security – either in totality or in reference to its constituent parts
–  should  be  affected  before  a  response  or  intervention  is  warranted.
Furthermore, there is ambiguity in regard to the position of the line between the
destruction of some or all elements of human security, and a mere erosion of
them. Judging from the passage above, Japan's human security discourse does
19 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.
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not offer any criteria which could be used to establish when materialised threats
have not  just  damaged human security  or  its  elements,  but  destroyed them.
Finally,  it  is  not  clear  whether  threats  are  postulated  as  subjective  feelings
intrinsic  to  the  individual  human,  the  human  at  the  group  level,  or  the
non-human beneficiary of policy such as the state. Alternatively, in light of this
omission regarding just who is to be the actual  perceiving,  feeling subject of
threat, the discourse implies an objective conceptualisation of threat perception
which does not give credence to the idea that what constitutes a threat for one
sentient being, might not do so for another. 
As  indicated above then,  a  significant  majority  of  the  issues  associated  with
human  insecurity  are  mediated  by  threat,  albeit  with  little  theoretical
elucidation on matters such as the mechanisms of cause and effect or how to
distinguish between threats and problems. However, the relationship between
some  of  these  apparent  problems  or  threats  and  the  conditions  of  human
security is at times represented in a more detailed manner. One exception to the
conceptual paucity can be found in regard to  conflict, which is treated with a
modicum of detail in regard to its effects on human security, although its effects
are still conceptualised in potential terms, due to its signification as merely a
danger.  Similarly  to  threats,  dangers  are  things  which have the  potential  of
leading to a negative effect, although by definition it cannot be claimed with
certainty  that  the  potential  will  be  realised  before  the  event  takes  place.20
According to a text by Takemi, for example, conflict is said to threaten human
security  by  “[inflicting]  severe  suffering  on  civilian  populations,  particularly
women  and  children”.21 As  discussed  in  the  first  chapter,  the  beneficiary  of
policy takes various guises in Japan's human security texts; in this instance it is
in the form of a subset of the population rather than the individual. What can be
gleaned from this expression of human security policy, is that severe suffering
20 “Danger,” Dictionary.com Unabridged (Random House, Inc.), accessed July 30, 2012, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/danger.
21 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
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has a  potentially negative impact on dignity, although as is typical of Japan's
human security texts, there is seemingly no way in which to determine the exact
situation  in  which  such  threats  may  materialise  or  impinge  upon  human
security in the negative, how to determine when suffering can be legitimately
quantified as  severe, or as discussed in the first chapter, how effects might be
discerned or their magnitude measured. 
To speak of dignity as something which is threatened, if not directly eroded by
severe suffering – as Takemi does in the above mentioned document – reflects a
particular conceptualisation of dignity; one which does not incorporate the idea
that it could actually be accumulated through one's ability to deal with suffering,
hardship or insecurity. Instead, writing about dignity this way prioritises the
notion that it is enhanced, or at least maintained, by the ability to avoid dealing
with problems, or having a third party such as the state deal with them. From
the texts under examination, it is unclear whether Japan is asserting that it is
the infliction of suffering per se which is incompatible with human security, or
whether it is only a certain level of suffering which can potentially affect people's
dignity.  This  is  not  a  trite  point  as  conceptual  imprecision  is  a  distinct
characteristic of Japan's human security discourse, as indicated throughout this
thesis,  and  this  example  of  imprecision  regarding  the  relationship  between
suffering  and  dignity  is  therefore  symptomatic  and  typical.  In  terms  of  the
legitimation  of  actions  taken  in  the  name  of  human  security,  conceptual
imprecision is a strategy which allows freedom and the adaptation of rhetorical
resources to various policy scenarios whose interconnectedness is contested or
not  established  upon  a  firm  theoretical  foundation.  At  the  same  time,
conceptual  imprecision leaves  the  possibility  of  manipulating  policy  to  serve
interests which are at odds with those of human individuals, through  ad hoc
redefinition of imprecise terms such as severity, whilst leaving unspecified the
conditions under which action is to be taken. 
As  the  preceding  discussion  about  the  difference  between  challenges  and
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problems indicated, Japan's discourse on human security has a tendency to lack
precision and continuity regarding signification of discursive objects. Another
case of  this  inclination can be discerned in the following case,  where  threat
comes across as being interchangeable with danger in the same paragraph:
In  our  times,  humankind  is  under  various  kinds  of  threats.  Environmental
problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for
future generations.22
Conceptual imprecision aside, as discussed above, one can see that by speaking
of humankind being under various kinds of threats and dangers, policy comes
across as being concerned with phenomena which have only the  potential, in
contradistinction  to  a  certainty,  of  impinging  upon  human  security.  Whilst
specific problems are invoked – including global warming, transnational crime
or infectious diseases23 – their relationship to human security is not expressed
clearly in terms of causality or an empirical, observable effect; the implication
being that the concern of policy is more with probability and perception rather
than with issues whose corrosive effect on human security can be ascertained
with certainty. The matter of threat perception is made more complex when one
questions  the  position  from  which  perception  is  meant  to  occur.  The  texts
examined did not  discuss,  explore  or even mention the  question of  whether
determining which phenomena are to be signified as threats, is to be undertaken
by the very people whose security is at stake, or whether other forms of human
security agency such as states or non-governmental organisations are to have a
voice in this matter. 
Whilst threats are merely potential phenomena whose realisation is not certain,
there is certainly a tradition in scientific theorisation which aims to accurately
predict  the  conditions  under  which  potential  might  manifest  itself  into
22 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”
(presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html.
23 Ibid.
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empirically verifiable effects, and thus Japan's human security discourse can be
contextualised  in  reference  to  such  a  research  tradition.  However,  the
signification of events or phenomena as threat is not only a matter of objective
potential or probability. Even though absent from the corpus of texts examined,
it  also  necessitates  a  consideration  and  theorisation  of  the  attitudes  and
perceptions of the individual observer, insofar as policy is at least in part about
the interests of the individual human. 
In  the  following  excerpt,  Obuchi  invokes  impairment;  a  metaphysical  object
which, unlike threat, is more closely aligned with certainty than probability:
It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity,
without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired.24
This passage implicitly invokes the spectre of things which can both threaten as
well  as  impair.  In  the  former  case,  the  discussion  revolves  around just  the
potential for a negative impact on human survival, whereas in the latter case, by
speaking of impairment Obuchi has impinged into the world of  certainty. To
clarify: to state that a phenomenon threatens human security is not the same as
saying that it impairs human security; since impairment is a matter of certainty,
constituted in part through the ability to empirically assert its presence, whilst
threat is a matter of probability or potential. In other words, if one were to state
that a phenomenon threatened their human security, it may indeed eventuate
that the threat would become manifest and that the phenomenon did in fact
result in an erosion of one's human security. However, it is also conceivable that
by virtue of the phenomenon being just a threat, it might not realise itself or
have a tangible, negative effect on human security. On the other hand, if one
were  to  say  that  the  phenomenon  impaired one's  human security,  then this
would  be  a  matter  of  certainty;  a  conclusion made after  the  observable  and
verifiable  occurrence  of  an  impairment  in  human  security  because  of  that
phenomenon. In making the assertion that the phenomenon had a corrosive
24 Ibid. emphasis added.
165
effect on human security, its status changes from being something which might
happen (i.e. a threat), to something which did happen (i.e. an impairment). In
summary,  although  unacknowledged  in  Obuchi's  human  security  discourse,
aside from the various kinds of problems which are invoked in relation to the
erosion  of  human  security,  one  can  discern  the  presence  of  two  kinds  of
metaphysical  objects,  whose  effect  on  human  security  differs  in  regard  to
whether it is a matter of certainty or only probability.
The postulation of uncertainty regarding threats to human security functions to
promote  policy  through  an  appeal  to  the  idea  that  in  the  lack  of  certain
knowledge, a wide and encompassing response is more appropriate than what
might  be  necessary  if  there  was  actually  certainty  about  what  is  corroding
human security in the present, or will definitely do so in the future. This wide
net  approach,  one  that  invokes  the  idea  of  considering  all  contingencies,  is
consistent  with  persistent  representations  throughout  the  corpus  of  the
discourse  which  invoke  a  diversity  of  threat,25 pervasive  problems,26 and  a
multitude of victims,27 since these images work to form an impetus or necessity
for the realisation of human security, essentially through sensationalisation and
the  construction  of  a  sense  impending  danger  and  inadequacy  of  current
security practices. 
Aside from threats, which have an ambiguous relationship to the conditions of
human security due to the uncertainty of their manifestation, texts also invoke
25 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002; “The
Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” 2009.
26 Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network” (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html; The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, “Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 2008).
27 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
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“problems affecting human security”.28 In other words, Japan's human security
policy  is  not  only  concerned  with  phenomena  which  have  a  negative  albeit
unspecified potential in reference to human security, but also with events whose
effect  can  be  more  directly  specified,  at  least  in  principle,  because  of  their
construction as things which do indeed affect human security. As an example,
whilst Obuchi did not clarify which discursive objects directly and demonstrably
have  impinged  upon  human  security  and  are  certain  to  do  so  again  in  the
future,29 in distinction to those which merely have a probability or potential of
impinging upon it,  he did specify that problems which affect human security
have the characteristic of being able to cross national borders, and that they
“directly affect the lives of human beings”.30
In a similar manner, Takemi drew a distinction between what is certain and that
which is merely probable when he asserted that:
In the context of human security, the issue of development is extremely important.
Especially in the three basic areas of health care, poverty-eradication, and African
development. These areas, which are today's sub-themes, are the most basic issues
from the standpoint of "Human Security." The area of health care bears directly on
human  survival,  the  most  fundamental  of  the  three  elements  that  together
constitute human security. Poverty, meanwhile, is a problem that lies at the root of
a whole range of threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity.31
In  speaking  of  phenomena  related  to  human  (in)security,  health  care  is
presented  as  standing  out  in  relation  to  various  other  problems  which  are
regularly invoked as threatening human security, since the effects of its absence
28 Ibid. emphasis added.
29 Obuchi's omission also hides the complexity of the matter; namely, that to speak of 
phenomena which will definitely affect human security in the future – this difference 
between certainty and probability being the key point here – one needs also to consider 
whose security will certainly be impinged and in what way. Of course, Obuchi's speech did 
not deal with these questions because they only become significant when the difference 
between potential threat and certain erosion is dealt with in depth. 
30 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
31 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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are  not said to be mediated by threat.  Instead, it  is  said to  bear directly on
human  survival,  rather  than  being  the  cause  of  a  threat  which  may  not  be
perceived,  or  may  never  become  manifest.  A  lack  of  health  care  is  thus
presented as something which has definitely caused, or causes erosion of human
security directly; either in the past or in the present, rather than just threatening
to do so in the future. In general the notion of threat is characterised not only by
uncertainty  in  manifestation,  but  also  by  specific  temporal  delineations.  If
threats  are  to  materialise,  they  will  do  so  in  the  future,  or  they  may  have
materialised in the past under particular circumstance, but by definition and
unlike things which have a direct relationship with human (in)security such as
the presence of absence of health care, they do not have a corrosive effect in the
present. 
In asserting that “health care bears directly on human survival [which is] the
most  fundamental  of  the  three  elements  that  together  constitute  human
security”,32 the implication is that human security is conceived of as a condition
in which survival is premised on the existence of a body which will  protect the
individual, insofar as health care practices are presupposed as being undertaken
by the state, rather than being left to the agency of the individual. In this vein
the continued existence of the state is justified, as long as human survival – a
key component of Japan's human security discourse – is deemed appropriate.
As a consequence, a form of human existence in which people are self-reliant for
their  own  survival  is  de-emphasised.  Adding  to  the  theoretical  incoherence
however, the discourse also emphasises the necessity of people taking on their
own  responsibilities,33 despite  the  lack  of  a  discussion  as  to  what  those
responsibilities might be. However, if one is to ascribe cohesion to the discourse,
at least in this context, a logical solution to the tension between reliance and
self-responsibility is to conclude that whilst one might have certain unspecified
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.; Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
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responsibilities in reference to one's own human security, these responsibilities
do  not include  personal  health  or  survival.  Nonetheless,  the  line  between
reliance and responsibility is unclear. For instance, it is not possible to conclude
from Japan's  human security discourse whether it  is  up to the  individual  to
determine  when they should  consult  a  medical  practitioner,  or  whether  this
should be regulated by the  state or some other  non-human agent  of  human
security.  Similarly,  the  text  does  not  indicate  whether  individuals  should  be
empowered in regard to determining the kind of health care which they can
access,  or  whether  such  decisions  should  also  be  relegated  to  regulation  by
non-human, non-individual agents acting in the name of human security. That
which  is  clear,  is  that  this  discourse  functions  to  legitimate  the  continuing
existence  and  expansion  of  the  health  industry,  promoting  longevity  and
continued participation in work and economic relations. 
The  postulation  of  problems  which  impinge  directly34 upon  the  security  of
humans is  problematic  because Japan's  human security  texts  do not  specify
what  it  would  mean  for  phenomena  to  affect  human  security  indirectly.
Moreover, if one were limited to reading only Japan's official human security
lore, it would not be possible to ascertain how to distinguish between discursive
objects which have a direct bearing on human security and those whose effects
are  only  indirect.  Another  reason  why  the  under-theorisation  of  the
direct/indirect dimension is problematic can be discerned if one considers it in
relation to causality and the scale of human security erosion. Specifically, there
is no a priori reason to assume – at least according to Japan's human security
discourse – that the extent of human security erosion attributed to direct causes
should  be  either  greater  or  smaller  than  that  caused  by  indirect  causes.
Consequently,  the  postulation  of  a  direct/indirect  dimension  is  analytically
superfluous in regard to the actual level of human insecurity experienced by
either  individuals  or  groups  of  people.  This  is  because  it  does  not  help  in
34 For instance,Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s 
Tomorrow,” 1998.
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distinguishing which phenomena are more or less certain, or likely, to have a
corrosive effect on human security, or what the extent of those effects might be.
Furthermore,  the texts  examined did not  provide any evidence which would
indicate a greater erosion of human security by direct causes than by indirect
ones. 
Representation of Threats and Problems
Causes and Sources
Although an exact  causal  mechanism is  not  brought  to  light,  the  apparently
recent increase  in problems that  have at  least  the  potential  to  erode human
security,  is  represented in association with the end of the Cold War and the
assertion that “the structure of international relations has changed in a drastic
manner” since that moment in time,  which is  implied as being singular and
unproblematically identifiable.35 The connotation of causality occurs despite the
apparent irony in the claim that a state of global war was more secure – at least
for humans – than the conditions since its end, and in spite of a lack of detail
regarding just what constitutes international structure, or in what ways it has
changed.  Indeed,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  is  itself  represented
unproblematically, as if it came about at a single point time and as if rivalries
based upon political ideology were no longer relevant.36 In terms of a politics of
representation, these images function to legitimate action in the name of human
security through the promise of order and structure, and as such appeal to the
35 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
36 The lack of normalised diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States on the 
one hand, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other, is a reminder that 
the Cold War is not entirely over for everyone. One of the reasons for continued antagonism
between Washington and Pyongyang is related to the United States' policy of refusing 
normal diplomatic relations with states it categorises as communist. See Dianne Rennack 
E., North Korea: Economic Sanctions, Report for Congress (US Library of Congress, 2003),
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31696.pdf.
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trusted, if not myopic, certainty of structuralism,37 as well as modernist  myths
regarding man's triumph over chaos and nature.
 
One facet of Japan's representation of the end of the Cold War, is as a moment
from which international order changed, resulting in a number of empirically
verifiable  changes,  such  as  an  increase  in  intrastate  war  and  advances  in
technology and economic liberalisation.38 As such, the period of the Cold War
ironically appears as a marker of a better, partially idealised past, since after all
it was “the collapse of the Cold War order [that] has triggered off numerous civil
conflicts”.39 On the other hand, insofar as the Cold War was indeed a war, it was
perpetuated by participants, but to speak of an order is to take attention away
from the order being not so much the presence of peace, but rather a perpetual
stalemate,  whose  maintenance  was  not  the  desired  objective  of  either  side,
according to the logic of war. Instead, the order of the Cold War was a result of
the very strategies that both sides utilised in their pursuit of a preponderance of
power to overcome the other side. These strategies involved the support, by both
sides,  of  client  states,  allies  and  friends  through  judicious  trade,  aid,  and
military cooperation, as well as nuclear deterrence. In essence, Japan's human
security discourse presents the idea of  order in contradistinction to  disorder;
that the former is necessary to prevent conflict and other forms of human and
state insecurity, glossing over the fact that this order was itself the unplanned
result  of  unsuccessful  military  strategy.  The very  peace  and stability  of  that
international  order – spoken of by Liotta as a “balance of terror”40 – was the
result of an ongoing war.41
37 Richard K Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization 38, no. 2 
(1984): 225–286; Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism And Its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986).
38 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007.
39 Ibid., 2.
40 P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” 
Security Dialogue 33, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 477.
41 This association of the Cold War with a higher level of peace than in the post-Cold War 
period is shared by Foong Khong, who argues that the “nuclear deterrence” of the Cold War 
“has been critical in maintaining general peace, however insecure it made individuals and 
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However, at the same time as it is associated with an increase in conflict, the
end of the Cold War is presented as little more than a catalyst that “triggered”
the violence that has apparently ensued in the post-Cold War world.42 The real,
“root causes” of conflict are said to lie elsewhere; with a disembodied, nameless
agency which is identified only though its association with so called “religious,
racial and ethnic contexts”.43 An important element of this representation of the
Cold War order, is the idea that it is only now that there is a need to establish
and maintain some kind of order, as a goal rather than as a means, for the sake
of  peace  and  security.  As  was  discussed  in  chapter  three,  temporality  and
appeals  to  the  present  are  prominent  discursive  tropes  in  Japan's  human
security texts. The significance of the Cold War in Japan's human security texts
lies  in  its  legitimising  effect  on  the  politics  of  human  security;  through  the
connotation that  it  is  this  particular concept – human security  – which will
provide the foundations for the order found to be absent in the post-Cold War
world. 
The end of the Cold War also figures in Japan's human security discourse as a
theoretical marker of structural realist reductionism. In the same way as the
Cold War trope – as an expression of bipolarity – serves as a reductive principle
by which all international relations phenomena of the Cold War period can be
deductively explained or justified, the post-Cold War version of the trope works
to explain phenomena in terms of an absence. In other words, whilst Cold War
international  relations  can  hypothetically  be  explained  by  reduction  to  the
principle of bipolar East/West competition, post-Cold War events are, according
to Japan's human security lore, explainable in terms which emphasise the lack
states”. However, in distinction to Japan's essentially legitimising human security texts, 
Foong Khong's invocation is part of a critique showing that, in part, human security is 
based on “false causal assumptions”. Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun 
Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” Global Governance 7, no. 3 (2001): 234.
42 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
43 Ibid.
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of bipolarity and its associated myth of stability and structure. Thus, in the same
way  that  theoretical  arguments  based  on  the  existence  of  the  Cold  War
privileged  a  US-USSR-centric  bipolar  and  neo-realist  view  of  international
relations, the presence of the end of the Cold War trope suggests the same: that
all can be explained in terms of the lack of competition between East and West.
In both cases there is an implicit recourse to a conception of the world based on
bipolarity. In this context, the interests, motivations, and policies of other state
agents are implied as having only secondary importance, if they are discerned at
all. 
In Japan's  human security  texts,  the  end of  the  Cold War is  presented as  a
unitary,  observable,  and  quantifiable  moment  in  time;  as  if  its  ending  was
experienced  or  known  to  all  observers  and  participants  in  the  same  way
regarding  –  inter  alia –  its  ramifications  or  consequences.  Moreover,  the
discourse implicitly establishes itself in the position of having the knowledge of
this unitary end. It states that there was just one end to the Cold War, and it
happened in  this particular way. The discourse does not say that perhaps  the
end may be significant in different ways, for different reasons, depending on the
observer.  In  other  words,  the  text  does  not  consider  its  own subjectivity  by
asking, 'for whom did the Cold War end in this way?' The domain of the noun
end has  numerous  semiotic  meanings,  and  on  an  emotional  level  these  can
range from lament to joy. Furthermore, postulating the end does not take into
consideration  the  prospect  of  changes  occurring  in  waves,  rather  than
watersheds - at one moment - and that for some the Cold War is not over,44 as
was mentioned earlier in reference to the lack of normalised relations between
the  United  states  and  the  the  Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea.  It
therefore seems that the end of the Cold War as a trope in a narrative of human
security does not  serve the purposes which a  first  reading of  the  text might
imply. Presented as a single historical moment, the end is less of an explanatory
44 Paul M. Evans, “Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning.,” Journal of East Asian 
Studies 4, no. 2 (May 2004): 263.
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concept for global, varied political change, as much as it is an expression of the
text's  authority and knowledgeable  status.  It  is  even less useful  in providing
insight into local political struggles, insofar as it can even discern these. 
The  preceding  discussion  has  pointed  out  that,  in  Japan's  human  security
discourse,  the  end of  the  Cold War  is  said  to  have “brought  numerous civil
conflicts  whose root  causes  lie  in religious,  ethnic  and economic  contexts”45,
which are implied as having some kind of relationship to human security, albeit
an  unspecified  one.  As  discussed  in  the  second  chapter,  the  fact  that  the
beneficiaries  of  human  security  policy  are  numerous  and  that  the  factors
making up human security and the conditions under which it can be said to be
satisfied are under-theorised in regard to –  inter alia – conflicts of interests
between various beneficiaries at both the group and individual level, as well as
between measures  of  human security,  according  to  Japan's  texts  it  is  by  no
means a given that the contexts which are spoken of above have a clear effect on
human security or even a negative one in the aggregate.46 It is however clearly
stated that “each of these challenges has a complex inter-linkage to one other”,47
though  typically  of  Japan's  human  security  discourse,  few  details  are
forthcoming. Despite such omissions and theoretical oversights, to speak of an
increase in conflict despite the collapse of the Cold War structure and a complex
inter-linkage between these so called challenges, clearly functions to legitimate
a role for agents said to be working in the name of human security. The logic is
simple, and works along the lines that since a lack of structure, albeit one which
was characterised by an unacknowledged state of war, is a cause of conflict that
is  eroding  human security,  then a  new structure  should be  put  in  its  place.
Indeed, this idea of the installation of a new structure has come up numerous
times in the discourse in the form of a new order; as discussed in chapter three.
45 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
46 Indeed, even considering human security in terms of an aggregate is problematic, in light of
the presence of an individualist point of view often said by Japan to be integral to human 
security policy. 
47 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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Moreover, in postulating a complex inter-linkage between problems that affect
human  security  negatively,  together  with  the  apparent  need  that  “we  all
understand  the  diversity  of  the  threat  to  human  security”,48 the  discourse
functions to legitimate a wide ranging, all encompassing role for agents who can
convincingly present themselves as acting in the name of human security. In
fact,  Japan  has  made  tacit  acknowledgement  of  this  legitimation  function
through assertions that human security is a “long term challenge that stretches
from preventative  activities  before  the outbreak of  a  conflict  to  post  conflict
reconstruction and development”.49
Japan's  human security discourse also presents threats to human security in
relation  to  development  processes.  Specifically,  Obuchi  characterised  some
threats  as  being  a  partial  result  of  “social  strains  [created  by]  remarkable
economic development […] aggravated” by economic crisis.50 At the same time,
he spoke of the necessity of “seeking new strategies for economic development
which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long
term development of [the Asian] region”,51 thus situating the pursuit of human
security  in  the  context  of  the  objectives  of  development.  A  such,  economic
development figures as both a positive and negative force in the human security
narrative, with its representation being similar to that of globalisation, which
also has an apparently mixed role to play in regard to problems associated with
human  security.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  in  part  because  of  rapid  economic
development that human security threats have come to the fore; on the other
hand, development is nonetheless to be continued, albeit in a way which gives
“due consideration” to human security.52 However, the meaning and extent of
48 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.
49 Yasuo Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session
on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’” (Davos, 
Switzerland, January 26, 2008), 
http://www.mofa.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address.html.
50 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.; also paraphrased in Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human 
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that due consideration is left unspecified, and so potential conflicts of interest
between human security goals and development goals remains under-theorised
and open to manipulation by those acting with perceived legitimacy in the name
of human security. Social strain itself was left undefined by Obuchi, and as per
the discussion above, its relationship to the condition of human security appears
as ambiguous, because it is postulated as being a threat, rather than a cause of
insecurity. 
According to this first of three following excerpts, knowledge of problems which
are  said  to  threaten  human  security  is  represented  as  being  a  result  of
globalisation:
Although  globalization  has  helped  to  bring  about  economic  growth  and  higher
standards  of  living, it  has  also  engendered  an  awareness of  the  existence  of
problems that threaten human lives, livelihoods, and dignity.53
In other words, it is thanks to globalisation that knowledge about relationships
between these problems and their corrosive effect on human security has come
to  be  perceived  and  understood.  As  mentioned  above,  globalisation  is
constructed in a somewhat precarious way in Japan's human security discourse.
Whilst  it  is  not  always  presented  as  a  negative  force  per  se,  the  role  of
globalisation in regard to human insecurity comes across as ambiguous, because
it is associated with negative events (for example, apparent problems relating to
human security  threats,  as  well  as  the  effects  it  is  said  to  have  had  on  the
international community in general),54 whilst at the same time featuring as a
source of enlightenment in regard to human security problems. However, the
positive representation of globalisation in terms of human security knowledge
which  is  evident  in  the  excerpt  above,  contrasts  to  a  negative  one  in  which
Security Concept,” 2002; “The Trust Fund For Human Security: For the ‘Human-centered’ 
21st Century,” 2009.
53 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999 emphasis added.
54 Globalisation appears in the guise of an uncontrollable wave, which has engulfed the 
international community: for examples see: Ibid.; Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: 
Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 43.
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globalisation is implied to be not a source of knowledge about what needs to be
done in the pursuit of human security, but an actual cause of human insecurity,
as is evident in the following two excerpts:
This globalization has helped to bring about economic growth and higher standards
of living. But it has also had negative effects, and has brought forth an awareness
of  problems  that  threaten  the  dignity  of  people--problems  such  as  poverty,
environmental  degradation,  international  organized  crime,  including illicit  drug
use and trafficking and human smuggling, and so on. 55
This process [of globalisation] has significantly deepen (sic) interdependence of the
world, having brought substantial benefits to many people on one hand,  widening
the gap between the rich and the poor both nationally and internationally on the
other. Today, as many as 1.3 billion people are forced to subsist on less than one
dollar  a  day.  The  massive  and  rapid  movement  of  people,  goods,  money  and
information encouraged transnational problems to spread, including the smuggling
of persons, arms and drugs as well as infectious diseases. The economic expansion
has worsened global  warming and other environmental  degradation and energy
problems.56 
In all three fragments above, globalisation is ascribed with positive influence,
primarily in terms of its apparent role in facilitating economic growth or raising
living  standards.  However  the  second  two  examples  also  ascribe  negative
characteristics  to  it.  The  first  of  these  two  speaks  of  them  in  an  imprecise
manner,  saying  only  that  globalisation  has  had  negative  effects  as  well  as
positive  ones.  The  last  example  is  marginally  more  specific  in  terms  of  the
mechanism of its negative operation; that it has widened the gap between rich
and  poor,  connoting  the  idea  that  it  is  inequality  and  lack  of  economic
well-being  which  causes  people  –  in  ways  left  unspecified   –  to  undertake
55 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.
56 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2 emphasis added.
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behaviours which lead to the erosion of human security.57 However, in general
Japan's human security discourse presents globalisation in positive terms, and
even though there are passages in which this positivity is put into doubt, texts
did not deal with the charge that for some “globalization and the international
economic  order,  over the  last  several  decades,  have systematically  generated
human insecurity throughout the world”.58
In speaking of problems associated with human security, Tsuchiya stated that:
Rapid advances in information technologies have led to a surge in the globalization
of  human and economic  activities.  Globalization  has  enhanced world  economic
growth  and  raised  living  standards,  but  these  benefits  have  been  offset  by
increasingly severe global problems, including the widening gap between the rich
and  the  poor,  environmental  degradation,  conflicts,  landmines,  refugees,
transnational organized crimes, and the spread of deadly infectious diseases. 59
This selection represents the emergence of human security problems vis-a-vis
globalisation in yet  another  way.  Namely,  globalisation is  ascribed with  only
positive characteristics, whilst the issues said to be threatening human security
are  implied  as  originating  from  some  other  unspecified  source  and
counteracting the positive tendencies of globalisation. The difference between
57 One way in which economic well-being might impinge on human security would be if lack of
economic well-being were to cause conflict. However, the relationship between human 
security and conflict is itself problematic because, whilst conflict could cause some elements
of human security to be compromised, certain forms of conflict – such as revolution or 
rebellion – may ultimately bring about changes which result in an enhancement of human 
security. For a systematic, quantitative exploration of the relationship between economic 
well-being and forms of conflict accompanying rebellion and civil war, see: Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50, no. 4 
(October 1, 1998): 563–573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil 
War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 563–595.
58 Nafeez M Ahmed, “The Globalisation of Insecurity: How the International Economic Order 
Undermines Human and National Security on a World Scale,” Historia Actual Online no. 5 
(Fall 2004): 124.
59 Shinako Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human 
Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International 
Community’” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “ Human 
Security - Its role in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka 
Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html.
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this representation of globalisation and the ones discussed above, is that here it
has  been  conceptualised  in  contradistinction  to  things  which  cause  human
insecurity. Previously discussed invocations of it were ambiguous in the sense
that it was attributed with causing or contributing to both positive and negative
changes.
Sumi's talk of globalisation as “having brought not only benefits to people, but
troubles  by  widening  the  gap between the rich and the poor  nationally  and
internationally”,60 shows yet another slight variation in the way that Japan's
human security texts represent changes associated with globalisation; without
specifying an embodied form of agency or cause. Rather than its  effects being
the  result  of  the  actions  of  a  body  such  as  the  state,  the  population  or
non-governmental  organisations,  they  are  presented  in  terms  of  natural
processes, having come in “rapid waves”, radically affecting international norms
of behaviour by “shaking the fabrics of the traditional approach of sovereign
nations”.61 Reminiscent of the social strain metaphor discussed earlier, the wave
metaphor is employed in a way which paints the international community as
powerless and helpless in the face of impending, natural processes of change.
Besides deflecting charges of responsibility for human insecurity away from the
international community or particular states, this picture functions to validate
policy by opening up a space in which action – namely human security practices
– comes  across  not  only  as  warranted,  but  necessary  for  the  entirety  of  an
imagined international community. 
Another form of representation of the source of threat to human security can be
found in a speech by Sumi, where he speaks of security threats as traditionally
having  come  from  “outside  of  boundaries”,  but  that  “in  recent  years  many
dangers  have  not  come  from  outside  boundaries”.62 He  cites  “poverty,
environmental  degradation,  suffering  from  infectious  diseases,  transnational
60 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
179
organized  crime  and  terrorism  [as]  a  few  examples”  of  this.63 This
characterisation of human security threats is notable because it is different to
ones  in  which  threats  have  been  represented  as  transnational,64 and  it  also
brings with it two connotations. Firstly, that insofar as human security policy is
a  foreign  policy, it implies intervention in the  internal affairs of other states,
since  the  concern  is  with  problems  that  do  not  originate  from  outside
boundaries; logically speaking, if the problems did not come from outside, they
must have originated, at least in part, from within sovereign borders. Secondly,
that  human  security  praxis  is,  among  other  things,  a  matter  of  securitising
phenomena which have as yet not been considered matters of security. Indeed,
regarding this second point, Sumi admits that “the concept of human security is
a viable framework to bring human-centered approach to the values of political
leaders  by  making  the  interests  of  individuals  a  priority  for  governance and
politics”.65 In other words, in the context of Japan's human security discourse,
securitisation  refers  to  a  process  which  involves  a  conscious66 attempt  at
changing global policy agendas. As Foong Khong explains:
The purpose of securitizing certain issues, while leaving others alone, is obvious.
Once an issue like drug trafficking is securitized, its status in the policy hierarchy
changes. It becomes an urgent issue, worthy of special attention, resources, and
fast-track  or  immediate  amelioration  or  resolution,  perhaps  even  by  military
means.67 
The conscious  policy of securitisation,  which is raised in the excerpt above by
Sumi, runs the risk that once issues related to the everyday lived experience of
individual people are made into matters of security, this very lived experience
63 Ibid.
64 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007. 
65 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
66 It is notable that in regard to securitisation, Japan's position is somewhat different to that 
of the United Nations Development Programme. Whilst in the latter, “elevation of issues 
[…] to the realm of security” for the sake of changing prioritisation is merely an “implicit 
assumption”, whilst for the former the assumption is clearly announced in explicit terms. 
For a critical analysis of the human security discourse of the United Nations Development 
Programme's 1994 Human Development Report, see: Matt McDonald, “Human Security 
and the Construction of Security,” Global Society 16, no. 3 (2002): 277–278. 
67 Foong Khong, “Human Security,” 2001, 231.
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can become marginalised in comparison to the pursuit of policy objectives made
in the name of state security and thus become an object of military instruments
of foreign policy.  In Japan's  case,  it  is  not entirely clear if  the realisation of
human security  should include the use of  the  military. Despite constitutional68
and social  limitations69 on  its  deployment in offensive combat roles,  Japan's
Self-Defence  Forces  have  undertaken  non-combat,  humanitarian  missions70
and,  what  is  more,  an  explicit,  outright  rejection  of  military  approaches  to
human security  was  not  encountered in  the  corpus of  texts  examined.  Even
though Takemi  has asserted that “in Japan’s case, the process of developing a
concept for human security was built on […] Secretary-General of the United
Nations  Kofi  Annan’s  focus  on  nonmilitary  education-based  methods ”,  one
should  keep  in  mind  that  this  statement  refers  to  Japan's  human  security
concept in the past tense71 and thus does not rule out the development of human
security practices in the future which do indeed incorporate the military.72 It is
perhaps  because  of  the  potential  for  the  marginalisation  of  human  security
interests in relation to state security ones that  Buzan decries the tendency of
human security approaches, in general, to “idealize security as the desired end
goal”,  instead  supporting  the  idea  that  “the  desired  end  is  some  form  of
desecuritization down into normal politics”.73
68 Article 9 of Japan's Constitution asserts that: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In 
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not 
be recognized”. See: “The Constitution of Japan,” 1946, art. 9, 
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html.
69 “Japan Marks 66th Constitution Day Amid Protest Against Law Revising,” Xinhua News 
Agency, March 5, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8232035.html.
70 Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003); Japan’s Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf.
71 Takemi said that for Japan the process of developing a human security was based on 
non-military methods, rather that it being based on them.
72 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44 
emphasis added.
73 Barry Buzan, “A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value,” Security
Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 369–370.
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In one of the passages discussed above, poverty was said to be “a problem that
lies  at  the  root of  a  whole  range of  threats  to  human lives,  livelihoods,  and
dignity”.74 As such, the relationship between poverty and human security can be
classified as tertiary,  since it  is  only the cause of  something whose effect  on
human security is not actually certain; that is, it leads only to a threat to human
security, rather than being associated with a certain erosion of it. However, as
the  following  excerpt  shows,  poverty  also  figures  in  a  secondary  position  in
relation to human security, because its absence is conceptualised as a partial
constituent of the condition of human security:
No doubt, there are differences of emphasis on various aspects of human security.
Every county, every community, every individual will have [a] different sense of
[the] most serious fear and insecurity, reflecting the condition and circumstance
under  which  they  are  placed.  For  some,  it  may  be  violence,  or  conflict,  or
landmines. For others, it may be poverty, or unemployment, or health problem.75
In speaking of human security as a fluid notion that depends on context for its
meaning,  poverty is not presented as something which causes  problems that
might have  a  corrosive  effect  on  human  security  under  conditions  left
unspecified, as it was in the first excerpt from Takemi,76 but rather as something
which  directly threatens human security. However, because it is mediated  by
notion of threat, the relationship between poverty and human (in)security can
be characterised as secondary.
The corpus of Japan's human security texts (re)presents little detail on the exact
mechanisms through which poverty might affect human security as a whole, or
its  constituent  parts  such  as  dignity,  livelihood,  potential,  freedom,  wisdom,
74 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
75 Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by
Change in the Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html emphasis added.
76 “Poverty […] is a problem that lies at the root of a whole range of threats to human lives, 
livelihoods, and dignity. From Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development 
Toward the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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fulfilment  or survival. Whilst  it  seems quite  obvious  that  poverty  is  a  direct
cause of malnutrition, deprivation and preventable illness or death,77 Japan's
texts themselves do not allow the reader to come to such a conclusion nor do
they warrant the belief that Japan shares such a view. Furthermore, whilst the
effects of poverty on the health and economic aspects of human security are
intuitive almost by definition, its relationship to the less quantifiable aspects of
the concept such as dignity, wisdom, fulfilment, freedom or potential are not as
obvious.  However,  this  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  no detail  at  all  in  Japan's
human security texts.  For instance, it has been said that poverty together with
“other  factors”  has  a  negative  influence  upon  the  health  aspects  of  human
security,  by preventing “the  vast  majority of  people in developing countries”
from obtaining medical services.78 Here the health aspects of human security are
presented  as  being  reliant  on  obtaining medical  services,  thus  situating  the
concept  of  human  security  in  relation  to  both  psychological  factors  and
economic  systems  in  which  services  are  provided  to  consumers.  The
psychological element can be discerned if one considers the construction of the
objects  of  human  security  services  in  terms  of  obtaining,  rather  than  say,
receiving or being provided with medical services. To speak of people as being
prevented  from  obtaining services,  imbues  them  with  a  kind  of  agency,
motivation, or initiative which is absent when they are spoken of in terms of
being provided with. One needs to be more pro-active in order to obtain a thing
than when one is provided with it, although receiving does of course presuppose
a measure of initiative as well; i.e. the act of accepting that which is provided.
However, to construct people as having a kind of motivation or desire to obtain
medical services, is to imply that the provision of such services is necessary. As
a result, policy comes across as a response to the desires of people, rather than
as  the  creation  of  systems  in  which  the  provision  of  health  services  might
involve  the  marginalisation  of  alternative  concepts  of  medical  care,  or  the
limitation of choice to prioritise the interests of a particular cross-section of the
77 I am grateful to one of the examiners for raising this point.
78 Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by 
Change in the Lives of People,” May 18, 2007.
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medical industry. However, such an ascription of agency is problematic, because
at the same time as policy is depicted as being a matter of providing services to
people who want them, it is represented in terms of a necessity to “strengthen
the total system […] including health care education for the people in order to
enhance their  awareness of  availability  of  various health care services”.79 So,
whilst on the one hand people are positioned as wanting the health services of
which Takasu speaks, on the other hand the strength of this want is undermined
when one is told that it is necessary to advertise those services to people, so that
they can avail themselves of them. Obviously, both kinds of human subjects can
exist side by side: those who want health services of their own accord, as well as
those who do not yet  know about  them. The theoretical  problem is  that the
discourse offers no way by which to determine the proportions between the two
kinds of people, nor a way to determine when the enhancement of awareness
becomes indoctrination. 
In  distinction  to  the  preceding  representation  of  the  relationship  between
poverty  and  human  security  in  secondary  and  tertiary  forms,  the  following
excerpt  speaks  of  poverty  as  having  a  primary  or  direct  effect  on  human
security:
While  economic  globalization has  certainly  brought  about  a  higher  standard  of
living for many people in many different countries,  it  has also enlarged the gap
separating  its  beneficiaries  from  the  people  and  countries  that  have  been  left
behind.  Poverty  is  a  force  that  strips  human beings  of  their  potential  and this
applies as well to human survival, human well-being, and human freedom.80
In distinction to excerpts discussed earlier, where poverty was either something
which  caused problems that threatened human security, or which  threatened
human security directly, here one is told in no uncertain terms what the effects
of poverty on the entirety of the hard-core of the human security concept are: a
79 Ibid.
80 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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force  which  strips people  of  potential,  ability  to  survive,  well-being,  and
freedom; rather than merely threatening to do so. The text's presentation of all
this in reference to a metaphor which brings to mind violence, abruptness and
the  powerlessness  of  the  human  (that  is,  to  strip),  is  undertaken
unproblematically.  There  are  apparently  no  doubts  as  to  the  existence  of  a
causal  mechanism  by  which  poverty  is  said  to  dramatically  erode  human
security.  Nor  does  the  text  question  the  presupposition  of  the  ontological
stability  of  poverty as  a force,  nor how this  characterisation might  influence
thought or policy. One can see that it in this excerpt, poverty is brought up in a
way which is clearly distinguishable from other human security problems which
do not have concrete manifestations occurring in the present, but rather are said
to pose merely a threat or danger to human security.  However,  as discussed
earlier  poverty  takes  various  forms  throughout  Japan's  human  security
discourse, and thus overall it has an enigmatic or fluid status in regard to the
condition of human security. 
Characteristics of Threats and Problems
Various kinds of threat
In  regard  to  humankind  as  the  object  of  human  security  practices,  Obuchi
situates a  number of  discursive objects  in a relationship of  antagonism with
human security. These threats are represented as being of “various kinds”, with
the implication that they are relatively new, since they are things which exist “in
our times”:81 
In  our  times,  humankind  is  under  various  kinds  of  threats.  Environmental
problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for us but also for
future  generations.  In  addition,  transnational  crimes  such  as  illicit  drugs  and
trafficking are increasing. Problems such as the exodus of refugees, violations of
81 The invocation of temporal markers, particularly the now, was discussed in chapter 2.
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human rights, infectious diseases like AIDS, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines
and so on pose significant threats to all of us. Moreover, the problem of children
under armed conflict ought never to be overlooked. 82
As can be seen in the excerpt above, policy is to deal with threats to humankind
and  these  are  categorised  in  a  number  of  ways.  One  kind  is  that  of
trans-generational threat, which is characterised by its corrosive effect on not
only the human security of living humankind, but also on that of generations yet
to come. A number of implications follow from this representation of threat.
Firstly, the postulation of threats which function in regard to those yet unborn
reveals a conservative construction of human nature whereby things which are
considered problematic by people in the present, will also be considered as such
by those in the future.  Secondly, if future generations are expected to have to
deal with the same problems that current generations are facing, it must be the
case that the threats of which Obuchi speaks are particularly grave, significant
and  metaphysically  stable;  because in  the  future  they  are  still  likely  to  be
thought  of  as  threats,  rather  than  as  less  dangerous  or  drastic  things  like
problems, challenges, or nuisances. Thus, a static and conservative position can
be  discerned  here  not  only  to  the  idea  of  threats  themselves,  but  also  in
reference to different generations who are presupposed as having to engage with
these threats at some point in the future. 
Aside  from  phenomena  which  are  said  to  have  a  cross-generational  effect,
Obuchi's typology of problems which threaten human security also includes the
following  categories:  things  which  cross  national  boundaries  and  are  of
increasing prevalence, those things which are characterised by their potential to
negatively  impact  upon  the  human  security  of  everyone,  and  things  which
should never be overlooked. This typology brings to mind Foucault's apparent
laughter  at  the  categorisation  he  discusses  at  the  beginning  of  the  Order  of
Things, and brings to the fore questions about the categorisation of objects in
82 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
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ways which are seemingly incompatible,  yet  nonetheless have a logic for the
compiler:
[The Order of Things] first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that
shattered,  as  I  read  the  passage,  all  the  familiar  landmarks of  my thought  […]
breaking  up  all  the  ordered  surfaces  and  all  the  planes  with  which  we  are
accustomed  to  tame  the  wild  profusion  of  existing  things,  and  continued  long
afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between
the Same and the Other. This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia' in
which it is written that 'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b)
embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h)
included in the present classification, (I) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with
a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher,
(n) that from a long way off look like flies'. In the wonderment of this taxonomy,
the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is
demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of
our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.83
With  the  above  in  mind  and  irrespective  of  the  logic  of  the  categorisation
scheme  in  which  the  various  threats  and  problems  associated  with  human
security are included together, to represent the category of threat as so broad
and varied carries out the political function of blatantly and explicitly justifying
a congruently expansive set  of interventions in the name of  human security.
There  is  a  difference  between  characterising  threats  as  various rather  than
diverse; Japan's human security discourse does both. Whilst the former term
points towards  kinds of threats and brings to mind generalised categories, the
latter  one highlights  specific  examples  and differences  between them. These
representations work together to paint a picture of a world in which the human
is surrounded by peril from all sides. However, one also gets the impression that
it  is  also  a  world  that  is  known  and  understood;  attested  to  by  the  very
possibility of not only listing in detail what makes up the diversity of threat, but
also categorising it in different ways. 
83 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, World of Man: A Library of Theory and Research in 
the Human Sciences (ed: R.D. Laing) (London: Tavistock Publications, 1994), xv.
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The breadth of threats
In light of the preceding discussion about the representation of human security
threats as being of various kinds, it is interesting to consider that in speaking of
a “framework [that] would guarantee the security of all”,84 the implication for
the construction of human security is that either the palette of phenomena listed
as threats or causes of insecurity is so vast that it can cover all of the things that
are considered to be security threats by all individuals, or that the conception of
security is so narrow that it  is  indeed possible to speak of every individual's
security meaningfully,  because the threats which are of interest in policy are
particularly narrow. The former implication seems to be more likely if one takes
into consideration the wide breadth of Japan's representation of the meaning of
human security as well as assertions such as, “it is vital that we all understand
the diversity of the threat to human security”.85 However, the discourse does not
deal with the problem that this “diversification of threats”86 and the postulation
of beneficiaries of security policy at the level of the individual human, can lead
to a dilution of the human security concept in terms of the elements which can
be included within it, unless it is an a priori assumption that there are none or
very few significant differences between the human security needs of particular
individuals. Such an assumption would be problematic in regard to the claim
that human security practice is at least in part about the interests of individuals,
who  must  differ  in  significant  ways  for  their  categorisation  in  terms  of
individuality to  be  meaningful.  In  other  words,  it  would not  make sense  to
speak  of  the  human  security  of  individuals  if  these  subjects  of  policy  were
conceptualised  as  being  homogeneous  in  regard  to  their  perception  or
understanding of threat. 
84 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 43.
85 Ibid., 44.
86 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
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Threats as critical and pervasive
Another way in which human security threats are painted is  in terms of their
“critical and pervasive” nature.87 To speak of threats in this way is problematic
when it is juxtaposed with the idea of threat understood in terms of potential
rather than certainty. This is because in the absence of certainty that a threat
will  manifest  itself,  there can also be  no certainty of  its  critical  or pervasive
nature, except in hypothetical terms. Whilst there might be sense in speaking of
uncertain  and  only  potentially  occurring  phenomena  as  pervasive,  if  their
presence had been perceived for a  particularly long time, it is problematic to
speak of them as critical. This is because the characterisation of a phenomenon's
effects as critical can only be stated in certain terms after the fact, rather than
prior to its manifestation; unless one relies on theory or assumptions to assert
the  critical  nature  by definition.  Nonetheless,  in  terms  of  political  function,
framing threats in this way creates an image of dangers which touch the essence
of  the  human  experience  deeply  beyond  an  imagined  superficial  level,  thus
legitimating policy by an appeal to the undesirability of change and the spectre
of doing nothing. To be exact, it appeals to a particular form of conservatism
which  rejects  the  presence  of  factors  which  might  bring  about  the  kind  of
fundamental change that could be characterised as critical or pervasive. What is
left  only  to  the  reader's  imagination  however,  is  elucidation  upon  what
constitutes a critical or pervasive threat or human security problem. A similar
resistance to change can be discerned in the discourse's implicit characterisation
of  threats  as  cross-generational,  which  was  discussed  above;88 connoting  a
conservative vision of future generations that will  conceive of the meaning of
phenomena  – specifically regarding their status as threats – in the same way as
do current generations.
87 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 42.
88 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
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Problems as interrelated, transnational, and existing in the present
The following excerpt presents threats as being interrelated, transnational, and
existing in the  present.  As such,  it  works to construct  the pursuit  of  human
security  as  necessitating  the  role  of  a  coordinator  of  the  international
community because of the apparent shared nature of human security threats,
hinting at a looser conception of sovereignty, whilst underlining the necessity of
prompt action:
Given the various interrelated problems that now transcend national borders, there
has never been a greater need than today to strengthen and coordinate the roles of
donor nations, developing countries, and international organizations, in addition to
individuals acting as players in their own right.89
The tropes of interrelatedness and particularity to the present were discussed
earlier,  especially  in  regard  to  the  presence  of  the  trope  of  newness  that  is
discernible throughout the corpus of texts and its functioning to spur on policy
by separating the past from the present to construct a sense of haste and danger.
Speaking of problems as transnational appeals to the protection of the national
self-interest, working together with the idea that even though each individual
national-Self  is  at  risk,  no  one  unit  can  protect  itself  adequately  because
problems apparently “transcend national borders”,90 and thus affect all the units
making  up  the  international  community.  These  characterisations  of  human
security related problems function to challenge older ideas about the obligations
and  rights  of  states,  promoting  instead  what  Paul  Bacon  has  called
“late-Westphalian”  norms  of  sovereignty  according  to  which  “solidarist
international actors endorse the principle of sovereignty but balance this with a
commitment to universal moral principles that address injustices suffered by
individuals or groups".91
89 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
90 Ibid.
91 Paul Bacon, “Community, Solidarity and Late Westphalian International Relations,” in The 
United Nations and Human Security, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver P. Richmond (New 
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Complexity of problems
Another way in which problems associated with human security are presented is
in relation to the notion of complexity:
The problems relating to human security are becoming increasingly complex, and
in responding to these problems it is absolutely essential to provide assistance by
means of a comprehensive approach within a framework of an equal partnership
among recipient countries, donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs
which address the so-called gap between humanitarian assistance and development
assistance and so on.92
Complexity, as a characteristic of human security threats, appears in a dynamic
form; since it has apparently been increasing over time. Presumably an element
of this complexity is the interrelatedness discussed above, since the reader is
also told that human security challenges  have “complex  interlinkages to each
other”.93 In general, the discourse has little to say regarding the nature of the
complexity attributed to human security problems. Instead the details are left to
the  imagination  of  the  reader,  thus  allowing  for  a  significant  measure  of
flexibility for the appropriation of human security legitimacy through the use of
human security language to frame a wide ranging palette of policy practices. In
this particular excerpt one can see the utilisation of the trope of complexity to
argue for an approach signified as comprehensive and cooperative. Complexity
functions to legitimate the extension of practices undertaken in the name of
human security into a wide range of fields of human and non-human existence
and experience,  as  well  as  invoking the  necessity  of  establishing a  leader  or
coordinator  of  the  international  community  of  states,  non-governmental
organisations, and international organisations. 
York: Palgrave, 2001), 83.
92 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
93 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
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It  is  interesting  to  note  that  while  complexity  is  presented  as  a  feature  of
problems associated with human security, an ambiguity regarding the meaning
of  that  complexity  was  discernible  throughout  the  body  of  texts  examined.
Specifically,  the  text  by  Takemi  speaks  of  increasingly complex  problems
related to human security, thereby connoting that it is the problems themselves
which are defined by complexity.94 As pointed out above, complexity is invoked
in dynamic terms; problems must already have been complex in order for there
to  be  meaning  in  the  claim  that  they  are  becoming  increasingly complex.
However, to speak of complex inter-linkages between phenomena which are in
a relationship of antagonism with human security, implies that it is the relations
between  those  phenomena  which  are  complex,  rather  than  the  phenomena
themselves.  As  such,  some  ambiguity  results  because  on  the  one  hand
complexity is ascribed to certain discursive objects  themselves,  whilst on the
other hand it is said to be a property of the relations between these objects.
The ascription of increasing complexity to the problems surrounding human
security is an example of the realist metaphysics which pervades Japan's human
security  texts.  The  excerpt  above  suggests  that  the  apparent  increasing
complexity of human security problems can be explained through recourse to
metaphysical realism. By focusing upon the problems and their transformations
rather  than upon the people  who construct  them through the production of
discourse, the text implicitly supports an ontological status for these problems
which is realist, or metaphysical in Rorty's terms, in the sense that problems are
deemed to have an identity or nature which is independent of discursive acts of
construction.95 The complexity of human security comes across as having been
discovered, rather than created or developed; thus implying that it would have
94 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
95 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
chap. 4.
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existed  irrespective  of  its  empirical  observation  by  a  researcher,  scientist,
politician,  scholar  or  some  other  profession  ascribed  with  the  power  to
announce  such  discoveries.  This  epistemological  position  is  not,  however,
unique to Japan; such “cosmological realism” being a characteristic of human
security discourse in general.96 An alternative account might focus instead upon
those very people who construct these problems through the linguistic act of
theorising about them; in essence to argue that these problems come to appear
more and more complex not when new theoretical connections are discovered,
but  when  they  are  made  or  formulated  by  theorists  of  human  security;  a
position reminiscent to that of Rorty's “ironist”.97
The representation of those things said to be problems for human security in
terms of  complexity functions to legitimate  state  policy in two ways.  Firstly,
there is the sense of necessity, impetus and imminence that is built up through
talk  of  increasing complexity.  Secondly,  the  signification  of  human  security
issues as complex justifies a state role in the process through an appeal to, and
support of the idea, that governments are still the only bodies with the necessary
or sufficient resources and expertise to deal with various problems, especially in
light of the implied limitations of the individual human being in realising its
own  human  security.98 However,  the  juxtaposition  of  complexity  in
96 Kyle Grayson, “Human Security as Power/knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional 
Debate.,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008): 383–401.
97 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 1989, chap. 4.
98 Interestingly, Japan's explicit appeal to states' monopoly on access to resource as a 
justification for a state-agent dominated discourse on human security can be contrasted 
with the human security discourses critiqued by Grayson; ones which which cloak or 
disregard this monopoly through references to a “democratic world” in which human 
security interests are pursued by numerous actors which include non-state ones. Grayson 
argues that such discourses omit to include the fact that “among other things, the state has 
an edge in financial resources, a monopoly over the ‘legitimate’ use of means of violence, a 
heightened ability to disseminate (dis)information and an advantage in the levels of energy 
that it can dedicate to perceived vital causes”. The difference between Japan's human 
security discourse and the one's targeted in Grayson's critique, is that the former proudly 
touts the superior resources of the state as a reason why the state should be involved in the 
realisation of human security, whereas the latter seem to obfuscate them in order to present
an image in which the state's role is not out of proportion to the roles of non-state actors. As
an aside, Grayson's critiques such “democratic world” themes because they take attention 
away from the potential that “national security paradigms can dominate and co-opt human 
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self-referential terms with complexity regarding relationships with other objects
comes with a number of theoretical  problems. The most obvious one is  that
despite the presence of complexity,  the texts are silent on the  details of  this
complexity, omitting discussion of its nature, meaning or ramifications. As such
the  discourse  contains  an  unfulfilled  potential  for  the  facilitation  of  policy
objectives through opportunities for the application of  power that come when
new discursive formations are constructed.99  
Increasing severity of problems
Not only are the issues and problems related to human security constructed in
terms  of  a  more  and  more  complex  and  tangled  web,  they  have  also  been
presented  as  “increasingly  severe”;100 a  characterisation  which  serves  to  give
impetus to activities taken in the name of human security in tandem with the
trope of complexity and increasing complexity. Ironically, this way of speaking
about human security problems comes with the unacknowledged connotation
that  human  security  efforts  so  far  have  been  relatively  ineffectual.  Since
problems are becoming increasingly severe, it must be the case that whatever is
being  done  to  address  them  is  lacking  in  efficacy.  Here  one  can  discern  a
problem  of  legitimation  in  the  discourse:  the  promotion  of  continued  and
increased  human  security  praxis  through  an  appeal  to  its  own  inefficacy.
Importantly,  this  paradox  brings  to  light  a  consistent  omission  in  Japan's
human security texts: the matter of how to prioritise between human security
concerns, and the measurement and assessment of efficacy of policy actions. 
security ‘vulnerabilities’ to further state interests” See: Kyle Grayson, “Securitization and 
the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor,” Security Dialogue 34, 
no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 338. 
99 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976).
100 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003.
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Context dependence in threat prioritisation
In representing human security in terms of “different concerns [..] depending
upon […] natural environment and other conditions”,101 Japan's human security
discourse reveals a sensitivity to the influence of context in determining whether
an event or phenomenon comes to be signified as a threat to human security.
This postulation of context dependence suggests that, for Japan, human security
practices are not conceptualised in terms of a blanket approach which asserts
applicability to all places, situations, or people. But, the texts examined did not
reveal significant elucidation about just what those  other conditions might be,
what exactly constitutes a  natural environment, or how either of these sets of
factors  might  impinge  upon  human  security  and  how  its  erosion  might  be
measured. 
The discourse does thus demonstrate at least a kernel of theoretical sensibility
regarding  the  identification  of  sources  of  human  insecurity  according  to
particular  times,  places  or  locations.  It  also  suggests  that  prioritisation  in
establishing  a  human  security  agenda  might  be  also  possible,  through  the
assertion that  “every county (sic), every community, every individual will have
(sic)  different sense  of  (sic) most  serious  fear  and  insecurity,  reflecting  the
condition and circumstance under which they are placed”.102 This  expression
serves to project an image of human security practices as being sensitive to the
various  concerns  of  different  policy  beneficiaries  and  brings  with  it  the
impression that policy is not about realising the parochial interests of a human
security agent such as Japan, but rather the interests of all the various subjects
which are invoked as beneficiaries; countries, communities, and individuals.
101 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a 
Globalized World” (presented at the International Conference on Human Security in a 
Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, May 8, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0005.html.
102 Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by 
Change in the Lives of People,” May 18, 2007.
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In promoting the idea that different subjects will have varying ideas about what
issues are most significant for their human security, a difficulty for the discourse
is the lack of theorisation on how priorities should be determined, and what to
do in cases where the priorities of different subjects run counter to each other. If
there is no specific delineation about which issues need to be solved first, there
is  an evident  likelihood of  conflicts  regarding  interests  arising;  either  where
subjects  of  human  security  policy  disagree  on  how  resources  should  be
dispersed, or more dangerously in situations where different bodies consider the
priorities  of  the  Other  to  be  a  threat  to  their  own  human  security.  A
consideration of the question of how one might practically go about determining
individuals' perception or understanding of threat was conspicuously omitted,
despite  frequent  emphasis103 on  the  individual  level  throughout  the  texts
examined. 
Causality and agency regarding human insecurity
Japan's human security texts contain little detail regarding who or what stands
behind problems which cause  human insecurity or threats to human security.
Instead,  phenomena  which  are  ascribed  with  a  negative  effect  on  human
security, irrespective of the level of certainty associated with them, often appear
as if they simply came about of their own accord, without the actions of any
particular body. Indeed as pointed out earlier, they are sometimes ascribed with
a certain natural, inevitable character through the metaphorical elucidation of
globalisation  as  having  occurred  in  rapid  waves.104 For  instance,  one  early
human security speech by Obuchi contains no references to an acting subject of
103 As was discussed in chapter twor, this emphasis is ambiguous; it manifests itself in texts' 
indeterminacy regarding the question of who is to be the main beneficiary of practices 
undertaken in the pursuit of human security. 
104 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002; 
Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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any  sort;  neither  states,  individuals,  people,  nor  non-governmental
organisations are ascribed with a causal role vis-a-vis those things which are
said  to  impinge  on  human  security  in  either  potential  or  concrete  terms.105
Whilst  there  is  talk  of  environmental  problems endangering  people,
transnational  crime increasing,  or  in  general  problems crossing  national
borders or threatening human beings,  no actual acting or causative bodies are
invoked. Agency, as a consciously or unconsciously motivated activity of social
actors working in the interests of someone or something, is rarely invoked in
reference to problems for human  security or threats to it,  in Japan's human
security documents. Instead, causes of human insecurity are often attached to
non-human,  inanimate  processes  or  phenomena  such  as  globalisation,
economic crisis, conflict, structural change, or process:
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has experienced rapid
globalization accompanied by the economic liberalization and a marked progress of
information technology.  At the same time,  this  process has significantly deepen
(sic) interdependence of the world, having brought substantial  benefits to many
people  on  one  hand,  widening  the  gap  between  the  rich  and  the  poor  both
nationally and internationally on the other. 
Today, as many as 1.3 billion people are forced to subsist on less than one dollar a
day. The massive and rapid movement of people, goods, money and information
encouraged  (sic)  transnational  problems  to  spread,  including  the  smuggling  of
persons, arms and drugs as well as infectious diseases. The economic expansion
has worsened global  warming and other environmental  degradation and energy
problems.  Furthermore,  the  collapse  of  the  Cold  War  order  has  triggered  off
numerous  civil  conflicts,  whose  root  causes  lie  in  religious,  racial  and  ethnic
contexts,  accompanied  by  refugee  and  internally  displaced  person  issues,
anti-personnel landmines and small arms.106
This typical expression of human security threats and problems does not refer
directly to a social actor or agent which might be, either intentionally  or not,
105 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
106 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 2.
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causing human insecurity. Notably, the passage contains the implication that it
is people themselves who are a cause of human insecurity, through talk of them
being forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day.107 Furthermore, a sense of
an implied, embodied causality also lurks in the invocation of “problems such as
the exodus of refugees”,108 in which the blame for potential negative effects on
human security is dispersed across a relatively faceless mass of people; though
their actions are still nonetheless implied as being not entirely of their own free
will, due to their characterisation as refugees.109 
The preceding discussion suggests  that  Japan's  human security  texts  do not
substantially  address Bellamy and McDonald's  critique of  human security  in
general, whose case against the prioritisation of a state role in the realisation of
the  idea  is  in  part  supported by the  argument  that  insofar  as  the  causes  of
human  security  threats  are  concerned,  “states  are  more  often  part  of  the
problem than the source of the solution”.110 The only explicit case in which the
state is implicated as at least a partial cause of human insecurity, can be found
in an early speech by Obuchi in which he asserts that  “both the state and the
market,  unless  carefully  managed,  may  well  hurt  human  dignity  by  shoving
107 If the clause regarding people being forced to subsist on less than one dollar a day is 
apprehended at face value, one can see that the use of the passive form for the verb to force,
takes attention away from a consideration of who might be forcing people to be in poverty. 
The ascription of a causative role to people for human insecurity, can be discerned if one 
considers the context in which the clause is situated; namely in a paragraph that deals 
primarily with causes of human insecurity. As such the idea that people are forced to subsist
on less than one dollar a day suggests that dire financial circumstances have resulted in 
people undertaking behaviours which erode human security. Moreover, this 
unacknowledged ascription of causality suggests a conceptualisation of people as homo 
economicus; a form of behavioural determinism which prioritises economic considerations 
over the effects of ethics, socialisation, or culture. 
108 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
109 In other words, their signification as refugees connotes different reasons for moving than 
would be the case if they were spoken of as tourists or immigrants.
110 Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, “‘The Utility of Human Security’: Which Humans? 
What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 273. For 
another critique of the prioritisation of the state in the provision of human security, see 
Heidi Hudson, “Gender as a Tool for the Analysis of the Human Discourse in Africa,” in 
Gender Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Studies, ed. Kari H. Karamé and Torunn L. 
Tryggestad (Oslo: PRIO, 2000).
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suffering on the socially vulnerable”.111 The relationship between the market, the
state and human security is affirmed by Thomas et al., who argue that economic
downturns can represent a “serious challenge” to  human security through their
mutual relationships with political and social (in)stability.112 However, Obuchi
himself neglects to explicate the mechanism through which mismanagement of
the state or market might erode human security, how such effects may manifest
themselves or how they could be discerned.
Obuchi's assertion is unusual not only because it is one of only a few examples
in which causes of human insecurity are ascribed to a particular agent, but also
because this agent is said to be the state. However, the implication is subtle and
indefinite because it is made through the use of the modal auxiliary verb may,
which only indicates probability rather than certainty. Incidentally, the use of
the  verb  to  hurt reveals  a  characteristic  indeterminacy  in  Japan's  human
security  language,  because  of  the  term's  subjective  nature.  This  usage  is
nonetheless consistent with Japan's partial conceptualisation of human security
at the level of the individual, since it is the case that an individualist point of
view does give credence to the idea that each person could in principle have a
different  perception regarding the constitution of  pain/hurt,  as  well  as  what
might be a bearable level of it. The representation of insecurity in terms of a
causal role for the state functions to present Japan – a state agent of human
security  –  as  cognisant  of  its  own  potential  role  in  the  creation  of  human
insecurity, although the significance of this picture is tempered in the interests
of Japan's positive image, by speaking of only a  potential  role for the state or
market in causing human insecurity. As a result, actions taken in the name of
human security come across as being constructed by a body which is self-aware
of  its  own  potential  shortcomings  and  actively  working  towards  countering
them. In other words, representation functions to legitimate policy though an
111 Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 1998.
112 Nicholas Thomas, Michael Wesley, and Hee-Soo Kim, “Human Security in the Western 
Pacific: The Asian Economic Crisis and Beyond 1,” Asian Journal of Social Science 29, no. 1 
(2001): 131.
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appeal to infallibility,  introspection and sincerity; in this case the state as an
agent of  human security is not presented as all  knowing or omnipotent,  but
rather as wholeheartedly attempting to realise human security in spite of its own
shortcomings.  Furthermore,  rather  than  hiding  them,  it  is  not  afraid  to
acknowledge these inadequacies and speak of them, thus painting itself in terms
of, and appealing to, a sense of humility and honesty. As stated above, Obuchi's
subtle implication of state agency in the creation of human insecurity is notable,
as most texts in the corpus examined did not ascribe a particular agent with
causality  for  human  insecurity,  speaking  instead  in  terms  of  natural
uncontrollable  forces  or  implying  that  humans  themselves  are  at  blame  for
human insecurity. 
An instance of ascription of agency for human insecurity to a particular body
was  also  found  in  the  invocation  of  problems  associated  with  the
“unprecedented moves of people, goods, money and information”, that are said
to have come about in the present period of post Cold War globalisation.113 For
the most part this movement is attributed to inanimate objects, but notably also
to the movement of people themselves. As such, the discourse situates people as
both  an object of insecurity, as well as a cause of it. Unlike other passages –
discussed  above  –  in  which  problems  were  said  to  be  at  least  partially
attributable to mismanagement of the state or market,114 here the ascription of
cause or agency is made only in passing and in relation to the human subject
itself. This positioning of the human as both victim and perpetrator  brings to
mind debates regarding the ascription of blame to victims of crime such as rape,
although in  this  text  this  blame is  only  subtly  implied.  Importantly,  despite
Obuchi's  exceptional  counter-example  regarding  the  roles  of  the  state  and
market, one can discern a delicate yet consistently implied representation of the
state as being relatively innocent in the creation of human insecurity.  As an
113 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
114 For instance see: Obuchi, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” December 16, 
1998.
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aside, this apparently multi faceted, unprecedented movement is said to only
“sometime[s]”  worsen  these  problems,  thereby  once  again  revealing  the
contingent and contextual, yet also imprecise nature of Japan's representation
of  threats  to  human  security.  Moreover,  not  only  is  Sumi's  exposition
indeterminate regarding the cause of threat, and the conditions under which it
might become manifest, he is inconsistent in characterising the origin of human
insecurity.  This  is  because  on  the  one  hand  dangers  are  said  to  be
“transnational”,  whilst  on  the  other  he  asserts  that  “in  recent  years  many
dangers  have  not  come  from  outside  boundaries”.115 This  intra-text
inconsistency  regarding  the  source  of  human  security  problems  aside,  Sumi
does not elucidate on the conditions under which problems might be worsened
by international movement, other than to say that it is only “sometimes”.116
Human  security  is  often  represented  in  reference  to  the  objective  of
empowerment  of  people,  both  at  the  level  of  the  individual  and  the
community.117 Targeting  people,  as  opposed  to  states,  is  consistent  with  the
notion of human security that Japan is putting forward because the concern is
with conflict undertaken by people:
At the same time, in order to prevent people from relapsing into conflict and allow
peace to take root, it is necessary to develop institutional framework to ensure rule
of  law  and  democracy  so  that  'human  security'  is  maintained  in  a  sustainable
manner. 118
As this excerpt above shows, it is not states which need to be prevented from
relapsing into conflict, but rather people. From this perspective, the concept of
human security comes across not as a concept which deals with the eradication
115 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
116 Ibid.
117 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007, 3; Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the 
Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 2004; Sumi, “Human 
Security and Health,” 2006.
118 Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on 
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’,” January 26, 
2008.
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or regulation of state controlled conflict, in which states go to war as part of a
rational foreign policy, but as being concerned with making sure that people do
not engage in conflict of their own accord, divorced from regulation by the state.
Again,  as  in  the  cases  of  people's  movement  or  when  under  dire  economic
circumstances, people are implicitly situated as agents of their own insecurity.
This form of representation gives the impression that human security policy, or
the  human  security/human  centered  perspective,119 advocates  one  of  two
things: either the prevention of war policies by  other states, through targeting
the  populations  of  those  states  directly  in  order  to  create  domestic  popular
resistance to war, or simply the prevention of any domestic conflict which is not
regulated or controlled by the state. Here the crux of the point being made is the
distinction  between  state  policies  of  war,  and  unwanted  or  unregulated
instances  of  conflict. Fukuda  seems  to  be  painting  a  picture  in  which  the
problem is not state controlled use of military force, but rather popular forms of
apparently random, non-rational violence on a mass scale; although the scale of
conflict which is to be addressed is not specified.120 He speaks of people, rather
than states, in conflict. In other words, Fukuda's speech implies that policy is
concerned with people, rather than states, as a cause of conflict which is said to
endanger human security. In this case one can observe another instance of the
deflection of  responsibility for causing human insecurity away from the state
and towards people themselves. 
Fukuda's speech contains conceptual opacity regarding the relationship between
two  elements  of  human  security:  the  issue  of  who  is  to  be  the  primary
beneficiary  of  human  security  policy  and  the  matter  of  causes  of  human
insecurity. The ambiguity comes from the invocation of two groups of people:
119 Global Issues Cooperation Division, “The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the 
‘Human-centered’ 21st Century,” March 2007; Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the 
International Symposium on Human Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of 
Various Threats to the International Community’,” February 25, 2003; Sato, “Statement on 
the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network,” May 28, 
2004.
120 These forms of violence are implied as being random and non-rational through their 
positioning in opposition to policies of state.
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those who are to be empowered and protected as part of the pursuit of their
security, and those who are to be prevented from relapsing into conflict. Both
groups of people seem to be amidst conflict which causes human insecurity for
non-rational  reasons.  The  former  group  of  people  “have  found  themselves
there”,121 suggesting that they did not desire or rationally plan to be there, but
rather ended up amongst conflict despite their wishes. Since the latter group has
the potential of “relapsing into conflict”,122 the connotation is that they are also
amongst conflict or involved in it in spite of themselves; as if their participation
was  at  least  the  partial  result  of  some unconscious  drive,  desire,  or  illness.
Specifically, ambiguity is a result of the indistinct way which this latter group of
people is theorised regarding human insecurity. It is difficult to discern whether
they  are  hypothesised  as  being  causes  of  insecurity  for  the  former  group,
whether  they  are  themselves  suffering  from  human  insecurity  which  causes
them  to  participate  in  conflict,  or  whether  their  status  vis-a-vis  sources  of
human insecurity entails being both victims and causes. 
As mentioned earlier, it is rare for Japan's human security discourse to ascribe
either threats to human security or the problems that cause them to a specific
actor.  Rather,  these  issues  are  usually  portrayed  as  being  unwanted  or
uncontrollable  effects  of  things  such  as  globalisation  or  economic  crisis.
However,  Fukuda's  speech is  notable  because it  indicates  an awareness of  a
need  to  face  the  issue  that,  according  to  the  logic  of  human security,  some
humans' insecurity can result from the activities of other humans. It is because
of the potential for such paradoxical situations that Foong Khong charges the
concept of human security with “false causal assumptions”, asking rhetorically
whether it “would […] not be foolhardy to put the safety of Slobodan Milosevic
and his supporters on par with that of the Bosnian Muslims?”.123 Nonetheless,
121 Fukuda, “Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Session on 
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Human Security and International Action’,” January 26, 
2008.
122 Ibid.
123 Foong Khong, “Human Security,” 2001, 234.
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the theoretical omission regarding the relationship between causality and the
line between victims and perpetrators of human insecurity is not addressed in
the corpus of Japanese human security texts.
In conclusion, this chapter has revealed and analysed a number of elements of
Japan's human security discourse related to the representation of threats and
other phenomena which are positioned as having a corrosive effect on human
security.  The  chapter  began  with  a  problematisation  of  signification  and
securitisation,  where it  was found  Japan's  human security texts  demonstrate
limited sensitivity  to  the subtleties of signification and language use. It is the
case  that  the  literal  interpretation  and  analysis  of  texts  that  has  been
undertaken  in  this  thesis  does  not  ascribe  much  importance  to  figurative,
metaphorical,  or  common sense  uses  of  language  in  which  the  gist  is  more
important than precise meaning. However, considering the pervasive nature of
human security policy on the everyday minutiae of human life, literal analysis
was undertaken by choice. If promoted as linguistic currency through the norm
setting actions of the United Nations General Assembly or the linguistic acts of
states,  Japan's  discourse  will  make  up  at  least  the  partial  conditions  and
foundations of thought and practice aimed at realising human security, and for
this reason the texts were apprehended in a strict and literal manner in which
the  nuance  and  meaning  of  individual  words  was  assumed  to  be  of  prime
importance. Moreover, this approach was justified because of these texts' role in
communicating  Japan's  human  security  thought  to  a  wider  international
audience. Since according to the discourse itself, “it is vital for Japan to express
[its] ideas in a clear manner and to undertake the implementation of concrete
policies  which  are  founded  on  the  basis  of  these  ideas,”124 it  was  deemed
appropriate to examine the discourse in terms of the subtleties of language use
and signification. In terms of this apparent intent to communicate, it is clear
124 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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from the discussion above that imprecise and inconsistent signification has the
opposite effect; that of adding opacity and ambiguity to constructing a shared
idea  of  human  security,  and  not  explaining  Japan's  own  ideas  clearly.
Furthermore,  not  only  is  inconsiderate  signification  a  risk  to  clear
communication,  it  also  embodies  a  danger  that  texts  will  be manipulated to
legitimate  unintended  practices  taken  in  the  name  of  human  security.  In  a
similar vein, whilst securitisation might be an effective way of affecting policy
priorities of the foreign policies of Other states, it has the unwanted side effect
of moving many mundane and private matters into the realm of security and
legitimising them as points of intervention for the state or other non-human,
non-individual  body  representing  itself  as  working  in  the  name  of  human
security.  What  is  more,  Japan's  human  security  discourse  also  reveals  an
ambition to hegemony, because it unashamedly advocates the modification of
the policy agendas of Other states and international actors.
The discussion then moved on to show how uncertainty signified in terms of
threat  or  danger  is  situated in  a  central  position in  Japan's  human security
thinking. Whilst texts did also invoke specific problems which were said to affect
human security directly rather than being mediated by threat, in general there
was a tendency for Japan to focus on things which might eventuate, rather than
on specific  issues  which  could  be  shown to  have occurred  or  that  might  be
observable in empirical terms or under specific, known conditions. With this in
mind  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  say  that  Japan's  human  security  discourse
implicitly  promotes  the  idea  of  prevention  and  pre-emption,  rather  than
working to neutralise or remove problems after their manifestation. 
Next, the chapter continued with an examination of the textual representation
of causes and sources of threats and problems pertaining to human security.
Commonly invoked tropes in this  regard were  the  end of  the  Cold War and
globalisation. Whilst under-theorised in terms of temporality or mechanism of
effect,  both  of  these  ideas  were  used  to  explain  apparent  rises  in  human
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insecurity even though their presentation was multi-faceted and led to tension
and ambiguity in Japan's human security discourse. 
Following on from the section on cause and origin, the chapter dealt with how
texts  have  presented  threats  and  problems  as  diverse,  interrelated,
transnational,  complex  or  numerous,  and  how these  images  both  work  with
each  other,  whilst  also  leading  to  problems  and  inconsistencies  in
representation. For the most part it was found that agency or cause for human
security  issues  was  not  ascribed  to  any particular  body such as  the  state  or
international community. It was also implied that humans were themselves at
least  in  part  responsible  for  human  insecurity  as  a  result  of  transnational
movement and a lack of economic well-being. 
The  final  analytical  chapter  which  follows  is  concerned  with  discursive
representations  pertaining  to  human  security  practices  and  the  relations
between different agents of human security.
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Chapter V: The realisation of human security
The  previous  chapter  was  concerned  with  Japan's  textual  representation  of
threats and problems related to human security. It was found that there is a lack
of  theoretical  elucidation  regarding  the  antagonistic  relationship  between
various phenomena and human insecurity, and that to a significant extent the
effects  of  these  phenomena  on  people's  security  are  mediated  by  the
probabilistic  idea  of  threat.  This  chapter  is  primarily  concerned  with  an
exposition,  analysis,  and  problematisation  of  the  representation  of  the
relationships between those actors and agents which are postulated as having a
role to play in the realisation of Japan's human security objectives. 
Chapter four is comprised of two sections: the first  introduces the agents of
human security which were invoked in the corpus of texts examined, whilst the
second undertakes a more detailed examination and discussion of the ways in
which these agents are positioned in regard to each other, as well as differences
in the way that bodies positioned as having a role to play in the realisation of
human security are depicted. The discourse represents the realisation of human
security as necessitating the actions of a large palette of both state and non-state
actors. However, a significant measure of discrepancy can be observed across
texts  in  regard to  how much agency is  ascribed to  various  agents  of  human
security; ranging from the extremes of almost an entirely statist project, to that
of a pluralism characterised in terms of equality and partnership between both
state and non-state actors. 
Agents of Human Security
At one end of the spectrum, Japan has represented the realisation of human
security as being based mainly on the initiative of states:
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Needless to say, appropriate security and economic policies which consist primarily of
responses mounted at the state level will, as in the past, be essential for the resolution of
[human security] problems.1
Whilst non-state agents are not ruled out in this excerpt, it prioritises the state 
as the main protagonist in realising human security by signifying responses 
mounted at the state level as making up the primary form of practice. The mode
of representation evident in this example is consistent with research which has 
charged human security with being a statist project that has lost its 
emancipatory potential precisely because of this kind of emphasis on the state 
as the main determinant of policy.2 It is a mode of representation which leaves a
significant space for the continued monopolisation of power by the state in the 
everyday minutiae of lived human experience. Vesting too much responsibility 
in the state for the realisation of human security runs counter to the necessity of
protecting people from its arbitrary power, since the marginalisation of 
non-states in the pursuit of human security works to limit their ability to offer a 
critical perspective in the determination of policy agendas,3 and runs the risk of 
prioritising state interests in lieu of human ones.4 It is thus notable and ironic 
that whilst Japan represents its human security policy in line with the 
1 Keizo Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century 
Which Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’” (presented at the International Symposium 
on Development, United Nations University, Tokyo, June 24, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9906.html emphasis added.
2 Tan See Seng, Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation, Working Paper 
Series (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4407; Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, “‘The Utility of 
Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow,” Security 
Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 373–77; Julie Gilson and Phillida Purvis, “Japan’s Pursuit of 
Human Security: Humanitarian Agenda or Political Pragmatism,” Japan Forum 15, no. 2 
(2003): 199.
3 It should be noted that there are also pessimistic views regarding the extent to which 
non-governmental organisations can offer critical perspectives. Duffield, for instance, 
asserts that “NGOS have progressively become adjuncts and implementing partners of 
policies and interventionary strategies emanating from effective states [and maybe even] 
uncritical accomplices of Western foreign policy. See: Mark Duffield, “Human Security: 
Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror,” in New Interfaces Between 
Security and Development (presented at the 11th General Conference of the EADI, Bonn, 
2005), 16.
4 Heidi Hudson, “‘Doing’ Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on 
Gender and the Politics of Human Security,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 
165.
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Commission on Human Security,5 that body has argued that an effective human 
security policy should not rely exclusively on the state; that “the range of actors 
[should be] expanded beyond the state alone”.6
Whilst  the  excerpt  discussed  above  prioritises  the  state  in  realising  human
security,  in  the  following  example  human  security  policy  is  alternatively
represented as necessitating the full participation of non-state actors:
One important point to be made here is the diversification and stratification of the
players  in  the international  community  […]  On one hand,  it  is  more and more
essential to respect the individuals not merely from the standpoint of a beneficiary
but also as a [sic] full-fledged players in the game in the so-called era of province7
or civil society.8
These  two  excerpts  contain  an  ambiguous  if  not  conflicting  image  of  the
importance of state and non-state actors in human security practice. In the first
example, it seems unequivocal that states should be the main protagonists in the
realisation of  human security.  However,  the  second passage destabilises  this
assertion  by  invoking  non-state  actors  as  full-fledged participants  in
international affairs.  In comparing these two images – ostensibly at odds with
each  other  in  regard  to  the  division  of  labour  in  the  realisation  of  human
security – it is important to keep in mind that they actually come from the same
speech. To reconcile them it seems necessary to abandon the idea that being a
full-fledged player is synonymous with having a role equal to that of the state in
5 Shinako Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human 
Security: ‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International 
Community’” (presented at the International Symposium on Human Security: “ Human 
Security - Its role in an era of various threats to the international community ,” Akasaka 
Prince Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, February 25, 2003), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0302_ps.html; Yukio Takasu, 
“Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security” (presented at 
the The General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, United Nations General 
Assembly, May 22, 2008), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2008/un0805-6.html.
6 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2003, 4.
7 Takemi did not indicate what was meant by “the era of province”, nor did the phrase come 
up again in any of the other texts examined.
8 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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determining or realising the aims of policy. Indeed,  Wittgenstein's argument
regarding the difficulty of identifying a consistent set of commonalities between
all those various things which are called games, serves as a reminder not to be
overly  hasty  in  ascribing  a  phrase  such  as  full-fledged  player with
egalitarianism or equality.9 At the most, it seems that being a full-fledged player
within this game metaphor merely establishes one's access to a particular role in
the game and that the existence of the role is to be acknowledged by the other
players. However, the text under consideration provided no a priori justification
for assuming that the existing rules of  the game could change as a result  of
incorporating new players or that players' relative positions are to be defined by
either  equality  or  fairness;  that  they  have  the  same  rights,  obligations,  or
powers. Indeed, even in a game such as chess, which is sometimes used as a
metaphor for international politics, particularly in reference to the Cold War,10
pieces  have different  powers,  degrees  of  freedom, strengths  and weaknesses
which are stipulated by the rules of the game. Moreover, being taken into the
game  can  be  a  form  of  co-optation  on  behalf  of  the  existing  players,  as
incorporation into it can have the effect of legitimising the game, its rules and
existing players, but without providing an opportunity for new players to change
the  conditions  of  the  game.  As  such,  whilst  the  players  are  said  to  have
diversified,  it  is  nonetheless  not  clear  as  to  what  their  respective  roles  or
authority might be.11 It is clear though – from the text itself – that  relations
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Singapore: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
2009).
10 For instance: Daniel Johnson, White King and Red Queen: How the Cold War Was Fought 
on the Chessboard (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2008); Suzanne Romaine, “War and Peace 
in the Global Greenhouse: Metaphors We Die By,” Metaphor & Symbolic Activity 11, no. 3 
(September 1996): 175; Francis J. Partel, The Chess Players, a Novel of the Cold War at Sea
(Navy Log LLC, 2011).
11 Regarding non-governmental organisations based in Japan, their relationship with the 
Japanese government seems somewhat weak. Whilst there has been an increase in their 
numbers, their influence in setting agendas is limited by their relative short history of 
participation in Japanese politics, limitations brought about by tax legislation in Japan, and
an unwillingness by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give them a role in policy making. For
more detail see Yukie Osa, “The Role of Japanese NGOs in the Pursuit of Human Security: 
Limits and Possibilities in the Field of Refugees,” Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 251–265; 
Kaori Kuroda, “Japan-based Non-governmental Organisations in Pursuit of Human 
Security,” Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 227–250; Mieko Fujioka, “Japan’s Human Rights
Policy at Domestic and International Levels: Disconnecting Human Rights from Human 
Security,” Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 287–305.
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between the various players are stratified.  As an aside,  it  is  notable that the
context  of  human security  is  presented as  being a  game;  a  metaphor which
brings  to  mind  the  idea  of  international  diplomacy  as  the  great  game and
contains  within  it  a  measure  of  cynicism  or  at  least  lack  of  due  concern,
considering that what is said to be at stake in the pursuit of human security is
the future of humankind and its way of life.12 
By  expressing  the  involvement  of  non-state  actors  in  the  pursuit  of  human
security in terms of it being “more and more essential to respect the individuals
[…] as full-fledged players in the game in the so-called era of province (sic)  or
civil society ”,13 the impression is that states have had little if practically any
choice  in  allowing  new  players  into  the  game;  a  conclusion  which  follows
because the text informs the reader that not only is respect of non-state players
essential,  but also that we are in a new  era. The representation of non-state
actors' participation as being essential and a matter of change of era constructs
an image not of states with unlimited choice, but the opposite: one in which
choice is limited because of an inevitable and uncontrollable change to an epoch
in  which  non-state  players  must  be  acknowledged  and  included  into  the
formulation of an agenda once dominated by the state. 
In a similar manner,  regarding the extent to which states have been able to
control  or  limit  the  activity  of  non-state  actors  in  international  affairs,  the
following  example  also  connotes  a  certain  air  of  inevitability  and  state
powerlessness  regarding  non-governmental  organisations'  involvement  in
12 The term 'the Great Game' became popular in discourse on international relations and 
diplomacy after its use by Rudyard Kipling in the novel Kim, although it had already been in
use in the 1830s. If the metaphor was to be taken literally, it would not bode well for the 
realisation of human security, since it is only “when everyone is dead [that] the Great Game 
is finished. Not before”. Kipling quoted in Matthew Edwards, “The New Great Game and 
the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder,” Central Asian Survey 22, no. 1
(2003): 84.
13 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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human security issues: 
Under the existing  international  order,  the state has  been the basic  constituent
component, and within this framework, international peace and stability as well as
economic  prosperity  have  been  pursued,  with  the advancement  of  the  national
interest  as  the key motivating factor.  However,  in  coping with these many new
problems,  it  has  become  apparent  that  this  kind  of  framework  is  no  longer  a
panacea. That is to say, non-state players--for example, international organizations,
NGOs, multinational corporations, and so on--are beginning to play a much greater
role in every aspect of efforts to solve these problems--from information gathering
and  the  enlightening  of  public  opinion  to  the  mobilization  of  resources  and
activities in the field. 14
Because of the use of the passive voice, in which there is no reference to an
agent that may have caused or allowed their participation, the assertion that
non-state players are “beginning to play a much greater role” brings with it the
impression that this role is becoming manifest in spite of, or independently of,
the  actions  of  states.  Discussed in  chapter  three,  a  similar  expression which
hints at the inability or powerlessness of states to deal with change, is present in
Japan's legitimation of the pursuit of human security in reference to the idea
that  states have had to respond to human insecurity because of civil society's
insistence on accountability and transparency.
However,  the  following example  paints  a  different  image in  which non-state
actors have seemingly been incorporated into human security policy through
states' rational, utilitarian calculations, rather than as a result of inevitability or
a lack of choice:
This brings me to the complementary role of non-state actors, that is, members of
civil society who are close at hand and familiar with the specific requirements of
their fellow citizens. They are better equipped to interact directly with individuals
14 Keizo Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International 
Order in the 21st Century” (presented at the Lecture Meeting Hosted by the Asia Society, 
Asia Society, New York, September 1, 1999), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech9909.html.
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to address their specific concerns. 15
The implication  is  that  non-state  actors  are  a  part  of  policy  for  the  specific
reason that they have a superior understanding of individuals'  needs as they
relate to human security, in comparison with the state's own knowledge. One is
left with the impression that after assessing its capabilities and finding them
lacking, the state has chosen to make up for its inadequacy by incorporating
other instruments of foreign policy – in the form of non-state agents – into its
human security policy. This representation of non-state actors as necessary in
realising  human  security  because  of  their  expertise,  adds  legitimacy  to
government policy by creating an image of the state as self-aware, gregarious,
and  willing  to  share  its  power  with  non-state  actors,  all  in  the  interests  of
human  security.16 At  the  same  time,  the  visage  is  problematic  for  the  state
because it  can be  interpreted as  suggesting  that  government has  inadequate
familiarity of the requirements of the people, in comparison to non-state actors,
thus destabilising its claim to primacy as an agent of human security.
The passages above have identified the postulation of both state and non-state
actors  as  agents  of  human  security  in  Japan's  official  texts.  Whilst  the
realisation  of  human  security  is  at  least  in  part  about  the  satisfaction  of
individual  interests,  policy  is  also  sometimes  represented  as  requiring  the
participation of those same individuals:
The objective of human security is to ensure that individual human beings have the
chance to lead healthy lives with dignity and to develop their potential capabilities
15 Yukio Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World” (presented at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, 
Bangkok, Thailand, June 19, 2000), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/speech0006.html.
16 The idea that the Japanese government has been willing to allow non-governmental 
organisations to have a role in the formulation of human security policy has been disputed 
by Fujioka, who argues that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has not been 
“enthusiastic about having NGOs involved in the policy making process regarding domestic 
and international human rights issues”. See Fujioka, “Japan’s Human Rights Policy at 
Domestic and International Levels: Disconnecting Human Rights from Human Security,” 
2003, 290.
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to the fullest extent. It is, therefore, primarily the responsibility of the individual
to do his or her best to overcome any impediment and to try to fulfill his or her
potential to lead a happy life. It is the responsibility of the government, however,
to  provide  a  foundation  or  environment  that  will  enable  individuals  without
restrictions to fulfill their own responsibilities.17
This  excerpt  presents  the realisation of  human security  policy as  not  only  a
matter of state and non-governmental organisations' practices, but also as being
dependent  upon  individuals  working  towards  their  own  human  security  by
maximising  their  potential  for  a  happy  life.  However,  the  fulfilment  of  the
individual's role is dependent upon a facilitation function by the state; that of
the construction of a context in which restrictions to the individual's role are not
present. 
At  the  outset,  the  above  expression  of  human  security  practice  is  notable
because  it  is  different  from  earlier  representations  of  policy,  as  consisting
“primarily of responses mounted at the state level will […] from a standpoint
that  gives  full  consideration  to  protecting  the  interests  of  individual  human
beings”.18 Whilst Takemi's representation of policy as primarily a matter of state
agency does not exclude other forms of actions undertaken by non-state agents
of human security – as there is still scope for secondary responses mounted at
the  non-state  level  –  there  is  a  significant  change  of  emphasis  here;  from
asserting that human security is primarily a matter of  state policy,  to stating
that it is primarily up to individuals to realise their own human security through
their potential to be happy. One of the difficulties in resolving the presence of
both these representations comes from the different elements of human security
which they implicitly highlight. In Takemi's speech from 1999, state policies are
contextualised in reference to a non-specific measure of human security; it is
17 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
18 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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human security in general  which is said to be primarily a matter of state level
policies. On the other hand, Takasu's speech from 2000 brings up a particular
element of human security – human potential for happiness – and represents it
as being mainly reliant upon individuals' own efforts. In light of  the linguistic
and theoretical imprecision evident when these texts are placed side by side, it is
difficult to come to a conclusion as to whether it is the human or the non-human
that  is  to  be  primarily  responsible  for  human security,  or  to  determine  just
which  actions  are  responsibilities  of  individuals  and  which  should  be
undertaken by the state or other non-human bodies.
The  excerpt  above19 frames the  realisation of  human security  as  primarily  a
matter  of  individuals'  effort  to  overcome impediments,  whilst  fulfilling  their
potential for a happy life. However, these objectives are said to be possible only
in an environment, or upon a foundation, in which there are no restrictions to
that fulfilment; and that the realisation of such a permissive environment is a
role  for  government.  Notably,  this  element  of  the  construction  of  human
security  practice  implicitly  invokes  a  distinction  between  “impediment”  and
“restriction”;20 terms  which are  similar  in  the  sense  that  they  both  imply
difficulties,  originating  externally  to  the  acting  subject,  in  the  realisation  of
objectives.  However,  they  also  differ  regarding  the  power  differentials  they
connote between the individual and the state. The use of the term obstruction
suggests a hindrance, albeit one which can be overcome. On the other hand, a
restriction points to a more severe impediment, and it is here that the assistance
of the state is said to be necessary. Whilst humans are ascribed with the power
to  deal  with  impediments to  their  human security,  they require  the  state  in
order to be able to manage with restrictions to that security. However, the text
lacks detail regarding the difference between these two limiting factors, making
it difficult to determine the conditions under which assistance by the state might
19 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
20 Ibid.
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be necessary.  A consequence for the construction of the condition of human
security  as  a  function  of  state  agency  in  the  case  of  restrictions  with  which
humans are unable to cope on their own, is a continuing demand for the role of
the  state  in  the  achievement  of  human  security,  despite  the  presence  of  a
concurrent statement positing that this role is mainly one to be undertaken by
the human individual.
The excerpt above, from Takasu's speech at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on
Building Asia's Tomorrow,21 is characteristic in terms of the lack of clarity that
pervades  Japan's  human  security  discourse;  a  result  of  interchanging
terminology  and  an  insensitivity  to  the  nuances  of  signification  that  were
discussed in chapter four. For instance, the second clause in the above passage
states that  it  is  “the responsibility  of  the individual  to  do his  or her best  to
overcome any impediment and to try to fulfill  his or her potential to lead a
happy life”.22 However, the next clause – which is joined to the preceding one
through  the  use  of  the  conjunctive  adverb  however –  asserts  that  it  is  the
government which should “enable individuals without restrictions to fulfill their
own responsibilities”.23 The problem is that the first clause is based around the
idea  of  the  fulfilment  of  potential,  whilst  the  second  speaks  of  fulfilling
responsibilities. Despite this imprecise use of language, the impression is that
the condition of human security  involves an obligation for each individual to
lead a happy life; although as discussed in chapter two, the discourse does not
elucidate upon the factors which constitute happiness. 
In constructing an approach to human security in which “each one of us […] has
the responsibility to lend a hand so that [policy] aims are realized”,24 and where
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. emphasis added.
23 Ibid. emphasis added.
24 Tsuchiya, “Statement on the Occasion of the International Symposium on Human Security: 
‘Human Security - Its Role in an Era of Various Threats to the International Community’,” 
February 25, 2003.
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“one  sheep's  care  is  all  sheep  (sic)  business”,25 brings  to  mind  the  mutual
surveillance that Foucault brought to light in reference to the construction and
operation  of  J.  Bentham's  panopticon,26 or  that  of  the  omnopticon  notion
related to mutual Internet surveillance.27 With this approach to human security
in  which the  interests  of  the  individual  are  shared by the  group,  one might
imagine that an answer to Juvenal's proverbial question of who is watching the
watcher, would be that all of the other watchers are watching the watcher, as
well as each other. A conceptualisation of human security such as this, where it
is in the interests of the individual to be concerned with the security interests of
all other individuals, works to destabilise Japan's emphasis on the individual
level in policy since an interest shared with all other members of a community is
more reminiscent of an analytical perspective at the group level, rather than the
individual level. Furthermore, this excerpt seems to envisage a form of human
existence  in  which  there  is  very  little  scope  for  privacy,  as  individuals'
livelihoods, dignity, well-being, freedom and other elements of life making up
human security, are conceptualised as being within the sphere of interest of not
only states and non-governmental organisations, but also other individuals. 
Representations of an international community
Aside from participation by the state, the non-governmental organisation, and
the individual, the realisation of human security is represented as necessitating
“the coordinated action of the international community”;28 this is because many
of the problems affecting human security are said to cross borders. Though an
25 Shigeki Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/article0604.html.
26 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Allen Lane 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977).
27 Sarah Elwood and Agnieszka Leszczynski, “Privacy, Reconsidered: New Representations, 
Data Practices, and the Geoweb,” Geoforum 42, no. 1 (January 2011): 6–15, 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.08.003.
28 Keizo Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”
(presented at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, Tokyo, 1998), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html.
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international  community is  invoked  often  throughout  the  body  of  Japan's
human security texts, there is little specification as to its nature or constitution.
Because of the concurrent invocation of numerous forms of agency that are to be
working in the interests of human security, it is difficult to ascertain whether
Japan conceptualises the international community as being made up exclusively
of states, or whether it also includes non-state bodies such as non-governmental
organisations or individuals:
What is required for the 21st century is a clear recognition that the notion that “you
are with us or against us” should be supplanted by a transnational esprit de corps
among nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.
Such transnational alliances between government and civil society are surely the
most  effective  method of  combating threats  to  the security  of  the international
community. 29
In this case, the objective of human security policy is that of combating threats
to the international community, through the combined efforts of a number of
different bodies: international organisations, non-governmental organisations,
nations, government as well  as civil  society. However, it is not clear whether
bodies such as civil society or non-governmental organisations constitute a part
of  what  is  meant  by  the  international  community,  or  whether  they are  just
envisaged as working for its benefit. That certain  bodies might be tasked with
working in the interests of a group to which they do not belong is certainly a
plausible, if utilitarian prescription.30 However, the matter of the constitution of
the international community is muddied if one considers that the beneficiaries
of human security include individual human beings as well; and since human
29 Keizo Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” in 
Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action-Fourth Intellectual Dialogue
on Building Asia’s Tomorrow, ed. Pamela J. Noda (Japan Centre for International 
Exchange, 2002), 44, www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/HealthHumSec/health_takemi.pdf.
30 Indeed, the question of whether civil society is independent or merely serving the interests 
of states, was posed in the context of human security practices in Southern Africa by 
Ngoma, through the words of South African President Thabo Mbeki: “(Does the continent) 
actually have an independent African civil society, because you have civil society 
organisations funded by the Americans, Swedes and the Danes, and the Japanese and so on,
who set agenda(sic)” . Katzenellenbogen cited by Naison Ngoma, “The Challenges Of Civil 
Society In The Discourse Of Human Security In Southern Africa,” Journal of Security 
Sector Management 4, no. 2 (2006): para. 3. 
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security is said to also be about the realisation of individual interests, the logical
conclusion would be that individual human beings are indeed also considered to
be part of the international community. 
As discussed earlier, human security policy is said to exist in a context where
there is a “diversification […] of the players in the international community”,31
and  so  at  least  in  regard  to  some  texts,  it  does  indeed  appear  that  this
international community also includes non-state actors.  Furthermore, speaking
of human security as “a concern of not only states, but also the international
community  as  a  whole”,32 presupposes  an  international  community  which
includes,  but  is  not  limited  by  the  membership  of  nation-states.  However,
Takemi  adds  confusion  to  the  meaning  of  the  term  by  differentiating  the
international  community from  developed  countries,  arguing  that,  “if  the
international community and the developed countries had extended to Somalia
economic cooperation based on the idea of human security ten years earlier, [...]
conflict could probably have been avoided”.33 In other words, the invocation of
both an international community and developed states presupposes a difference
between  the  two  groups,  even  though  the  significance  of  making  such  a
demarcation is not explained. Nevertheless, the phraseology works to create an
image of two kinds of international membership defined according to a state's
characterisation as either developing or developed. On the other hand, a text by
Obuchi implies that for the most part the term international community refers
exclusively to states:
Since many of the problems affecting human security cross national borders, no
country   can  solve  such  problems  alone.  The  co-ordinated  action  of  the
international community is necessary. 34
31 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
32 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
33 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
34 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
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In this excerpt, the impression that international community refers for the most
part  to  states  is  connoted  by  contrasting  the  idea  of  individual  states  being
unable to deal with human security problems, with a co-ordinated international
community  that  will be  able  to  deal  with  them.  Despite  indecisiveness  or
perhaps just a lack of clear language regarding the constitution of international
community, it is the case that invoking such a body as working in the name of
human security, certainly adds an air of consensus regarding both the meaning
of the term and the objectives of policy. This comes about through the framing
of  the  pursuit  of  human  security  in  reference  to  a  co-ordinated,  unified
community of states being in agreement about the idea and how to bring it to
fruition.
Although  non-governmental  organisations'  participation  in  human  security
policy is represented in terms of them being a “credible political and social force
and an indispensable partner in decision making”,35 this image is destabilised
within the same speech, through a form of representation in which the United
Nations General Assembly appears as the place where discussion and definition
of the concept of human security is to be undertaken:
In  the  outcome  document  of  the  World  Summit  in  2005,  our  political  leaders
committed themselves "to discussing and defining the notion of human security in
the General Assembly."36
The  resultant  picture  is  one  in  which,  whatever  non-governmental
organisations' decision making role might be, it does not include participation
in discussions about, nor definition of, human security at the conceptual level.
Moreover, whilst the role of non-state agents in the pursuit of human security is
said to be indispensable, it is still contingent upon the power and leadership of
the  state;  since  “without  the  political  will  and  commitment  of  respective
35 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
36 Ibid.
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governments, there is a severe limit as to what non-state actors can do”.37 As
such,  whilst  non-governmental  organisations are represented as necessary in
the realisation of human security, they are also constructed as being insufficient
for the task on their own or without leadership from the state; thus reinforcing
the centrality of state actors in human security praxis.
Relative positioning of human security agents
As discussed  above,  Japan's  human  security  discourse  invokes  a  number  of
human security agents aside from the state, but it lacks elucidation upon the
form that relations between them should take. Nonetheless, texts do represent –
either explicitly or implicitly – the relative positioning of state and non-state
agents  in  human  security  practice.  One  form  of  representation  in  which
non-state actors are involved, occurs in reference to a recent “diversification and
stratification of the players in the international community”.38 An initial reading
of this assertion gives the impression that recently there has been a decrease in
the homogeneity within this nebulous and under-theorised community and that
there has also been a change in the relations between its constituents; resulting
in a decrease in equality. At least two observations can be made in reference to
this picture of relations between agents of human security; both dealing with
temporality.  Firstly, it is  implied that changes have come about recently, but
there is no reference as to when they are supposed to have happened, or when
they  became  noticeable.  This  kind  of  indistinct  use  of  tense  appears  as  a
rhetorical device similar to one which was encountered and discussed in chapter
three,  dealing with  the legitimation of  human security  policy in reference to
temporal markers and distinctions between the past and the present. Secondly,
one  can  discern  a  tension  in  the  juxtapositioning  of  diversification  with
37 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
38 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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stratification; discernible in the logical incompatibility between the terms when
they  are  positioned  in  relation  to  the  so-called  players  in  the  international
community. The presence of the idea of a recent diversification of players in the
international community works to create the impression that there was limited,
if any, distinction between international agents in the past. However, one would
assume that there must have been at least a modicum of plurality in the past, for
stratification to be possible now; since to speak of stratification – a process –
implies  a  change  in  existing relations.  Furthermore,  the  characterisation  of
relations  between  agents  of  human  security  in  terms  of  stratification  is  in
tension  with  other  representations  throughout  the  texts  where  harmony,
partnership and equality are foregrounded; and notably there is no specification
regarding  the  context  of  stratification.  In  other  words,  whilst  speaking  of
stratification brings to mind a vertical ordering of human security agents, one is
not  told  what  that  ordering  refers  to;  whether  it  is  an  ordering  of  agents'
importance,  significance,  power,  or  influence  in  setting  the  human  security
policy agenda or some other element of foreign or human security policy. 
As  mentioned,  other  Japanese  representations  of  the  relationship  between
various agents of human security paint a picture of them working in a manner
which is energetic and heart-felt and in a spirit of togetherness and agreement.
For  instance,  interaction between representatives  from developing countries,
non-governmental organisations, international organisations, officials in charge
of economic cooperation policies from donor nations, as well as “other people
involved with these matters”, at the "Health Initiative in Asian Economic Crisis:
A Human-centred Approach" symposium, was characterised as being a matter
of “vigorous discussion”, whilst the outcome of these discussions was said to be
“broad consensus”.39 Yet, even though under some circumstances signification
of events as vigorous discussion might imply disagreement or contest regarding
the positions taken by participants in the symposium, that the outcome was said
39 Ibid.
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to have been a  consensus, works towards an image in which the participants'
hard  work,  passion  or  effort  is  highlighted,  whilst  potential  dilution  or
compromise of human security objectives that may have occurred for the sake of
that very consensus, is de-emphasised.
The  representation  of  relations  between  agents  of  human  security  in  the
establishment of an approach to human security in terms of consensus, works to
promote policy through an image of harmony, like-mindedness, agreement and
determination regarding the best way to proceed with human security praxis. It
is  also  interesting  that  consensus  was  said  to  have  emerged,  like  a  natural
process  that  came  about  despite  any  particularities  of  the  actions  of
participants; as if the result was somehow different to a negotiated settlement in
which parties compete to set agendas, bargain with each other, prioritise their
objectives and sacrifice smaller gains for larger ones, use  coercion or pressure
each other to realise parochial interests. Consensus is a notion which allows for
the dispersal of responsibility, since in its presence it is difficult to determine
the locus of particular decisions or initiatives, or to ascribe responsibility for a
decision to a body in particular. Furthermore, it contains a strong legitimation
potential  which  can  be  used  to  reject  charges  of  parochialism  through  the
connotatoin  that  action  is  based  on  and  promotes  a  dispersed,  diverse  and
generalised set of interests that are not exclusive to any one actor. However, the
invocation  of  consensus  in  the  so  called  international  community  is
problematic, even in regard to apparently formal expressions of it such as the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, of which Japan spoke at the 2008
United  Nations  General  Assembly  Thematic  Debate  on  Human  Security.  By
framing the General Assembly  debate as a matter of “our commitment”, and
speaking  of  “availing  ourselves of  an  important  opportunity  to  initiate  […]
discussion”,40 Japan appears to be expressing the views of all of the members of
the General Assembly, through the use of the inclusive plural pronoun our. In a
40 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
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similar  manner,  by  asserting  that  “the  notion  of  human  security  had  been
discussed at the United Nations [and that] the Member States agreed upon a
common understanding on human security by this resolution”,41 an image of a
international  community  in  general  agreement  on  the  meaning  of  human
security, as well as its agenda and legitimacy is formed. This is despite the fact
that  a  closer  examination  of  United  Nations  General  Assembly  statements
reveals significant differences in opinion about both the definition and aptness
of the human security concept and its pursuit. For instance:
The representative of Syria said that […] the human security of individuals could
not replace the security of the State and society, or “govern above it”.
The  representative  of  the  Russian  Federation  said  that  his  delegation  was  not
convinced about the very concept of human security or about the “value added”
that it could have for the work of the United Nations. 
The representative of Venezuela said he had joined consensus, but while progress
had been made towards a common understanding of human security, work must
continue to define the concept,  its  scope and implementation within the United
Nations system.
The representative of the United States [said that] human security was a sensitive
issue, on which there was a wide array of views on what it was and what it was not
and, thus, a shared definition remained elusive.42
***
The  aforementioned  representations  of  policy  in  regard  to  consensus  and
rational  discussion  were  constructed  in  reference  to  the  formulation  of  a
conceptual approach to human security. Similar themes can be discerned in the
context of assertions made in reference to actions that are to be undertaken, or
are being undertaken in the pursuit of human security. For example, the Trust
41 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Resolution Adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly ‘Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome’,” November 9, 2012, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/9/0911_01.html.
42 “United Nations General Assembly GA/11274,” October 9, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11274.doc.htm.
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Fund for Human Security is  said to have been established in order to allow
“governments,  international  organizations,  and  non-governmental
organisations  [to]  work  together to  strengthen  their  responses  to  problems
threatening human security”.43 In a similar vein, a “human-centered approach”44
was invoked in contrast to the so called “theory of state security”,45 in which
competition is eschewed for togetherness expressed in terms of an  esprit  de
corps and transnational alliances:
What is required for the 21st century is a clear recognition that the notion that “you
are with us or against us” should be supplanted by a transnational esprit de corps
among nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.
Such transnational alliances between government and civil society are surely the
most  effective  method of  combating threats  to  the security  of  the international
community.46
The above expressions of solidarity and togetherness between agents working in
the pursuit of human security, function to dissipate the impression that human
security policy is exclusively a state project or that it represents solely Japanese
foreign policy interests. Other variations on such themes can be discerned in
Sato's statement to the Human Security Network:
For each of these policy conclusions,  joint efforts and actions are necessary -  a
network of public, private and civil society actors who can help in the clarification
and development of norms, embark on integrated activities and monitor progress
and performance. Such efforts and actions could create a horizontal, cross-border
source of legitimacy that complements traditional vertical structures. This array of
alliances  could  begin  to  give  voice  to  a  nascent  international  public  opinion.
Human security could thus serve as a catalytic concept that links many existing
initiatives.47
43 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999 emphasis added.
44 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998; Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International 
Order in the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999; Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly
Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 22, 2008.
45 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 44.
46 Ibid.
47 Keitaro Sato, “Statement on the Occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network” (presented at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security 
Network, Bamako, Mali, May 28, 2004), 
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In this case, human security practices are expressed as joint efforts and actions
as well as alliances. Whilst there is an exposition of the actions which are to be
undertaken, the excerpt does not indicate whether all agents of human security
are to do these things, or whether the roles are to be specifically prescribed. At
the same time, the relationship between these agents is expressed as a network.
This is notable because of the different implications of conceptualising relations
as networks, rather than as a partnership, which is discussed below. The latter
term works to form an image of close relations and joint decision making, whilst
idea of a network connotes a looser or more informal form of relations.
Japan  has  also  represented  the  relationship  between  states  and
non-governmental organisations in the pursuit of  human security in  terms of
complementarity; an expression implying harmony, consensus, and a necessary
pairing that makes up the implied lack which would be present if either party
were absent.48 This kind of relationship comes across as justified because of the
apparent fact that non-governmental organisations are “members of civil society
who are close at hand and familiar with the specific requirements of their fellow
citizens [and] better equipped to interact directly with individuals to address
their  specific  concerns”.49 As  such,  the  impression  is  that  neither  state  nor
non-state actors can can possibly fulfil their human security mandates without
each other's presence; an equality defined in terms of essential participation or
presence. However, as with the game metaphor discussed earlier, a relationship
of  complementarity does not necessarily imply equality in terms of the roles,
responsibilities or powers ascribed to either party, because the context in which
the term is used by Japan does not indicate the characteristics or obligations of
the respective, and apparently complementary, roles. Rather, complementarity
only stipulates that both parties are required in order to realise the objectives of
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0405.html.
48 Specifically, Takasu spoke of “the complementary role of non-state actors” in dealing with 
problems related to human insecurity. Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual 
Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to 
Ensure Human Security in a Globalized World,” June 19, 2000.
49 Ibid.
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policy. Interestingly,  the idea that the complementarity of  non-governmental
organisations  contains  within  it  an  “indispensable  […]  decision-making”50
function is brought up in a way which presents Japan as an erudite, rational and
open-minded actor, due its ability to take into consideration the functioning of
non-governmental  organisations  in  political  processes  outside  its  own  local
context; namely, in Korea.51 Paradoxically however, the invocation of a decision
making role for non-governmental organisations in the specific and historically
bounded context of the “evolution of civil society in Korea after the economic
crisis  of  1997-1998”,52 can  also  function  to  provide  an  argument  for  the
suppression  of  such  a  role  for  non-governmental  organisations  in  a
non-historical, present tense or future context. Such a rhetorical turn could be
undertaken  by  arguing  that  a  decision  making  role  for  non-governmental
organisations was only justified under specific, historical conditions in Korea,
but that in current or non-Korean conditions such a role would be unnecessary
or unwarranted. 
Whilst ostensibly consistent with the visions of togetherness and unity in the
relationship  between  states  and  non-governmental  organisations  discussed
above,  and  despite  assertions  such  as  “it  is  important  for  governments  and
international  organizations  to  strengthen  the  linkages  and  cooperation with
citizen's activities to cope with [human security] problems”,53 certain variations
on the themes of joint action are problematic in regard to the implications of
power  inequality  between  states  and  non-states.  For  instance,  action
represented  as  having  contributed  to  the  realisation  of  human  security  –
Japan's  signing of the Ottawa Convention against anti-personnel land mines –
was said to have been the result of “collaboration” between Japan and “NGO
50 Ibid.
51 Did not explicitly indicate which Korean state he had in mind.
52 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
53 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 
1998.
227
groups”.54 Consistently  with  the  tropes  of  working  together  and  eschewing
competition, the form of relationship between Japan and non-state groups is
characterised as  collaboration; thus implying that the impetus for action was
the free will of all parties involved, rather than for instance, coercion or political
pressure. Also of significance to the construction of power relations, is the facile
claim that this collaboration was undertaken by Japan as the sole state, together
with  a plurality of non-governmental organisations. Whilst the text does not
make  anything  of  this  characterisation,  to  speak  of  non-governmental
organisations in the plural form paints a picture that has implications which are
very much in line with the assertion that human security praxis “does not in the
least  diminish  the  significance  of  the  state  as  the  basic  component  of  the
international society”.55 However, this visage of imbalance based on the idea of
the gravity of a single state necessitating non-state protagonists to work as a
group, causes problems for the unproblematic manner in which state/non-state
relations are frequently characterised in ways which emphasise equality whilst
backgrounding their huge power differentials.
Presuppositions regarding the centrality of the state in the realisation of human
security can be discerned in representations which seem to do the opposite; i.e.
to emphasise equality. For example, the  Japanese state – represented by the
Japan International Cooperation Agency  – is presented as having  recognised
non-state  actors  as  partners,  and  as  having  entered  into  a  particular
relationship with them in which the state entrusts implementation of projects to
them.56 Whilst this kind of assertion can work to raise the profile of non-state
actors from a peripheral position, it is also notable that characterisation of the
relationship in terms of entrusting connotes the transference of a mandate and
responsibility  from one  body  to  another,  thus  presupposing  that  one  of  the
parties  has  the  power  to  do  so  whilst  the  other  initially  does  not.  For  this
54 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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performative utterance to be valid, the state must be ascribed with an authority
that will indeed bring non-state actors into the fold of human security practice.57
It is as if the state was bestowing upon non-state actors the right to participate
and take action in the name of human security. To speak in this way gives the
impression of a state-based agenda to which non-states are given access, rather
than an image of partnership based on an agenda for action determined by both
states and non-states together. In other words, whilst speaking of partnership
works to paint a picture in which power and agency imbalances between state
and non-state actors are concealed, to speak of entrusting non-governmental
organisations with a role to play in the implementation of human security policy
counters  the  image  of  partnership  because  it  implicitly  reinforces  power
imbalance and presupposes the power of one side to determine the conditions
under which the other side might be allowed to take part in the realisation of
human  security.  In  a  similar  manner,  Japan's  presumption  that  it  has  the
performative authority to assert that in regard to the health aspects of human
security  policy,  “civil  society  should be  included in  a  process  of  formulating
health policies”, it is implied that the relationship between the state and civil
society is not equal, because only one party – the state – is able to determine the
conditions under which the other party is to be included in policy practices. 58 In
other  words,  the  statement  presupposes  that  it  is  the  state  which  is  in  the
privileged position of  deciding who should  be  allowed to  have a  role  in  the
practices of human security.
Japanese human security texts commonly represent  the relationship between
the  state  and  non-governmental  organisations  in  terms  of  partnership.  For
example, in a speech subtitled  “Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to
Ensure  Human  Security  in  a  Globalized  World”,  non-governmental
57 For more on the presuppositions of various kinds of statements, see Jean-Francois Lyotard,
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, vol. 10, Theory and History of 
Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 9–11.
58 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006.
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organisations were said to be indispensable  partner[s] in decision making”.59
Other  examples  in  which  partnership signifies  relations  between  state  and
non-state agents include:
The UNTFHS60 finances projects carried out by organizations in the UN system,
and  when  appropriate,  in  partnership with  non-UN  entities,  to  advance  the
operational impact of the human security concept. 61
[UNTFHS] Operational projects shall be selected along the following parameters
[…]   Promoting  partnerships with  civil  society  groups,  NGOs,  and  other  local
entities and encouraging implementation by these entities. 62
Partnership, protection and empowerment are key words for human security and
Japan hopes that this new security concept will be widely accepted to meet new
challenges. 63
Partnership  is  presented  in  a  number  of  forms  including  “cross-sectorial
partnership”, as well as in an intra-sectorial fashion which can apparently “take
many  forms  at  the  local,  district,  national  as  well  as  at  the  regional  and
international  levels”,64 although  details  of  these  differences  and  their
ramifications for human security practice were not found in the body of texts
examined.  It  was  also  presented  in  relation  to  “factors  that  determine  the
success or failure of a cross-sectorial partnership”,65 revealing a construction of
partnership in relation to knowledgeable practice; that there are both correct
and incorrect ways to undertake partnership around which a body of knowledge
exits,  although  details  of  those  factors  were  not  presented  other  than  the
invocation  of  a  number  of  so  called  “core  principles  […]  such  as  better
59 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000 emphasis added.
60 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.
61 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for 
Human Security” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 2008), 1 emphasis 
added.
62 Ibid., 2 emphasis added.
63 Sumi, “Human Security and Health,” 2006 emphasis added.
64 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
65 Ibid.
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governance,  community  participation,  the  empowerment  of  individuals,  new
partnerships for development and greater public awareness ”.66 
Partnership relations are also presented as a fundamental form of relationship
between all agents purporting to work in the interests of human security:
Any government must inevitably extend its hand of partnership to non-state actors
including intellectuals, academics, think tanks, community leaders, trade unions,
non-governmental organizations, and members of the business community.67
The presence of  the idea of  partnership  brings  connotations of  equality  and
egalitarianism;  that  associated  bodies  acting  in  the  name of  human security
have a relatively equal role to play and an equal voice in determining agendas
and forms of activity; although as discussed above it  is the case that various
types of relationships can be encapsulated by this term, and thus one should not
presume a priori that an equal partnership is being implied. Framing policy in
terms  of  partnership serves  to  take  away  focus  from  any  parochial  or
self-centred  interests  Japan  might  be  pursuing  through  its  human  security
policy, since being in a partnership is at least in part defined by the common
interests of all the partners. Another problem with Japan's assertion that human
security policy depends on “an equal partnership among recipient countries,
donor  countries,  international  organizations,  and  NGOs  which  address  the
so-called gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance and
so on”,68 is that such themes of togetherness and equality are present side by
side  with  expressions  in  which  the  position  of  the  state  is  prioritised.  For
instance, Takasu implied that the setting of the human security agenda and the
meaning  of  the  concept  are  responsibilities  of  the  state,  through  his
announcement that “in the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005,
our  political  leaders  committed  themselves  to  discussing  and  defining  the
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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notion of  human security  in  the  General  Assembly”.69 Similarly,  in affirming
that it is “primarily the responsibility of the individual to do his or her best to
overcome any impediment and to try to  fulfill his  or her potential  to  lead a
happy life [but that] it is the responsibility of the government [...] to provide a
foundation or environment that will enable individuals without restrictions to
fulfill their own responsibilities”,70 the human individual is implicitly positioned
in a subordinate relationship to the state in regard to the realisation of human
security,  as  was  discussed  earlier.  This  hierarchical  relationship,  which  is
somewhat  at  odds  with  representation  in  terms  of  equality  or  partnership,
works  to  make  the  individual  dependent  on  the  state  because  even  though
people's actions are said to be necessary for realisation of the state of human
security, they are not sufficient on their own. It is only when the state provides
the  appropriate  base  that  people  are  able to  satisfy  the  conditions  of  their
human security.
Japan's human security practice is also depicted as involving “support [for] the
initiatives of people”.71 Here the implied relationship between the state on the
one hand, and people as agents of human security on the other, is characterised
as  being a  matter  of  aid or  assistance.72 As such,  the  impression is  that  the
human security agenda and its pursuit have, at least in part, sprung primarily
from  the  actions  of  the  people  rather  than  from  the  state.  This  image  is
69 For example Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human 
Security,” May 22, 2008.
70 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
71 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
72 Interestingly, through the use of the signifier assistance, the majority of human security 
projects which Japan has funded through the Trust Fund for Human Security have also 
been presented in a way which implies a supporting rather than leading role for Japan. See 
“Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance.html; “Assistances through the 
Trust Fund for Human Security Archives,” accessed July 4, 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/archive.html; “Other Assistances for Human 
Security,” accessed July 4, 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assistance-2.html.
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bolstered by the  characterisation of  people's  actions in  terms of  initiative;  a
form of signification which works to paint people as working for human security
of their own will  and enterprise, rather than being encouraged or led by the
state to do so. Notably, here the representation of relations between people and
the state is different from the form it  took in the above mentioned example
where people are implied as being dependent upon the agency of the state for
their  security.  In this  case,  the act  of representation is  different because the
image highlights the role of the state in assisting the human, which does not
connote as  strongly the idea that people are not able to realise their security
without the intervention of the state. 
In a similar vein, to speak of a “foreign policy that moves hand-in-hand with the
people”,73 is to imply that human security policy is something which is desired
by  the  imprecise  notion  of  the  people,  rather  than  being  an  initiative  of
government or state. Consider the following example:
In accordance with this way of thinking, Prime Minister Obuchi, ever since he was
Japan's Foreign Minister, has been  encouraging the initiatives of citizens for the
creation of a new international order for the 21st century.74
In this excerpt, Takasu speaks of human security policy as if it was designed to
help actions undertaken spontaneously by citizens; giving the impression that
the government's role is that of facilitating a movement – the pursuit of human
security  –  which  came  from  its  people.75 This  visage  presupposes  a  clean
separation  between people  on  the  one hand,  and  the  state  on the  other.  In
reality  such  a  distinction  is  difficult  to  maintain  since  –  for  instance  –
government officials are also citizens of the state and as such also constitute the
people. The representation present here appeals to a common sense imagery in
which  the  state/government  is  a  body  separate  from  that  of  the
73 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
74 Ibid. emphasis added.
75 Note that it was said that it was people's initatives which are encouraged; thus suggesting 
that those initiatives had already been undertaken prior to the involvement of the state. 
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people/population,  allowing  justification  and  legitimation  of  government
regulations  through  –  inter  alia –  popular   elections  or  the  idea  that  the
government is working for the people and in its interests. 
The following excerpt is similar to the preceding one, but it also contains an
implied  meaning  which  actually  runs  counter  to  the  image  of  policy  as  a
response to the initiative of the people:
In  the  outcome  document  of  the  World  Summit  in  2005,  our  political  leaders
committed themselves "to discussing and defining the notion of human security in
the General Assembly."76
On the one hand, the framing of the derivation of a definition of human security
as a matter of political leaders' commitment, invokes an imagery of a public to
which  this  commitment  was  presumably  made.  As  a  consequence,  the
representation of policy – in this case the discussion and definition of human
security – as a result of a commitment to an imagined public, also works to give
an impression that it is the public which has called for human security, rather
than it being a design of government. However, this form of representation is
problematic because declarations about the necessity of discussing and defining
the  notion  of  human  security  at  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly
presuppose that it is still an undefined or incomplete notion. As such, it seems
inconsistent  to  argue  that  initiative  for  human  security  has  come  from  the
people, when the concept itself is apparently yet to be formulated and elucidated
upon in full. A correspondingly inconsistent strategy – which was discussed in
chapter three – can be found in Japan's justification of its moves to take on a
greater role in international affairs. Within one and the same text, it argues both
that its human security practices are part of an overall policy aimed at securing
the confidence of other states, and also that its pursuit of human security is a
response to the international community's calls for a greater Japanese presence
76 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008 emphasis added.
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in international affairs.77 
Of note is the implication regarding relations  between intellectuals on the one
hand, and policy-makers on the other, present in the ascription of a role for the
former which involves the “review and [analysis of] major global trends from a
broad  historical  perspective  […]  to  present  directions  which  policy  makers
should follow in  formulating  policy  measures”.78 Ostensibly,  the  relationship
comes across as prioritising so-called intellectuals, since they are represented as
being a guide for, and source of, human security policy at the conceptual level.
However, it is also the case that the work with which intellectuals are tasked is
presupposed  as  being  rooted  in  a  particular  methodological  framework
consisting of historical analysis, the postulation of international trends, and the
prediction of the future. In other words, whilst on the one hand the work of
intellectuals is said to serve as a basis for the development of a human security
policy and agenda, it is also the case that the way in which they are to work and
the methods that they are to employ are at least in part exogenous to them,
seemingly  having  been  predetermined  by  the  state  at  the  outset.  From  this
epistemological point of view, the impression is that it is indeed the state, rather
than  the  intellectual,  which  is  the  locus  of  human  security  policy  at  the
conceptual level; due to its role in choosing the theoretical and methodological
tools which are to be used by intellectuals working on the idea. 
As far as the representation of relations between intellectuals are concerned,
their practices have been signified in terms of discussion; painting a picture of a
calm,  rational  and  emotionally  detached  group  of  people  gathering
pragmatically in the the interests of human security:
77 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
78 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
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The "First Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow" was held in Tokyo
last  December,  with the concept  of  "human security"  as  its  main  theme.  Many
intellectual leaders from Asia participated in the conference and, recognizing the
realities  of  Asia  in  which  diverse  cultures  coexist,  discussed  their  visions  and
strategies  for  new  development  in  Asia,  taking  "human  security"  fully  into
account.79
Indeed, this detachment is implied in regard to intellectuals' national identity,
since it has been said that:
In order to build such future, that is to say such a "tomorrow," the most important
thing is for the intellectuals to gather by  crossing national borders and sharing
their confidence in the future based on common aspirations emerging from their
intellectual dialogue.80 
In  other  words,  the  determination  of  a  human  security  policy  agenda
necessitates the partial abolishment of national sentiment or the pursuit of the
national  interest  in exclusive terms; an image which is consistent with other
tropes in the discourse which assert that human security policy is not a project
for the realisation of parochial Japanese interests as much as it  is about the
good  of  an  imagined  international  community.  However,  this  emphasis  on
trans-national  sentiment  in  the  formulation  of  a  concept  of  human  security
works  to  destabilise  Japan's  support  for  the  utility  of  national  markers  and
boundaries, implicit in claims that human security is “promoted in full respect
of  national  sovereignty”,81 or  that  Japan does  not  “associate  [itself]  with  the
sweeping  argument  that  human  security  concerns  transcend  national
sovereignty”.82
79 Takemi, “Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in 
the 21st Century,” September 1, 1999.
80 Obuchi, “Opening Remarks at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” 1998
emphasis added.
81 Takasu, “Statement at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security,” May 
22, 2008.
82 Takasu, “Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow: 
Toward Effective Cross-sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human Security in a Globalized 
World,” June 19, 2000.
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The  discourse  also  contains  an  unacknowledged  position  in  regard  to  the
relationship  between the  state  and the  human conceptualised  in  terms of  a
particular  demographic  group. By speaking of  youth as  a  “resource”83 in  the
pursuit of human security, the impression is of a relationship in which, from the
perspective of the state, young people are objects to be used in the realisation of
foreign policy objectives determined exogenously to them. At the same time as
the youth of Japan are positioned as policy instruments, it is also asserted that
“the commitment of the young of Japan is something that we must continue to
nurture”,84 thereby constructing the commitment of  youth as  being inspired,
maintained and promoted through the efforts of the state, rather than as a result
of their own, self directed actions. This image of the state steering the activities
of  young people  towards  the  pursuit  of  state  objectives,  reveals  not  only  an
instrumental and utilitarian attitude towards governance in the name of human
security, it also presents a problem for representations of human security policy
in which the state's role was said to be merely the support of people's initiatives,
rather than that of leading or formulating them. It is worth noting that to speak
of people as resources whose commitment is to be nurtured, is not the same as
talking about support and assistance for people's initiatives. The difference is
that in the latter case, the impression is that the role of the state is only that of
assisting  or  helping  people  achieve  objectives  which  they  determined  or
mounted for themselves. Conversely, in the former expression the connotation
is of the state deciding the agenda and objectives of human security policy and
working in such a way as to encourage people to promote that policy and take
part  in  its  realisation.  Clearly  then,  there  is  a  discrepancy  in  Japan's
representation  of  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  youth  in  terms  of
impetus or motivation for the pursuit and realisation of human security. 
As far as relations between non-human agents of human security are concerned,
themes  of  togetherness  and  congruity  are  likewise  present  in  Japan's
83 Takemi, “Presentation for Session I: Evolution of the Human Security Concept,” 2002, 50.
84 Ibid.
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presentation of a vision for the relations between two diplomatic forums said to
be dedicated to human security; the Human Security Network85 and the Friends
of  Human  Security.86 In  distinction  to  Acharya's  characterisation  of  human
security  as  “not  essentially  a  multilateral  notion”,87 Japan  characterises  the
relationship between these forums in terms of  working together, carrying out
joint activities,  complementing and  supporting each other. Significantly, their
relationship is also expressed in opposition to competition:
First,  the  FHS  is  an  open-ended,  informal  forum  of  representatives  who  are
supporters of human security and willing to work together to make its approach
better reflected in UN activities and to carry out joint activities. The Friends is not
to compete with the Network. Rather, the two groups will play complementary and
supporting  role  by  sharing  information  and  good  practices.  For  instance,  the
initiative by the Network to promote better protection of children in the UN FORA
will receive favorable support from many Friends countries. 88
The  expression  of  relations  between  these  two  bodies  as  not being  about
competition is noteworthy because it brings with it the risk that the objectives of
human security, measured in relation to human beneficiaries, can  come to be
marginalised in favour of the interests of these two state forums. On the other
hand, if competition was embraced like it is in certain  variants of free market
capitalism on the basis that it fosters benefits to the consumer rather than to the
members of the market as a group, one might imagine that the consumer – in
this case those bodies said to be beneficiaries of human security policy – might
receive a better outcome in regard to their human security, as agents such as the
Friends of Human Security or Human Security Network competed with each
85 The Human Security Network is an initiative between Norway and Canada which was 
initiated in 1998 under the name of the Lysøen Cooperation. See: “Human Security 
Network,” The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa, accessed March 19, 2012, 
http://www.emb-norway.ca/Embassy-and-Consulates/norwaycanada/Initiatives1/humans
ecurity/.
86 The Friends of Human Security is an grouping primarily initiated by Japan. 
87 Amitav Acharya, “Human Security - East Versus West,” International Journal 56 (2001): 
456.
88 Yukio Takasu, “What the Friends of Human Security Aim to Achieve -- Measure Progress by
Change in the Lives of People” (presented at the 9th Ministerial Meeting of the Human 
Security Network, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 18, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0705.html.
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other to provide humans with the best service. Such a competitive situation –
reminiscent  of  Waltz's  notion  of  relative  gains89 –  is  feasible,  but  even  if
providers  of  human  security  such  as  the  Human  Security  Network  or  the
Friends of Human Security were to eschew monopolisation and compete against
each other, Japan's human security texts do not ascribe people with the power
to  choose the  nature  of  the  human security  policy  they will  receive  or  from
whom they will receive it, unlike consumers in a free market. Without such an
ascription, neither competition nor collusion between agents of human security
can  guarantee  that  the  interests  of  individual  humans  will  be  prioritised  in
practice.
Whilst Japan's human discourse commonly invokes a plurality of agents in the
realisation  of  policy  objectives,  little  attention  is  paid  to  the  details  and
technicalities of how various agents are to act in relation to each other. One of
the fundamental tropes that surfaced throughout the body of texts examined
was that of the international and interrelated nature of the threats and problems
faced by the condition of human security. This idea is used as a warrant to make
the case for an agent to act to strengthen and coordinate agents working for
human security:
Given the various interrelated problems that now transcend national borders, there
has never been a greater need than today to strengthen and coordinate the roles of
donor nations, developing countries, and international organizations, in addition to
individuals acting as players in their own right. 90
Notably, whilst human security policy extends to include a coordinator role, the
wording of the passage suggests that coordination is primarily supposed to be
undertaken in regard to non-human agents of human security, but not towards
individuals. Directly influencing the activities of private citizens in Other states
would  be  problematic  in  light  of  prevailing  international  norms  of  national
89 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
90 Takemi, “Keynote Address ‘New Forms of Development Toward the 21st Century Which 
Focus on the Dignity of the Individual’,” June 24, 1999.
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sovereignty, despite Japan's ambiguity on this point in its human security texts.
Nonetheless, if private individuals are indeed to have a role in the realisation of
human  security  policy  objectives,  as  Japan's  texts  have  suggested,  some
consideration to how these private individuals' actions affect the initiatives of
donor  nations,  developing  countries,  or  international  organisations  seems
warranted.
It is the United Nations – albeit without specification as to which organ – which
is presented as being most appropriate for taking on the role of coordinator:
Someone  must  assume  the  role  of  setting  an  agenda  for  the  international
community as a whole and coordinating its activities. In my view, no institution is
better  qualified  to  accept  this  challenge  than  the  United  Nations,  given  the
universality  of  its  185  members  and  its  wide-ranging  authority  over  not  only
political  security  issues  but  also  issues  related  to  development,  human  rights,
humanitarian affairs, the environment, and social development in general.91
Placement  of  the  United  Nations  in  this  role  is  justified  according  to  an
apparent  universality based on its constitution by nation-states, although this
universality  only  extends  to  membership  but  not  function  within  the
organisation,  as  debates  about  the  reform  of  the  United  Nations  Security
Council in terms of the fairness of its representation suggest. Moreover, Japan's
invocation  of  a  universality  based  on  United  Nations  membership  clearly
prioritises states in regard to human security policy, since it is only states that
are represented at the General Assembly or Security Council.  Nonetheless, the
relationship between all agents of human security under the coordinating and
agenda setting leadership of the United Nations is represented as being that of
an equal partnership; without acknowledging the possibility that state interests
will receive more attention than human ones, when an organisation made up
exclusively  of  states  is  positioned as  the coordinator of  international  human
security policy:
91 Ibid.
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In responding to these problems it is absolutely essential to provide assistance by
means of a comprehensive approach within a framework of an equal partnership
among recipient countries, donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs
which address the so-called gap between humanitarian assistance and development
assistance and so on.92
***
In conclusion,  this  fourth and final  analytical  chapter  has  focused primarily
upon the textual representation of bodies tasked with realising human security
and the relationships between them. A number of points serving as a summary
can be  made  in  this  regard.  Firstly,  as  far  as  agents  of  human  security  are
concerned the discourse is for the most part silent about the distribution of roles
in the pursuit of human security. That is to say, there is very little elucidation
regarding distribution of responsibilities and delineation of roles in practices
aimed at realising human security. Such a stance makes it possible to construct
contextually  sensitive  responses  to  human  insecurity  as  the  participants  in
human security practices and their roles can be established on a case by case
basis.  On the other hand, it  does not contribute to the transparency of such
practices because there are limited grounds according to which policies can be
assessed in terms of efficacy; a problem which is compounded by the lack of a
concrete definition for human security. As such, human security practices are
open to interpretation not  only  in  terms of  aims and objectives,  but  also in
regard to who is to take part and what their roles might be. The end result of
such a situation is the  potential pursuit of numerous  contradictory  interests –
undertaken merely in the name of human security – by actors who are for the
most part required to work, in the first instance, in the pursuit of their  own
national interests. 
However,  it  was  found  that  one  exception  to  this  general  trend,  of   not
specifying  who  is  responsible  for  what  in  human  security  practices,  was
92 Ibid.
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suggested by the prescription that the concept of human security and an agenda
for its  realisation is  essentially  a matter  for states,  implying that  the role of
non-states is peripheral thus limited to an instrumental role of implementation.
This prioritisation of the state is troubling because it does not acknowledge the
idea that the state is at times a culprit in the emergence of human insecurity and
that non-state actors should be more than just instruments for state-derived
policies and agendas, if they are to offer a critical perspective and contextually
sensitive approach to human security practice. 
Secondly, whilst texts made it relatively clear that non-state agents should have
a part in the realisation of the human security agenda, they were ambiguous in
regard to why this should be the case. The inclusion of non-state agents was
attributed  not  only  to  a  choice  made  by  states  on  the  grounds  of  rational
calculation, but to an inevitable result of circumstances beyond the power of
states.  Non-state actors should indeed have a role in human security practice;
including  the  determination  of  the  meaning  of  human  security  and  how  it
should  be  achieved.  Moreover,  there  are  numerous  reasons  for  why  their
participation is important. These include the potential to offer alternative points
of  view  which  are  not  tied  to  the  national  interest  or  success  in  political
campaigns,  as  well  as  a  finer  affinity  with  and  understanding  of  particular
groups and their specific needs or the forms of insecurity with which they are
faced. However, that Japan's discourse rarely invokes these reasons indicates
that there  is  limited understanding of  the  significance of  non-state actors in
policy amongst political elites in Japan and that their incorporation in policy
rests on shallow foundations which reflect Japan's concern with being seen as a
progressive and modern state rather than being a state which has an original or
novel contribution to make in regard to the theory and praxis of human security.
Thirdly, whilst the notion of an international community working towards the
objectives of human security was prominent throughout the entire body of texts
examined, there was significant ambiguity in regarding the membership of such
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a grouping. Whilst some texts gave the impression that it consists only of states,
others implied that non-state actors are also part of this community, or even
that  individual  human beings  are  in  it.  As  far  as  the  relative  positioning  of
human  security  agents  is  concerned,  the  representation  of  their  relations
vacillated between explicit images of equality, harmony, and partnership on the
one hand, and implications of difference and stratification on the other. This
representational tension is particularly discernible in texts which prioritise the
role of the state in determining the meaning of human security and an agenda
for its realisation, as well as in expressions which ascribed the reason for the
participation of non-states in the practice of human security to a rational choice
by states, rather than non-states. The prevalence of the state in the realisation of
human security could also be seen through the way in which the state positioned
intellectuals as having an important role in the conceptual elements of human
security policy, but at the same time dictating the mode of research that these
intellectuals should use in their work. 
The next and final chapter constitutes a conclusion of the four analytical foci
undertaken throughout the body of this thesis.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
The research reported in this thesis has revealed, analysed and problematised a
neglected aspect of human security: political discourse on the topic of human
security as  constructed,  propagated and main-streamed by Japan.  Instead of
attempting to deduce or infer reasons or causes for why Japan has undertaken
human security practices, the thesis focused on Japan's world view, as reflected
in official  discourse, with an emphasis on a particular element of  social  and
political reality  as inscribed by language: human security. Moreover, analysis
did  not  proceed  with  the  intent  of  ultimately  making  generalisations  about
findings; this approach was eschewed because it was deemed to come with the
risk of taking away from the rich detail, nuance and particularities of the data at
hand. One of the objectives of the form of analysis undertaken in this thesis was
to  uncover  the  details  about  Japan's  world  views – in  the sphere of  human
security – and this included an interest in the points of textual consistency as
well as inconsistency, difference and contradiction. As such, to attempt to make
generalisations about  the  findings would only  efface and trivialise  difference
and nuance; the only advantage of writing about generalisations would be to
make neat and easily comprehensible statements about Japan's human security
discourse, but at the expense of a more detailed understanding of the topic.  
The modest  contributions  of  this  thesis  to  the  body of  knowledge  regarding
human  security  can  be  encapsulated  in  four  points.  Firstly,  a  form  of
conceptualisation  and  analysis  which  had  not  been  applied  to  the  field  of
Japanese human security policy was utilised. This involved establishing – as the
object of inquiry – a body of texts published by Japan, purporting to be on the
topic of its human security policy. These texts were conceptualised as political
artefacts containing linguistic representation of a number of elements of reality
which are associated with the term human security. In  order to uncover these
elements, analysis was organised around four general questions which served as
points of  departure  for  delving into  the  world  depicted by the  texts  and for
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discerning its details. 
These questions – which promote an emphasis on the role of texts and language
in constructing social reality – and the answers to them, make up the second
element of  contribution to human security  knowledge offered by this  thesis.
Addressed in chapters two to five, they represent an opportunity to look at the
act of writing as the researcher's interrogation of Japan's human security texts
and a problematisation of what they profess to know about human security. The
first analytical chapter (chapter two) inquired about Japan's conceptualisation
of the notion of human security. This involved examining the bodies and objects
which  Japan  posited  as  benefiting  from  its  human  security  practices,  the
parameters making up the conditions of human security, as well as the nature
and status of human security as a body of knowledge.  The next chapter was
interested in determining why Japan, or indeed anyone, should be interested in
pursuing and realising human security around the world. The third analytical
focus  involved  looking  at  the  way  in  which  Japan's  texts  represented  and
constructed the phenomena, events or occurrences which have a negative effect
on human security. Finally, the fourth analytical chapter (chapter five) inquired
about  the  bodies  and  agents  which  Japan  has  invoked  for  the  task  of
undertaking human security practices and the relations between them. 
The third point of significance regarding the research contained in this thesis, is
the  form  of  critique  and  problematisation  which  was  applied  to  the  four
analytical pillars identified above. Although the style and form of each chapter
differed  somewhat  because  of  shifts  in  analytical  perspective,  each  chapter
interrogated the political imagery which was found in Japan's human security
texts  in  terms  of  the  structure  and  validity  of  its  logical  conclusions  and
outcomes, differences and inconsistencies between representations of the same
or related discursive objects, ambiguity or tension in representation, ineffective
representation  which  led  to  discursive  formations  appearing  as  rhetorical
figures,  omissions  in  representation,  recurring themes and tropes applied to
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different aspects of human security reality, the ramifications of representation
on human freedom and security and the image of the state.
Finally,  the  work undertaken in  this  thesis  has attempted to add theoretical
rigour, consistency and precisions to Japan's construction of the idea of human
security and to bring attention to the significance that discursive practices such
as signification and representation have on  reality,  the state, policy practices
and  human  activity.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  concludes  the  thesis  by
offering a final overview of the complexity, ambiguity, tension and selectivity
characteristic  of  Japan's  human  security  discourse,  presenting  a  number  of
general observations and drawing implications for future research. 
Chapter  two  –  the  first  analytical  chapter  of  the  thesis  –  began  with  an
examination of  Japan's  discursive representation of the objects  of  its  human
security  practices.  Numerous  bodies  were  found to  have  been  postulated  as
beneficiaries of these practices, including humans, at both individual and group
levels,  as  well  as  the  non-human  bodies  of  the  state,  the  region  and  the
international community. In this regard, Japan's human security discourse is
unique because it  does not focus as strongly on the human individual as the
beneficiary  of  security  practices,  as  do  other  human  security  discourses.
Human security practices were represented as being in the interests of all  of
these different beneficiaries. In principle, there is no theoretical impediment to
postulating such a wide range of objects for human security practice, but two
problems were encountered in regard to this issue. Firstly, there was significant
ambiguity in certain texts as to the actual object of concern at any particular
time because of an unreflective linguistic tendency to interchange human and
non-human bodies as recipients of aid and assistance. Secondly, the discourse
did not indicate a way by which to resolve the conflicts of interests which are
implicit in concurrently situating the security interests of individual humans,
groups of humans, and non-human entities as the objective of policy practices.
Whilst  lacking theoretical  precision and elucidation,  the  positioning of  all  of
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these bodies as objects of security practice functioned to legitimate policy taken
in the name of human security over an exceedingly wide range of objects. 
The  primary  focus  of  the  second  chapter  was  Japan's  representation  of  the
constituent  parts  and  parameters  of  the  condition  of  human  security.  An
extensive  range  of  over  thirty  five  elements,  covering  social,  psychological,
spiritual,  biological and economic fields, was found to have been brought up
throughout the discourse to give the concept meaning. However, most of these
constituent parts were invoked only in individual cases and without definition
or  theoretical  elucidation.  The  state  of  human  security  was  not  represented
merely in terms of the maintenance of biological life or the prevention of injury,
but also encompassed the way in which people's life should proceed or be led.
The postulation of a wide palette of human security variables was found to work
towards the legitimation of a broad range of interventions – by legitimate agents
of human security – in the everyday lived experience of all of those bodies that
fall within the category of the human.
The  three  most  invoked  and  elucidated  upon  elements  of  the  condition  of
human security were found to be survival, dignity and livelihood. However, the
meaning attributed to these three concepts was unstable both across and within
particular  texts.  Textual  representation  of  dignity  was  found  to  have  been
imprecise, under-theorised and ambiguous. The most cohesive expressions of
human individuals' dignity were constructed in terms of the life experiences and
conditions of others and individuals' economic well-being. However, texts did
not indicate the mechanism through which the dignity of the Self could be either
enhanced or eroded by the experiences of the Other. One of the consequences of
this oversight, was difficulty in ascertaining whether all people could achieve an
acceptable level of dignity at the same time, or whether its acquisition by one
person could only be at the expense of another's. Furthermore, a specification of
acceptable levels of dignity was not encountered in any of the texts examined.
The relationship between individuals' levels of dignity was constructed only in
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the potential form, with texts failing to indicate the conditions under which the
Other's life conditions would affect the dignity of the Self.  This dynamic and
relative concept of dignity was posited as being realisable in the future – as a
result of human security practices – but due to a lack of theoretical precision
regarding  the  temporal  delineations  between  the  present  and  the  future,  it
functioned merely to legitimate perpetual human security practices, rather than
to offer criteria for measuring absolute or relative changes in people's dignity.
The  association  of  dignity  with  economic  well-being  was  under-theorised
because no grounds were offered for accepting the notion that an increase in
one's  affluence  would  cause  a  corresponding  improvement  in  dignity.  The
construction of dignity also lacked a specification as to whether it  should be
conceptualised in subjective or objective terms, and means by which one might
measure dignity in either relative or absolute terms were not present in the texts
examined. Consequently, it was not possible to conceive of the situations under
which an intervention in the interests of human dignity might be justified. The
notion of dignity's proximity to the idea of value was problematic because it
ascribed  human  security  practice  with  an  instrumental  character  in  which
individuals'  dignity was a function of their  value to the state.  In light of the
centrality  of  the  notion  of  dignity  in  Japan's  human  security  discourse,  an
interesting avenue for future research might be that of considering the extent to
which dignity pervades or is present in Japan's  general  political discourse.  Its
cursory and inconsistent treatment in the texts making up the body of Japan's
human security discourse – specifically in regard to questions about the point of
view from which it should be conceptualised, how it should be measured or even
discerned  or  how  individuals  might  be  guided to  treat  each  other  in  more
dignified ways – might indicate that dignity is not a particularly salient element
of Japanese domestic political discourse. Rather, on the face of it, it seems that
its presence in Japan's human security discourse is merely the continuation of
an  ongoing  international  trend of  invoking  the  concept  without  elucidation,
rather than an attempt to develop it or incorporate a sophisticated, pre-existing
Japanese version of it within the concept of human security.  
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In comparison to dignity, the construction of life was more complex. One mode
of its representation invoked the activities people pursued on a daily basis, but
without specifying what those activities actually were or if individual differences
in daily behaviour were to be taken into account. A similar form of construction
encountered was one in which life was conceived of as a set of recurring patterns
of daily activity which should not be hurt or disrupted. In this case too, there
was no indication as to what made up these patterns of activity, how they could
be discerned or measured, or what constituted either hurt or disruption to them.
As in the case of dignity, temporal delineations were vague, such that it was not
possible to determine how quickly changes would need to occur in order for
them to be signified as sudden. Life under a human security regime was also
posited  in  temporal  terms;  both  in  the  sense  that  human  security  was
represented as having a positive correlation with one's life expectancy, and that
it was not only the human security of living people which should be of interest,
but that as yet unborn, future generations should be taken into account when
assessing threats to human security. 
Another  aspect  of  life  under  the  conditions  of  human  security  was  that  of
creativity. Although the form that  creativity should take was not stipulated, it
was found to have been delineated according to the prescription that it must be
concurrent  to  individuals  being  happy;  albeit  without  indication  of  how
happiness itself  should be understood or assessed.  Human security  was  also
constructed in terms of people having the freedom to live their lives in a way
whereby  they  could  take  responsibility  for  themselves  and  make  their  own
choices.  However,  texts  did  not  acknowledge  or  deal  with  the  potential  for
situations  arising  in  which  people  chose  not  to  take  responsibility  for
themselves,  decided  that  the  realisation  of  human  security  is  their  own
responsibility  rather  than  the  state's  or  rejected  the  terms  of  state  human
security policies or definitions. The inclusion of these forms of freedom as part
of  the condition of  human security  was  justified according to their  apparent
utility in generating a sort of wisdom which has apparently allowed the human
species to overcome numerous and various – albeit unspecified – difficulties.
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However,  texts  did  not  explain  the  ways  in  which  it  might  be  possible  for
individual choices to contribute to a form of wisdom which is applicable to all
members  of  the  species.  The  freedom  to  participate  in  family  life  also
constituted  Japan's  representation  of  human  security.  Nonetheless,  the
definition of relations making up the idea of a legitimate family life  was not
catalogued despite the fact that some forms – such as nepotism – are generally
decried in democratic societies. Expressions of life as a matter of the freedom to
make choices and be responsible for one's self were found to be dependent upon
the existence of a body which would provide such freedom, thus functioning to
promote  the  continued  role  of  the  state  in  facilitating  individuals'  human
security, even in cases where people did in fact choose to take responsibility for
their  own  human  security.  What  is  more,  postulation  of  human  security  as
dependent upon a form of freedom which necessitates the presence of the state
leads to an unstable version of human security, because it cannot be maintained
in cases where the state might suspend that freedom or change its definition. 
Life was also found to have been positioned in relation to the idea of a vital core;
an  opaque  concept  which  appeared  variously  as  a  non-definitive  point  of
departure  for  the  definition  of  human  security,  as  a  part  of  the  concept  of
human security, or as something which could – in unspecified ways – function
to promote collaboration between states in the pursuit of human security. Texts'
assertions that the vital core should be protected in ways which enhance human
freedom  and  fulfilment  led  to  the  logical  implication  that  this  core  could
conceivably also be protected in ways which do  not lead to either freedom or
fulfilment  and this  was  problematic  in  the  discourse  because,  in  light  of  an
absence  of  further  theorisation,  the  relationship  between  the  vital  core  and
human  security  could  not  be  clearly  pinpointed.  The  ambiguity,
under-theorisation and incomprehensibility of the idea of the vital core led to
the impression that its invocation functioned only to represent human security
practices  as  a  beneficial  and  effective  way  to  affect  some deeply  hidden yet
fundamental element of the experience of human life. 
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Despite being a part of the most commonly evoked elements of human security,
livelihood  was  defined  only  in  terms  of  an  opposition  to  poverty,  with  no
consideration  of  alternative  or  holistic  definitions  of  the  concept.  No
specification was provided as to whether understandings of livelihood should be
determined objectively or subjectively, although the lack of reference to humans'
own  thoughts,  beliefs  or  priorities  regarding  the  meaning  of  livelihood
suggested  an  objective  conceptualisation  determined  endogenously  to  the
human object of human security practice.
Chapter  two  concluded  with  an  examination  of  Japan's  human  security
discourse from an epistemological point of view. Japan implicitly represented
itself as a source of wide ranging knowledge about human security in terms of
history, explanatory, normative and predictive theory, ethics and quantitative
social  science.  However,  non-traditional  forms  of  knowledge  or  personal
experience  did  not  figure  as  components  of  its  understanding  of  human
security. It was also found that texts catered to a particular audience which was
characterised by a knowledge of English and the resources which would allow
access  to  these  texts  through  the  Internet,  participation  in  human  security
themed symposia or conferences organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, or its status as a member of the United Nations or other state-based
organisation.  As  such,  the  human  security  knowledge  which  Japan  offered
through its official documents and speeches was unlikely to be accessed by those
people whose human security was often said to be at stake; the people of poorer,
developing nations where English is not the native language.
An element of scientificity was prevalent through Japan's representation of the
concept  of  human  security;  based  on  the  invocation  of  factors,  probability,
potential,  prediction,  statistical  data  and  quantification  in  talk  about  the
concept. This element functioned to legitimate and justify human security policy
through  the  idea  that  a  scientific  approach  can  offer  truth,  certainty  and  a
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panacea  to  disorder.  However,  the  close  relationship  between  probabilistic
thought and uncertainty – most conspicuous in reference to the idea of threat –
remained unacknowledged throughout the body of texts under examination. 
Economic measurements of human security were made in both absolute as well
as  relative  terms.  The  most  salient  examples  of  this  were  assertions  about
people having to live for less than the arbitrary sum of one dollar per day, and
ones  which  emphasised  the  apparently  increasing  gap  between the  rich and
poor.  Relative  comparisons  were  undertaken  at  both  the  domestic  and
international  level,  but  without  thought  about  how  it  might  be  possible  to
meaningfully compare relative income across political or economic systems on
an international  level.  Postulation  of  absolute  measures  did  not  address  the
issue of just why one dollar should serve as a baseline for acceptable limits, and
the ramification that such a measure is at  odds with the idea that if  human
security is to be measured at an individual level with people indicating what
insecurity means to them subjectively, other economic baselines need also to be
taken seriously if they represent a source of insecurity for particular individuals.
The presence of the concept of human security was represented as the result of
an evolution; giving the impression that human security thought has been the
outcome  of  a  natural,  inevitable  process  based  on  consensus  and  harmony,
rather than as a result of political contest and schism. Moreover, human security
was  depicted  as  an  extension  of  the  notion  of  state  security,  which  worked
towards ascribing human security practices with the same kind of traditional
normalcy associated with the practices of state security. At the same time, the
concept of human security was commonly represented in terms of newness, but
a  lack  of  precision  or  consistency  was  evident  in  regard  to  the  use  of  this
signifier; it having been attached not only to human security as a concept, but
also as a phrase and as a set of practices. Moreover, texts did not explicate the
nature of that newness. Indeed, ascriptions of newness to human security were
problematic  because  the  concept,  as  represented  by  Japan,  shared  certain
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characteristics  with  older  forms of  knowledge such as  political  (neo)realism,
Critical  Theory and feminist theories of international relations. Furthermore,
Japan  destabilised  its  construction  of  human  security  policy  as  new  by
indicating  that  it  was  a  traditional  element  of  statecraft.  Characterisation  of
human security  in  terms of  newness  was  accompanied  by  statements  which
asserted that human security practices are necessary in the present, working to
create a sense of urgency that legitimated the application of these apparently
new security practices. 
Finally  in  chapter  two,  Japan's  human  security  texts  were  found  to  have
represented the origin of ideas about human security in a complex way in which
the United Nations Development Programme took on a seminal role in regard to
a number of different facets of human security. Together with assertions that
Japan's human security thought is closely related to that of the United Nations
Development  Programme,  an  image  was  formed  in  which  Japan's  practices
appeared  as  being  in  the  interests  of  all  states  rather  than  just  particular
Japanese ones. However, some representational instability was also discerned
in regard to the question of the source of human security, due to the presence of
a text which strongly implied that human security was a Japanese concept. 
The focus  of  chapter  three  was  the  justification,  legitimation,  and  reasoning
which Japan has presented for the pursuit of human security. It was found that
over  twenty  distinct  discursive  strategies  functioned  to  cast  human  security
practice  as  legitimate,  natural,  and  warranted.  These  could  be  categorised
according to whether the beneficiary was presented as human, whether reason
or non-reason was used to frame policy, and according to whether the condition
of human security was a means to an end or an end in itself. There was some
tendency  for  legitimation  made  in  reference  to  the  human  subject  to  be
characterised  by  non-rational  appeals,  whilst  that  made  in  regard  to  the
non-human  subject  was  more  often  found  to  be  spurred  on  by  rational
considerations. Non-rational arguments were couched in language that evoked
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beliefs or convictions that the condition of human security is an apt pursuit,
whereas rational  arguments brought to mind calculations about the tangible,
reasonable benefits of policy practices. 
A characteristic tension in Japan's human security discourse was discernible if
one compared two kinds of framing that were found to be present in its texts on
the subject. On the one hand, there were those formations which asserted that
human security should be pursued because it  can facilitate the realisation of
objectives conceptualised with a non-human beneficiary – such as the state – in
mind.  On  the  other  hand,  other  excerpts  promoted  the  pursuit  of  human
security as an end in itself, measured in terms of the interests of the human,
either  at  the  individual  or  group  level.  A  potential  conflict  of  interest  was
inherent – unannounced and unresolved in Japan's human security documents
– between these two kinds of beneficiaries. Its manifestation was likely to occur
in the case of a simultaneous pursuit of human security on its own terms, with
its pursuit as an end in itself. 
As  far  as  the  relatively  sparse  non-rational  justifications  for  the  pursuit  of
human  security  are  concerned,  it  was  found  that  speeches  invoked  needs,
beliefs, convictions, or a heavenly mandate, as well  as normative imperatives
expressed  through  the  auxiliary  verbs  must or  should.  However,  in  these
contexts  there  was  little  explanation for  why  the  security  of  humans should
actually be pursued on its own terms, other than to assert implicitly or explicitly
that it was apt to do so. Moreover, to speak in non-rational and normative terms
about the human security imperative had the effect  of  taking away a critical
attitude  from  policy,  insofar  as  such  terms  represent  unquestionable,
matter-of-fact  and  seemingly  obvious  points  of  view.  Such  a  non-reflexive
attitude was most discernible in expressions which suggested that the pursuit of
human security was the will of God.
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As  a  way  of  legitimating  policy,  the  concept  of  need  was  found  to  have
functioned in reference to  more than one beneficiary.  Whilst  some speeches
spoke of the needs of the people, others invoked the needs of the international
community or states, whilst a third category framed policy in regard to need but
without specifying exactly who it was that apparently needed human security
practices. Moreover, such expressions of legitimation in reference to the human
beneficiary were aimed at both the entirety of humankind, as well at a subset
defined in terms of the severity of their life conditions. However, the discourse
remained  silent  on  both  the  potential  conflicts  of  interests  that  might  arise
between these two groups, as well as on a benchmark by which to judge whether
a person's conditions qualified as severe. 
For the most part, need was invoked without elucidation on its basis or nature;
texts  did  not  indicate  whether  it  was  based  on,  for  instance,  physiological,
psychological  or social  factors and thus it  was not possible to determine the
consequences of  not pursuing human security.  A notable  exception could be
seen in an excerpt which conceptualised needs in reference to state political
legitimacy; explaining the imperative to undertake human security practices as
a way by which to maintain the state's right of being. However, this argument
was found to be circular because it was based upon the presupposition that the
realisation of human security is a responsibility of the state. 
Development  figured  as  a  common  trope  of  policy  legitimation  in  the  texts
examined,  having been applied to  a  number of  distinct  discursive objects  of
human security practice. Regional, economic, and human development were all
brought  up  as  either  the  final  objective  of  human  security  measures,  or  as
processes through which human security could be accomplished. However, a
difficulty regarding the positioning of development as a reason for undertaking
human  security  practices,  was  the  textual  ambiguity  about  whether
development practices were conceptualised as a way by which to realise human
security  aims,  or  whether  the  condition  of  human  security  facilitated
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development  objectives  conceptualised  at  the  level  of  the  state  and
endogenously to the interests of individual human beings. In relation to themes
regarding development, the idea that the condition of human security was a goal
in itself was destabilised through the implicit construction of human beings as
resources which could be utilised in the realisation of state based objectives or
as having value, albeit without specification as to the designs in which people
figured as resources nor elucidation on the nature of the value with which they
were ascribed. 
The promise of a better future figured prominently as a device for the promotion
of  human  security  practice.  One  of  the  ways  it  functioned  was  through the
creation  of  an  image  of  foresight,  planning  and  certainty  around  policy
practices,  as  well  as  by  highlighting  shared  interests  between  states  while
de-emphasising the idea that policy was concerned with realising only parochial
Japanese foreign policy aims.  However,  such formations were found to have
concealed  a  significant  measure  of  variance amongst  states  in  regard  to  the
utility  of  human security  practice or the validity  of  the concept in regard to
norms of  state  sovereignty.  Policy  was  also  promoted  through the  idea  that
human security practices are necessary to create better future conditions in the
interests of both those yet unborn, as well as those already living, revealing a
conservative vision of human nature and society. Another use of temporality
based on the idea of the future, was legitimation based on the notion that policy
should address issues in such a way that current conditions do not turn into
future insecurity. Temporal invocations of the future were problematic not least
because of a lack of clarity regarding the way in which one might be able to
objectively and accurately distinguish the present from the future or the past.
Moreover,  expressions  utilising  the  idea  of  temporality  did  not  include  a
discussion  of,  or  solution  to,  conflicts  of  interests  that  are  inherent  in  the
postulation  of  a  better  future  for  a  number  of  distinct  beneficiaries  which
included  the  individual,  society,  future  generations,  or  the  international
community. The use of the idea of a better future as a way to spur on human
security  policy  was  also  problematic  because  this  image  was  sometimes
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constructed in terms of hierarchical relations between agents of human security,
whilst at other times it was represented in terms of an absence of stratification
between them. 
The rationalisation of policy in reference to an idealised future was discussed in
relation  to  a  number  of  other  tropes  that  functioned  to  provide  reasonable
grounding for the pursuit of human security. One of these was the promise of a
new international order or system. This trope was problematic because it was
not accompanied by a specific consideration of the perspective from which order
was  being  conceptualised,  what  its  component  parts  were  to  be,  nor  whose
interests it served. It was also the case that some expressions of policy in terms
of the realisation of a new order were buttressed through reference to the needs
of  an  opaque,  homogeneous  and  under-theorised  notion  of  the  people.
Invocations of order functioned to add legitimacy to human security practice
through  the  guarantee  of  certainty  and  a  rejection  of  chaos  and  disorder.
Textual treatments of international order were contradictory in regard to the
direction  of  causality  because  they  tended  to  vacillate  between  a
conceptualisation of human security as a result of international order and one in
which human security was itself the condition of this order. 
Expressions regarding the future  benefits  of  pursuing human security in the
present were also constructed in terms of its apparent utility in generating a
form of  wisdom which has  historically  allowed all  of  humanity  to  overcome
various problems, albeit without specification as to how this wisdom could be
shared or what those various problems have been. In this case, human security
was also partially defined in terms of people's freedom to take responsibility for
themselves  and  to  live  creative  and  meaningful  lives.  However,  such
prescriptions were problematic because they did not indicate how the potential
for living life in a particular way might become manifest if people chose not to
take advantage of their freedom or potential. Legitimation tropes utilising the
ideas of freedom, wisdom, and potential relied on the invocation of the idea of
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human  history,  but  just  as  notions  regarding  the  future  were  imprecise  in
reference to temporality, the discourse did not indicate which particular periods
of history were being conceptualised, nor whose history was of interest. As such,
they  came across  as  rhetorical  devices  which  worked  to  create  an  image  of
human  insecurity  as  being  a  universal  problem,  rather  than  as  theoretical
clarifications  about  the  meaning  of  human  security  or  its  normative
underpinnings. Fulfilment was also found to be amongst the constructs used in
the context of a better future, but without specification as to its precise meaning
or ways in which to differentiate so-called  long term fulfilment from short or
medium term fulfilment. 
A commonly encountered implicit argument for the pursuit of human security
was discernible in frequent connotations of international and domestic norms,
as well as consensus within an imagined international community. It was found
that despite invoking human security activities of non-state actors in order to
support  the  argument  that  human  security  praxis  is  already a  legitimate
international  norm,  their  role  was  often  constructed  in  terms  of  the
implementation and realisation of  state derived human security  aims,  rather
than as a non-instrumental one that might include a part to play in defining the
concept  or  setting  policy  agendas.  Moreover,  particularly  in  reference  to
utterances  by the  Secretary-General  of  the  United Nations,  texts  created the
impression that not only was policy a norm of international behaviour, but also
a responsibility or calling; that its pursuit is a matter more of necessity than of
choice.  However,  whilst  reasoning  couched  in  international  norms  and
consensus necessitated the invocation of an international community, as with
the  case  of  the  representation of  practice  in  terms  of  shared  interests,  such
utterances  were  very  rarely  accompanied  by  acknowledgement  of  a  lack  of
agreement amongst states regarding the meaning of human security, or whether
it should even be a part of states' foreign policies. 
The construction of human security praxis in terms of an apparent orthodoxy
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within the international community was reinforced in a facile manner by an idea
which  is  prevalent  not  only  in  Japan's  human  security  texts,  but  in  many
discourses on the topic: that the post-Cold War period has seen an increase in
intra-state  conflict,  as  compared  to  inter-state  conflict.  Irrespective  of  the
verisimilitude of this claim in quantitative terms, its invocation was problematic
because  it  did  not  logically  support  Japan's  implicit  position  that  human
security  measures  should  be  undertaken  by  states  beyond  their  sovereign
borders. This argument was found to have been supported by an assumption of
trust and goodwill between states, as well as international relations defined by
states'  willingness  to  have  other  states  fulfil  their  responsibilities  to  human
security when unable to do so on their own. 
It was found that the positioning of human security as an international norm in
order to argue for its pursuit was undermined by representations of Japan as
being a leader in the field and as being particularly committed to it, since such
representations also connoted the idea human security is not yet an established
norm  of  international  conduct.  Other  forms  of  human  security  legitimation
found in the discourse – also constructed in terms of international norms –
were that Japan pursues human security in part because of similar assistance it
had itself received in the past, and that human security policy is a responsibility
and obligation of all states. Japan was found to be ascribed with a particular
obligation in this regard. However, texts did not indicate the genealogy of this
sense of responsibility, nor why it should be more pronounced in Japan's case.
Rationalisation of human security practice in reference to international norms
demonstrated a strong tendency to promote the idea that policy was primarily
about objectives conceptualised in the interests of the non-human international
community,  posing  problems  for  alternative  formations  which  prioritised
human security as an end in itself. 
Egalitarianism and fairness both figured as prominent themes which functioned
to  justify  human  security  praxis.  Egalitarianism  was  most  prominent  in
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invocations  of  the  effects  of  globalisation,  where  it  was  argued  that  human
security  practice  was  warranted  because  it  could  counteract  some  of  the
negative  effects  of  globalisation  in  the  economic  sphere.  Globalisation  was
generally  framed in  positive  terms  throughout  the  discourse,  although some
ambiguity regarding its status could be discerned in fragments which implicitly
ascribed  it  with  a  causal  role  in  the  genesis  of  human  insecurity.  Textual
treatment of the effects of globalisation was problematic from a linguistic point
of  view,  with  a  measure  of  incoherence  regarding  the  constitution  of  the
so-called  global village;  a construct which served as the beneficiary of human
security practices said to be undertaken in the name of egalitarianism. Similarly
to the case of egalitarianism as a justificatory device, humanitarianism was also
invoked with a discernible lack of clarity because it functioned to both legitimate
and de-legitimise human security policy. The problem was that despite claiming
that humanitarian intervention was an unjustified practice, it was also partially
defined in ways which resembled certain elements of human security praxis.
Finally, the prevention of conflict was brought up as a device in the legitimation
of actions taken in the name of human security.  Typically  of Japan's human
security  discourse,  it  was  unclear  whether  human  security  conditions  were
conceptualised as a means by which to prevent conflict, or whether conflict is to
be prevented in the interests of human security. The relationship between the
prevention  of  conflict  and  the  conditions  of  human  security  reflected  a
generalised tendency throughout the texts to focus on prediction and control via
reference to the notions of probability or potential. It was found that some texts
connoted the idea of prevention rather than cure regarding not only conflict, but
international problems in general. 
Chapter  four  was primarily  concerned with Japan's  textual  representation of
issues, events or phenomena which were positioned as being in an antagonistic
relationship with the conditions of human security. However, a large proportion
of these discursive objects were not posited as being in a direct relationship with
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human security; being instead mediated through the probabilistic and uncertain
notions of threat and danger. As such, because the manifestation of threats and
dangers is not definite, they had only a potentially corrosive effect on human
security, although this potential state was not acknowledged in the discourse
and  threats  were  often  spoken  of  as  occurrences  whose  effects  on  human
security were known and certain. However, not all phenomena were signified as
threats; certain ones were implied as having a definite and verifiable effect on
human security through their signification as problems or impingements. From
a theoretical point of view, the texts under consideration were found to have
been impoverished in regard to the mechanisms by which various phenomena
were supposed to  affect  human security,  the  conditions  under  which threats
would  manifest  themselves  into  empirically  observable  effects  on  human
security, the way by which to quantify such negative effects and compare them,
whether various issues affect all or just some of the components making up the
conditions of  human security,  the extent to which the  parameters of  human
security should be affected in order to warrant a response, and whether not only
destruction but merely damage to aspects of human security would be enough to
warrant human security practices. Furthermore, whilst the discourse seemed to
support  the  notion  that  the  categorisation  of  an event  or  phenomenon as  a
threat  to  human  security  was  dependent  upon  the  context  at  hand,  it  was
unclear if such a decision was to be undertaken by the objects of human security
practice – that is, by human beings at the individual or group level – or if it was
the state or other agent of human security which should have determined the
constitution of threat. 
The texts examined were not sensitive to the significance of acts of signification
on the  construction of  social  reality,  nor  their  ramifications  on thought  and
policy responses. The most obvious sign of this lack of textual reflectivity was
inconsistency in the use of terminology and frequent use of synonyms without a
consideration of  their  consequences on meaning or action.  Consistently  with
existing critiques of  human security discourses in general,  it  was found that
Japan's  securitising  treatment  was  under-theorised  in  reference  to  the
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apparently interconnected nature of the vast array of things classed as threats to
human  security,  omitting  to  point  out  the  nature  of  the  connections  and
relationships  between  them,  aside  from  hypothesising  that  they  all  have  a
potentially  negative  effect  on  human  security.  The  declaration  of  an
interconnectedness between problems related to human security was found to
have  a  minimal  explanatory  role,  offering  little  towards  their  prediction  or
control,  functioning  instead  to  open  up  and  legitimate  a  wide  palette  of
phenomena to regulation and control by agents purporting to be working in the
pursuit of human security.
Aside  from  threats,  discursive  objects  defined  by  certainty  and  identifiable
effects rather than only potential ones were also situated as having a corrosive
effect on human security. Such objects included conflict, lack of health care and
a series of unnamed problems which were invoked only through characteristics
such  as  their  ability  to  cross  borders  and  impair  various  aspects  of  human
security.  A  distinction  was  drawn  between  problems  which  affected  human
security directly, and those which had an indirect effect, although there was no
discussion as to the nature of this difference or of why direct threats should be
more corrosive to human security than indirect ones.
Throughout Japan's textual treatment of threats to human security, it was found
that the commonly invoked notion of dignity was conceptualised in a way which
promoted the state's agency in protecting it, thus downplaying the potential for
people to enhance their own dignity by overcoming diversity and suffering on
their own. Whilst a relationship between suffering – albeit in an unspecified
form  –  and  dignity  was  constructed,  there  was  no  elucidation  upon  the
mechanism by which suffering might have a negative bearing upon dignity, the
conditions under which this might occur, or how much suffering an individual
would need to experience before an intervention for the sake of their dignity
would be justified. The lack of detail in Japan's representation of the effects of
numerous phenomena on the parameters of human security had the result of
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leaving open the possibility that empty signifiers such as suffering or dignity
would  be  appropriated  or  redefined  to  complement  foreign  policy  interests
conceptualised with the state – rather than the individual – as the beneficiary. 
Both the end of  the Cold War and the Cold War itself  figured as prominent
themes in Japan's discussion of things which had a real or potential adverse
effect on human security. The end of the Cold War was presented as a singular
point in time that marked the rise of problems associated with human security;
particularly conflict.  Without specifying the kind of  conflict  which was being
envisaged – other than its general negative effect on human security – it was
represented  as  being  the  result  of  apparent  root  causes  located  in  religious,
ethnic  and  racial  issues  which  were  dormant  until  the  catalytic  effects  of
collapse of the Cold War structure.  Despite the significance of the Cold War
trope in Japan's human security narratives, its representation was problematic
because texts conflated the end of the Cold War into one unproblematic point in
time, not taking into consideration continuing international antagonism based
on ideological  differences,  and  connoting that  the  end of  the  Cold War was
perceived and understood universally in the same way. The invocation of an end
to  structure  served  to  open up  a  discursive  space  for  the  pursuit  of  human
security through the promise of a new structure that would bring back order and
stability. The irony that the apparently stable and more secure state of the Cold
War was a result of the conditions of war and perpetual stalemate, remained
unacknowledged throughout the texts examined.  The trope of the end of the
Cold War functioned to add impetus to the pursuit of human security through
the delineation of the past from the present, with the alarmist connotation that
it is now that such policy is particularly necessary. In regard to presence of the
Cold War's end, it was found that the discourse entailed a form of structural
reductionism  which  explained  phenomena  such  as  conflict  not  through  the
presence of dualistic notions about conflict between East and West, but rather
in terms of their absence. 
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Similarly to the notion of globalisation, economic development was found to be
both  a  positive  and  negative  force  in  Japan's  human  security  narratives,  in
regard to its  effects  on the  conditions of  human security.  On the one hand,
together with economic crisis, it was implicated in the rise of human insecurity
by  having  worsened  social  strain,  although  on  the  other  hand  it  was  also
represented as a process which promised a reduction in human insecurity. A
form  of  development  which  gave  due  consideration  to  human  security  was
promoted, albeit without delineation as to what this meant or how it should be
practised, thus failing to resolve potential conflicts of interests between human
security and development objectives. Social strain also remained an undefined
and under  theorised category,  thus  taking away any analytical,  predictive or
heuristic value it might otherwise have.
The  presence  of  globalisation  in  Japan's  human  security  narratives was
characterised  by  tension  because,  whilst  generally  ascribed  with  having  a
positive  role  in  the  accumulation  of  knowledge  pertaining  to  human
(in)security, there was also an implication that it has had an erosive effect on
human security. Globalisation was characterised as an overwhelming, natural
and  disembodied  process  which  has  had  radical  effects  on  the  norms  of
international relations and conduct, and has progressed in spite of any actions
that  states  may  have  been  undertaking  in  regard  to  it.  Thus,  the  texts'
construction  of  globalisation  functioned  to  take  away  emphasis  from  states'
responsibilities for any ill effects it may have had, whilst creating an impression
that human security practices would be beneficial not only in regard to human
security, but that they could also empower states and thus help them to cope
with the changes brought about by globalisation. Representations of the source
of  threats  to  human  security  also  pointed  not  only  to  a  place  within  the
sovereign borders of states, but also outside of them. Threats were ascribed with
the ability to move across borders; for the most part this was said to be a matter
of the movement of inanimate objects,  although an implication that people's
own movement was the cause of their insecurity could also be discerned. The
postulation  of  threats  as  coming  from  both  within  and  outside  of  borders
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logically justified the implementation of policy practices both within the borders
of any state as well as within the borders of other states. 
Poverty was found to have been situated as an important consideration in the
genesis  of  human  security.  However,  the  representation  of  the  relationship
between poverty and human insecurity was characterised by a lack of clarity
that resulted from situating the latter in relation to the former in three distinct
ways.  The  first  way  presented  poverty  as  a  problem which  affected  human
security directly. The second form also established a direct link between the two,
but threat played a mediating role. In the third instance, poverty was itself a
cause  of  only  the  problems  which  threatened  human  security,  rather  than
having a direct relationship with human security. The texts examined did not
elucidate  upon  these  differences  by  indicating,  for  instance,  the  conditions
under which poverty's relationship to human insecurity might change, or how
responses to these three conceptualisations of the relationship between poverty
and human security might differ. It was also found that Japan's characterisation
of people as wanting to obtain medical services, functioned to create an image of
human security health policy as being a necessary response to people's needs,
rather than as an imposition of particular health policies aimed at furthering
Japan's foreign policy interests. 
A number of ascriptions regarding human security threats and problems were
found to be commonly invoked throughout the body of texts examined. For one,
threats  were  said  to  be  of  various  kinds,  thus  connoting  a  wide  range  of
legitimate  interventions  which  could  be  undertaken  in  the  name  of  human
security, as well as creating a sense of urgency through the construction of a
delineation between the past and the present. They were also characterised as
being trans-generational,  thus revealing a conservative facet to the discourse
through  the  connotation  that  neither  future  generations  nor  future  threats
would differ significantly from those of the present. However, this conservatism
was  found  to  be  selective  and  applied  pragmatically,  because  a  difference
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between threats was postulated in terms of a delineation between the past and
the present; with threats to human security being constructed as particular to
present  conditions,  and different  from the threats  of  the  past.  Although the
representation  of  threats  to  human  security  as  new  was  destabilised  by
assertions that human security is a traditional and established part of statecraft,
it functioned to add a sense of urgency and impetus to policy practices. At the
same time, the implicit erasure of differences in threat perception between the
present and the future had the political effect of legitimating the continuation
and perpetuation of human security praxis beyond now and into the future. 
The presentation of human security threats as being of various kinds, existing
now and likely to be present in the future, worked to create the impression of a
human security policy which is important and necessary for the protection and
promotion of the interests of a vulnerable and dependent human being, who is
accosted  by  danger  from  all  sides.  However,  this  visage  of  complexity  and
danger  was  accompanied  by  the  assurance  that  there  is  an  extant  body  of
knowledge  about  human  (in)security,  which  has  been  evolving  and  is  in
continuous development, working to make human security practice appear as
realisable and unproblematic. The presentation of policy objectives as being for
all people worked to buttress the idea that there are various kinds of threats to
human  security,  thus  functioning  to  legitimate  an  extremely  wide  range  of
policy interventions.  
Impetus was found to have been added to long term human security practices
through the signification of threats as critical and pervasive, despite a lack of
elucidation as to what was meant by either of these terms in relation to their
effects. However this discursive strategy was seen to be problematic due to lack
of  acknowledgement  that,  being  only  potential  events  which  may  not
materialise, the categorisation of threats as critical, pervasive or otherwise could
only be undertaken in a hypothetical manner. The representation of threats as
critical and pervasive also pointed to a conservative trend in Japan's human
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security discourse, insofar as a rejection of the presence of critical and pervasive
phenomena or their  effects,  indicated a resistance to potential  change of the
experience of human existence and life. 
Other common characterisations of threat which were found in Japan's human
security texts were those which spoke of them as interrelated, transnational, and
existing in the present. These discursive formations reinforced expressions of
policy which emphasised newness, and worked to support late-Westphalian –
rather  than  traditional  –  notions  of  sovereignty  which  prioritise  moral
principles at the expense of strict adherence to national boundaries. Complexity
of  human  security  problems  and  threats  was  also  a  common  trope  which
legitimated long term and detailed engagement in the pursuit of human security
by states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations, as
well as suggesting the necessity of a coordinating body for these different agents
of  human  security.  However,  this  complexity  remained  under-worked  in
theoretical  terms,  aside  from  its  expression  in  a  dynamic  form  which
emphasised  increasing complexity  and  interlinkage.  Ambiguity  also  arose
because the discourse was indistinct as to whether it was the relations between
problems  which  were  complex  or  whether  the  problems  themselves  were
complex. The framing of complexity was found to support a realist metaphysics
which  privileged  the  idea  that  phenomena  related  to  human  security  exist
irrespective of the discursive reality in which they are constructed. Ideas about
the increasing severity and complexity of human security issues were invoked to
legitimate  and  justify  continued  engagement  in  the  realisation  of  human
security.  However,  ironically  the  idea  that  human  security  problems  are
becoming  more  severe  also  worked  to  destabilise  the  legitimacy  of  human
security practices, because the notion of increasing severity could, in principle,
be a result of ineffective human security techniques. 
The discourse demonstrated a sensitivity to context in the determination of the
events or phenomena which constitute human security threats, by representing
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human security  threat  perception  as  a  function  of  natural  environment,  the
particularities  of  the  object  of  human  security  practice,  and  other  unnamed
conditions. However, because texts did not demonstrate significant theorisation
or conceptualisation of the relationship between context and how it might affect
human  security  practices  or  the  prioritisation  of  threats  and  problems,
invocation of the significance of context came across primarily as a rhetorical
attempt at creating the impression that Japan's human security practices are
not about realising its own parochial interests, but that they are concerned with
the security interests of all humans. 
Finally, texts were characterised by a tendency to represent threats or problems
without  specifying  who  or  what  was  responsible  for  causing  them.  Rather,
phenomena said to be in an antagonistic relationship with human security were
presented as disembodied processes that occurred without the agency of any
particular state or non-state body. It was also found that at times the human
was itself represented as a cause of human insecurity, as well as a victim of it.
Aside  from  one  text  in  which  the  state  and  market  were  said  to  have  the
potential to erode human security if not carefully managed, discussion of the
idea that states might cause human insecurity was consistently left out. 
The  fifth  chapter  –  the  final  analytical  one  –  had  as  its  focus  textual
representation  of  bodies  positioned  as  agents  of  human  security  and  the
relations between them. At the outset, it was found that Japan's human security
texts  invoked a  broad  range  of  agents  –  including  states,  non-governmental
organisations,  international  organisations,  and  private  individuals  –  as
necessary for the realisation of human security. However, discrepancies were
encountered across texts  in regard to the degree of agency ascribed to these
different  bodies.  At  times  the  impression  was  one  in  which  human  security
policy was almost exclusively a state determined and implemented project. This
mode  of  representation  was  found  to  be  problematic  because  it  implied  a
monopolisation of political power by the state and thus limited the possibility
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for  critical  perspectives  on  human  security,  through  the  marginalisation  of
non-state actors' voices in policy determination and practice. Assertions which
prioritised the role of the state also worked to destabilise discursive formations
which  invoked  the  Commission  on  Human  Security  –  a  body  which  has
advocated  the  participation  of  non-governmental  organisations  in  human
security practice – to legitimate Japan's human security practices.
Other  instances  in  the  discourse  appeared  to  advocate  more  than  just  an
instrumental  role  for  non-state  organisations  in  human  security  praxis.
However, it was difficult to come to a definite conclusion as to the way in which
the role of  non-state actors was being envisaged,  because of the presence of
seemingly contradictory assertions in this matter. For instance, the signification
of non-state actors as full-fledged players was accompanied by claims – even
within the  same text  – that  human security  depended mainly  on state  level
responses. It was noted that whilst the use of a game metaphor to describe the
position of non-state actors might have, at first glance, implied equality between
them and the state, there were also games in which the roles and responsibilities
of  participants  were  organised  in  a  hierarchical  manner.  Furthermore,  the
representation  of  relations  between  state  and  non-state  actors  in  terms  of
equality  was  found  to  be  destabilised  by  the  representation  of  the  United
Nations General Assembly as the place for discussing and defining the concept
of human security. As such, despite the use of particular terms or phrases which
implied  the  opposite,  it  was  not  possible  to  conclude  that  Japan's  human
security texts advocated equality between state and non-state actors in regard to
their positions and functions in the practice of human security. 
The reason for the presence of non-state actors in the practice and politics of
human security was also represented inconsistently. Reminiscent of similarly
opaque  pictures  of  the  nature  of  globalisation,  their  participation  was
sometimes said  to be inevitable  and beyond the control  of  states;  a  form of
depiction which also contributed to the legitimation of human security praxis,
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through the construction of a context in which it came to appear as necessary
and  unavoidable.  At  other  times,  it  was  suggested  that  non-governmental
organisations' inclusion in human security practice was the result of a rational
choice  by  state  agents  who  had  realised  that  these  non-state  agents  had  a
superior  knowledge  of  people's  needs;  a  mode  of  representation  which
contributed to the overall promotion of human security through the promise of
efficacy and an image of the state as self-aware and concerned with the security
interests  of  humans,  to  the  extent  that  it  would  admit  its  own  infallibility.
However, both of these images also worked to destabilise the central position of
the state in human security policy, since in the first instance it comes across as
powerless in the face of change, whilst in the second instance it appeared as less
than omnipotent and lacking adequate knowledge of people's needs. 
Other  passages  in  the  discourse  indicated  not  that  the  realisation of  human
security was to be undertaken primarily by either the state or non-governmental
organisations, but that it was mainly a responsibility for each human individual.
However,  expressions  of  individual  responsibility  explicitly  presupposed  a
requisite  facilitation  role  by  the  state,  defined  in  terms  of  establishing  the
indispensable  foundations  which  would  allow  such  a  responsibility  to  be
undertaken  and  realised  by  individuals.  As  such  this  discursive  formation
revealed  a  tension  insofar  as,  on  the  one  hand,  the  role  of  the  state  was
presented  as  vital,  whilst  on  the  other  hand,  its  responsibility  for  human
security was minimised; a position which served to destabilise assertions which
rationalised  the  pursuit  of  human  security  in  terms  of  state norms  and
responsibilities. It was difficult to ascertain the balance of responsibilities for
human security  between the individual  and  the  state,  not  only  because  of  a
shifting emphasis between and across texts, but also because of imprecision in
language use; particularly in regard to the question of what the exact object of
responsibility  was.  It  was  also  found that  formulations  of  policy  implied  an
extension of a panopticon model of state-society relations into an omnopticon
model in which the sphere of personal privacy was severely minimised because
individuals were to be concerned not only with their own human security, but
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also with that of others. 
A  body  commonly  invoked  in  Japan's  human security  texts  was  that  of  the
international  community.  Whilst  it  was  used  to  formulate  arguments  which
legitimated the pursuit of human security in reference to international norms
and  consensus,  as  well  as  being  presented  as  a  legitimate  agent  of  human
security, texts contained little detail about its composition. Some ambiguity was
also discerned regarding whether this imagined body was made up exclusively
of states, or whether non-states were also included in it. For the most part it was
presented as an integrated body, with little mention of differences between its
members regarding the validity of human security as a notion, or the delegation
of  responsibilities  in  its  pursuit.  Its  primary  discursive  function was  that  of
supporting an image of unity and consensus underlying the pursuit of human
security. However, such a visage of a homogeneous international community –
at least in regard to its members' stances on human security – was unstable
because  it  appeared  alongside  complex  textual  formulations  that  shifted
between emphasising equality and stratification in the relations between agents
of human security, 
Texts  contextualised the preponderance of  different kinds of human security
agents in reference to an apparent diversification and stratification of players in
the  international  community,  though  without  elucidation  upon  when  this
diversification  was  supposed  to  have  begun,  nor  with  meaningful  detail
regarding the relations between these different agents, specifically in reference
to human security practice. There was unacknowledged and unresolved tension
between the characterisation of the international community both in terms of
stratification and diversification; the two terms implying contrasting levels of
plurality that had apparently existed amongst international actors before these
two processes began. The characterisation of relations within the international
community as being stratified was not accompanied by clarification as to the
nature of that stratification, and it was problematic in light of the existence of
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alternate  images  which  highlighted  equality,  consensus,   togetherness  and
agreement.
Reminiscent of the way in which the concept of human security was represented
as  having  evolved  rather  than  being  the  product  of  political  contest,  the
consensus said to have been characteristic of relations between agents of human
security was framed as having emerged; implying a natural  and uncontested
process. The representation of relations between agents of human security in
terms of consensus functioned to legitimate policy through an appeal to shared
interests  and therefore connoted a  rejection of  the idea that  human security
practices might be used for the pursuit of parochial state foreign policy interests.
However,  textual  representations  of  consensus  or  mutual  understanding
between states on the topic of human security did not elucidate upon differences
of opinion between them regarding the meaning of the concept nor the lack of a
common position on whether human security contains any added value for the
United Nations as a whole.
Relations between agents of human security were most commonly represented
in terms of complementarity, consensus, alliance, togetherness, esprit de corps,
and agreement regarding the formulation of an approach to human security, as
well as in regard to actions that have been taken or are to be taken in its pursuit.
Whilst  some detail  was  presented  regarding the  actions  that  various  human
security agents are to undertake together, it was not clear whether in practice all
agents  should  be  involved,  or  whether  the  roles  were  to  be  specifically
delineated. A measure of ambiguity regarding the nature of relations between
different agents of human security was also found through signification of them
as a network on the one hand, and partnership on the other. Whilst featuring
prominently in the texts examined, the signification of relations between agents
of human security in terms of partnership was problematic because there was
no elaboration on the meaning of the term and because other passages which
prioritised the agency of the state – by emphasising its role in defining human
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security  or setting the conditions under which individuals  could realise their
own human security – undermined the egalitarian underpinnings of the idea of
partnership.  It  was  also  found that  expressions  about  the  relations  between
state  and  non-state  agents  of  human  security  in  terms  of  complementarity
worked at a rhetorical level to connote equality, but that at the same time this
mode of representation guaranteed only the inclusion of both kinds of agents in
the realisation of human security, without clarification as to the assignment of
responsibilities.
Invocations of plurality of agents working in the name of human security were
problematic from a technical point of view because little specification was found
as  to  how these  agents  should  act  in  relation  to  each other,  aside  from the
postulation of the United Nations in the role of coordinator. Whilst apparent
universality  in  the  United  Nations  was  provided as  the  primary  warrant  for
suggesting this leadership role, there was no discussion as to potential conflicts
of interest in the organisation based on power inequalities. Moreover, to base
human security legitimacy on the apparent universality of the United Nations
also worked to prioritise state interests, thus undermining expressions of policy
in which state and non-state agents were said to be in an equal partnership. 
Some texts were found to construct the state as significantly more influential
and powerful than non-state agents in regard to human security practices. The
representation of  Japan's signing of  the Ottawa convention as a result  of  its
collaboration  with  non-governmental  organisations  connoted  cooperative
relations between  states and non-states in the pursuit of human security, but
also implied an imbalance of power by highlighting the fact that a plurality of
non-governmental organisations was required to affect state policy. Similarly, to
speak of states as  recognising the importance of non-state actors connoted a
power  differential  which  favours  states,  by  positioning  them  as  having  the
performative  authority  to  incorporate  non-state  actors  in  policy  design  or
implementation. 
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Japan's  human  security  activity  was  found  to  be  commonly  expressed  as
assistance,  aid  or  support;  both  in  relation  to  state  beneficiaries  as  well  as
human ones. Rather than constructing an image in which policy was designed
and  initiated  by  Japan  in  its  own  interests,  this  mode  of  representation
functioned to make policy appear like something which was initiated either by
the people or other states which had requested Japan's assistance because of an
inability to guarantee the human security of their citizens. In a related vein, it
was found that some texts invoked the notion of a public body that desired an
enhancement of human security, and to which the state has a responsibility or
obligation. However, this visage of the public wanting the state to undertake
human security in its interests was undermined by representations of human
security which suggested or implied that the concept was yet underdeveloped or
not  fully  defined.  Expressions  of  human  security  practice  as  a  response  to
people's needs were also disturbed by a passage which connoted the initiative of
the state rather than the people, through the idea that individuals are resources
for the policy designs of state. In a similar manner, the monopoly of the state in
determining the agenda of human security policy was found to underwrite an
assertion which, on the face of it, suggested that the derivation of the concept of
human security is a task of intellectuals who should advise the state on the way
to  undertake  human security  practices.  However,  a  close  reading  revealed  a
tension  in  this  form or  representing  the  relationship  between  the  state  and
intellectuals, because it  appeared that the research methods which should be
used by intellectuals were dictated by the state. 
As the findings outlined above indicate,  Japan's human security discourse is
characterised by omissions, silences, ambiguities, contradictions and variations
in  representation.  One  of  the  implications  of  this  characterisation  is  the
continued marginalisation of the human security discourse by scholars in the
field  of  security  studies.  Simply  stated,  the  concept  of  human  security  –  as
articulated  by  Japan  –  does  not  come  across  as  theoretically  cohesive  or
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sufficiently critical in reference to its own precepts and thus is still unlikely to be
“taken  seriously”1 by  either political  or  security  studies. What  is  more,  the
presence of unacknowledged and unexplored conceptual lacunas means that the
concept is vulnerable to appropriation by various and potentially contradictory
political projects which can fill the theoretical vacuums as they see fit,  thereby
capitulating  on  the  normative  attractiveness2 of  the  concept  whilst further
diluting  it and, in sum, adding to its incoherence.  As far as the conditions of
human security are concerned, the fact that Japan has left so many questions
unanswered can only add to the practical, technical and logistical difficulties of
realising  the  security  interests  of  human  beings  at  the  individual  level.
Irrespectively of whether one agrees with the ethics of pursuing human security
– essentially a biopolitical project of intervention – the fact remains that whilst
the  discourse  constructs  numerous  points  at  which  power  can  be  applied,
ostensibly in the name of human security, it also contributes to the construction
of the human individual as a vulnerable and readily manipulated being. What is
more, the interests of Japan's human security project are compromised because
the very points at which power might be applied are not of sufficient specificity
to prevent various interventions from cancelling each other out and resulting in
either unchanged or even diminished aggregate levels of human security.
Few themes were found to be particularly original, although – taking variation
in to consideration – it appears that Japan's human security vision focuses less
on  the  security  interests  of  the  human  individual  than  do  other  versions.
Moreover,  even  though  Japan's  human  security  discourse  shares  with  other
elucidations  of  the  concept  a  tendency  to  minimise  the  role  of  the  state  in
causing human insecurity, it is unique in attributing partial blame for human
insecurity to humans themselves. 
1 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36, 
no. 01 (2010): 77.
2 Edward Newman, “A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept,” Security 
Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 358–359.
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Future avenues of inquiry implied by the research reported in this thesis include
a closer examination of the ramifications  of interplay between the numerous
elements invoked in Japan's human security discourse, in order to give more
cohesion to the potential of Japan's human security for problem solving and
realising human security. As far as explanatory theory is concerned, it would be
of interest to consider whether there are chronological patterns underlying the
different forms of representation present in the discourse. An analysis such as
this  might  examine  the  extent  to  which  changes  in  the  representation  of
discursive  objects  over  time  has  followed  a  linear  progression,  or  whether
objects' forms fluctuated between earlier and later versions. Another promising
avenue  of  research  would  involve  inquiring  into  the  extent  to  which
representation of elements of human security changed according to the context
– including the audience, venue, time, place – in which speeches were delivered.
In terms of furthering analysis of the  politics of representation, an promising
research programme, and one with significant ramifications on the stability of
Japan's  self-representation and its  ability  to  pursue foreign policy  objectives
effectively,  would  involve  comparing  the  invocation  and  representation  of
elements of international relations ontology between the field of Japan's human
security  foreign  policy  and  other  sites  of  representation  such  as  national
security.
The present work, through its critique of texts on human security published by
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan,  has  endeavoured  to  open  up  this
hitherto  neglected  area  of  critical  inquiry.  By  employing  critical  and
problematising strategies,  which had not yet  been applied to Japan's  human
security discourse, this thesis has found that Japan’s official discourse, covering
the decade of 1998-2008, situated the human individual as just one of a number
of  beneficiaries  of  security  practice,  conceptualised  human  security  as  an
extension of state security and, moreover, was explicitly committed to the use of
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securitisation as a way to influence policy agendas. These and other findings of
this  research suggest  that  the human security  concept has yet  to  distinguish
itself  sufficiently  from  conventional  notions  of  state  security  to  warrant  its
elevated status as a pillar of Japan’s foreign policy, let alone the hallmark of a
new international era.
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